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ABSTRACT 
 
The two most important decisions in the history of NASA after its founding have 
been John Kennedy’s decision to send humans to the moon and Richard Nixon’s 
decision to develop the space shuttle.  This study examines the nature of each 
decision, and illustrates how each decision resulted from a confluence of world 
events, presidential personalities, and domestic political pressures.   
This examination of both primary and secondary historical and policy source 
materials demonstrates that the individual personalities of each president, 
especially how each reacted to domestic and international political and economic 
pressures, played a major role in the formulation of these space policy 
decisions.  Furthermore, the presidential election of 1960 played a critical role in 
determining the focus of NASA's activities from the early 1960s to this day. 
These policy decisions directly shaped the nature of NASA's human spaceflight 
program in the short term, but had unintended consequences in the long 
term.  While each decision produced spectacular results in the moon landings 
and in the space shuttle program, each decision affected NASA's ultimate growth 
and curtailed other space-related projects that had been proposed.   
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CHAPTER I 
THE ELECTION OF 1960 
 
A Tale of Two Men 
America entered the space race in October of 1957 with a shock: global news 
coverage of the successful launch of the Soviet satellite, Sputnik.  Reactions to 
this news around the Western world were nothing short of hysterical, especially 
in the Western press.  President Eisenhower, who secretly launched the 
American space effort in 1955 when he signed NSC memo 5520 outlining a 
civilian American space program largely as cover for a more aggressive spy 
satellite program, had advocated a more moderate space program with a modest 
budget. His proposals instead focused American space policy on ICBM and 
reconnaissance satellite development.  The Sputnik launch, however, changed 
the whole character of the nascent space race, placing it firmly in the context of 
the already full-blown Cold War, at least in the eyes of the press, public, and 
Congress.   
Eisenhower remained reluctant to become involved in an all-out race for space 
supremacy with the USSR, but his hand was forced by political factors, the press, 
and the public, all of which favored a direct approach to address the apparent 
space gap.  The American President favored a more measured response over a 
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crash program, whose high costs were anathema to him.  Because he supported 
a civilian rather than a military response to Sputnik, the Vanguard project was 
given priority over Wernher von Braun’s effort with the Army’s Redstone Arsenal.  
The largely civilian nature of Project Vanguard was a factor in this decision; 
however, the US Navy was involved, as was Eisenhower’s reluctance to rely on 
von Braun and the former V-2 team—he loathed any dependence on a team of 
people he considered deplorable Nazis, which was understandable considering 
his history in the Second World War.  Moreover, Eisenhower was concerned with 
the perception that von Braun’s project implied that America had to import rocket 
expertise from elsewhere.  It was only when the Vanguard test flight failed 
spectacularly on live television that the ever-growing pressure from the press, 
public, and political forces prompted the US to turn to von Braun and his 
German-born team, now relocated to Huntsville, Alabama.  America and von 
Braun answered the Soviet challenge with the successful Explorer I mission on 
January 31, 1958, and the space race was underway.  NASA was formed later 
that same year, launching America’s civil space program under the more modest 
terms that Eisenhower favored. 
A key milestone in the development of the US space program, and one that still 
affects NASA more than 50 years later, was the US presidential election of 1960.  
The presidential campaign and ensuing election occurred at the beginning of the 
US space program, while national space policy was still being debated.  It was 
contested by two public figures who would arguably play the most influential roles 
in the short- and long-term future of NASA, Senator John F. Kennedy and Vice 
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President Richard M. Nixon.  These men both campaigned vigorously for the 
position in one of the closest presidential elections in US history.  Each man 
would serve as US president and each, in turn, would have his presidency ended 
in a national tragedy, albeit one of his own making, in Nixon’s case. 
These two men competed for the presidency against each other by a strange 
turn of fate.  They had each served as officers in the US Navy during the Second 
World War, although Nixon did not see combat.  Richard Nixon served in the US 
Congress as a Representative from California from 1947 to 1950, when he was 
elected to the US Senate, and served as a Senator representing California from 
1950 to 1953.  Nixon left his Senate seat to serve as Eisenhower’s Vice 
President for two terms.  John Kennedy was also elected to Congress in 1946, 
and served as a Representative from Massachusetts from 1947 to 1953, when 
he was elected as a Senator from Massachusetts, where he served until he was 
elected President in 1960.  While they served in the House, both were strong 
anti-Communists and were interested in matters of national defense.  They 
became friends while serving in the House, but this friendship ended during the 
presidential campaign, and in Nixon’s case, turned into hatred after the campaign 
ended in victory for Kennedy.   
Despite the similarities in political views while serving in Congress, the two men 
had drastically different personalities.  Nixon was insecure, secretive, and 
obsessed with the fact that he did not come from wealth and lacked an Ivy 
League education; although accepted at Harvard and offered a tuition waiver, 
family issues forced him to attend Whittier College; he then attended Duke Law 
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School.  By all accounts, Kennedy was a hyper-competitive risk taker who loved 
to meet and be around people and was largely secure in himself; he came from a 
fortune, had a father who had been an ambassador to Great Britain, and was 
educated at the Choate prep school, then Harvard, Stanford, and the London 
School of Economics.  Sid Davis, a reporter who was a friend of Kennedy, 
summarizes the differences between the two presidents: 
I think [Kennedy] was curious about people. . . . If you look at the golfing 
partners and that sort of thing, they were reporters. He had certain 
reporters he enjoyed, [such as] Bill Lawrence of the New York Times, that 
he enjoyed being with. They were invited to the White House. A friend of 
mine, Hugh Sidey . . . wrote for Time magazine and had great access to 
Kennedy. But he loved to have people like that to talk to, and they weren’t 
all successful millionaires. 
If you look at Nixon’s closest associates, they really were very successful 
businessmen. There was a different attitude, different outlook. Not that 
that’s bad. But he was curious in a different way.1  
These respective personality traits played large roles in how they governed.  
Kennedy’s penchants for soliciting the opinions of others and risk-taking informed 
both his personal conduct while President and his decision-making process, 
which was evident in his decisions during the Cuban Missile Crisis and in his 
policy decision to pursue a crash lunar landing program, which we will discuss in 
                                                            
1
 Sid Davis, recorded interview by Vicki Daitch, February 10, 2003, (15-16), John 
F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program. 
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depth in Chapter Two.  Nixon’s desire for secrecy and his tendency to trust only a 
few people contributed to the Watergate scandal and also influenced his space 
shuttle policy decision, which we will examine in detail in Chapter Three. 
One of the great historical ironies involving these two men lies in their respective 
views on space and space policy.  Evidence suggests that John Kennedy did not 
understand space science, nor did he show any curiosity toward the subject; yet 
he spearheaded the largest space project in world history: Project Apollo.  
Richard Nixon, on the other hand, fully understood space policy and exhibited 
this knowledge on several occasions, but single-handedly killed the proposed 
Apollo follow-on projects, such as a moon base, Mars mission, and other 
ambitious space endeavors, and approved a much smaller budget for the space 
shuttle than NASA desired.  How could a President who had little interest in 
space make the decision to pursue NASA’s and the United States’ signature 
space achievement, the moon landings, while a President who was a vocal 
advocate of space exploration end the grand ambitions of NASA soon after their 
greatest triumph, and consign human spaceflight to LEO for the next 40+ years?   
In order to better understand how the Apollo and Shuttle decisions were made 
and how they have affected NASA in the years since, we must take a close look 
at each man, the political environments in which each choice was made, and the 
factors that went into informing each decision.  It is only by doing this can we 
learn how such monumental decisions are made, warts and all, and can use this 
knowledge to make better decisions concerning the US space program moving 
forward.  This study will examine in depth the rationale for each decision in 
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historical context, and will evaluate each on its own terms to determine the 
answer to the question, why was each decision made?  However, before we 
attempt to answer this question by analyzing the individual situations and factors, 
we must first consider how each man viewed space and space policy before he 
became President. 
 
Nixon Before the 1960 Campaign 
From the earliest days of the Space Age, Richard Nixon fully understood the 
implications of the United States’ maintaining a leading role in space exploration.  
On October 4, 1957, the day of the Sputnik launch, Vice President Nixon was the 
first member of the Eisenhower administration to make a public statement on the 
Soviet feat.2   Eight days later, in a speech in Oklahoma City on October 12, 
Nixon restated the Eisenhower administration position when he publicly stated,  
It is obvious that we are behind as far as the ability to launch a satellite is 
concerned . . . but there is a tendency to overestimate what the satellite 
will do in military power.  Russia is not one iota stronger than it was before 
it put [Sputnik] up.  As far as the missile field is concerned, we intend to 
keep the Soviet Union from gaining an advantage, and keeping our 
advantage.3 
                                                            
2
 Emme in Durant, Between Sputnik and the Shuttle, 96. 
3
 Emme in Durant, Between Sputnik and the Shuttle, 96.  
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Under withering criticism from the press and political opposition, the 
administration began to admit that Sputnik had a profound effect on the prestige 
of the US with respect to the USSR.  In a speech in San Francisco on October 
15, Nixon continued his role as the public mouthpiece for US space efforts by 
stating,  
We could make no greater mistake than to brush off this event as a 
scientific stunt of more significance to the man on the moon than to men 
on Earth.  We have had a grim warning and a timely reminder of truth; we 
must never overlook that the Soviet Union has developed a scientific and 
industrial capacity of great magnitude.4 
This suggests that the administration was beginning to recognize the geopolitical 
implications of the Sputnik launch (and by extension, Soviet space/military 
capabilities) as a threat to the US.  Moreover, they suspected a domestic threat 
to the administration.   A later speech given in Pasadena in early February of 
1958 seems to imply that Nixon not only understood the geopolitical and policy 
implications of space, but that he might have taken a personal interest in the 
space program; he told the press that JPL “had not had the credit it deserves for 
its part in the development of the satellite, Explorer.  Insofar as the public is 
concerned, the part played by the Army and its arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama, is 
well known.  I have followed the work at Cal Tech with interest.”5  Whether this 
                                                            
4
 Emme in Durant, Between Sputnik and the Shuttle, 96.  Also Krug, Space 
Politics and Policy, 66, and Krug, Presidential Perspectives, 48. 
5
 Emme in Durant, Between Sputnik and the Shuttle, 97.   
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interest stemmed from a personal or official capacity is unclear, but Nixon clearly 
understood the importance of space to the US.   
A hint of Nixon’s future position on space when President, as well as his 
tendency towards diplomacy, was on display during a speech he gave while 
visiting Moscow in 1959 in his role as Vice President:    
Let us expand the concept of ‘open skies.’  What the world needs are 
open cities, open minds, and open hearts.  Let us have peaceful 
competition, not only in producing the best factories but providing better 
lives for our people.  Let us cooperate in our exploration of outer space.  
As a worker said to me at Novosibirsk, let us go to the moon together.6 
Here, Nixon mentions the “Open Skies” concept that Eisenhower had originally 
put forward at the Geneva Conference of 1955. The proposed policy of allowing 
each superpower to overfly the territory of the other for reconnaissance purposes 
was rejected by Krushchev because of the strategic need for Soviet secrecy; it 
was one of the concepts proposed to enable satellite reconnaissance in NSC 
5520, the original US space policy, as “Freedom of Space.”  Nixon then goes on 
to advocate open cities, minds and hearts.  He seems to suggest here that the 
two nations’ space efforts should make life better on Earth, or at the very least, 
should take equal priority with improving the lives of the citizens.  This impulse 
toward balancing space efforts with social and civil improvement was a key 
Nixonian innovation that is discussed at length in Chapter Three.  It is also 
                                                            
6
 Emme in Durant, Between Sputnik and the Shuttle, 99. 
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interesting to note that here Nixon’s offer of a joint mission to the moon predates 
Kennedy’s overtures to Krushchev by several years. 
The most striking demonstration that Nixon fully understood the political 
implications of the space program at an early date is his testimony, recorded in 
the notes from the Greenewalt Committee meeting held on September 23, 1959.  
The committee, assembled by T. Keith Glennan, the first NASA Administrator, 
and NASA Deputy Director Hugh Dryden, was composed of non-NASA thought 
leaders: a group of five business leaders, five scientists, and two academics, 
Paul Nitze and Walt Rostow.  Charged by Glennan and Dryden with determining 
whether and how to match the Soviet space program (that is, whether or not to 
race), they appointed Crawford Greenewalt, the CEO of DuPont, as the 
chairman.  The committee’s findings are summarized by Walter McDougall in his 
history The Heavens and the Earth, where he remarks that during the meeting of 
the committee in question,  
the debate reached a climax after dinner in the basement of the White 
House.  Vice President Nixon presided.  He had studied and listened 
carefully, and revealed a technical knowledge greater than some of the 
panelists’.  Speaking without notes, Nixon rambled on for forty-five 
minutes, the august audience listening in confusion, boredom, or 
admiration to a man who grasped, rightly or wrongly, the political 
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symbolism of the Space Age.  Politics, thought Nixon, had to rank higher 
than science.7 
In typical Nixonian fashion, he displayed an understanding of how a space race 
would play out on the international stage, and of the role that international 
prestige would play in the years ahead as both the US and the USSR wooed the 
non-aligned nations of the world.  A closer look at the actual hand-typed notes 
from the meeting reveals much more: a snapshot of exactly how Nixon viewed 
space at this time.  Not only did he understand the foreign-policy implications of a 
robust space policy, but he foresaw how it would all play out, within the 
government (both in Congress and in the tension between the military and 
civilian space programs), with the American public, and internationally.  
Responding to the question of “what is the importance of prestige to the US, the 
Vice President answered: 
On the matter of organization, there will be a fight in the Congress on this.  
The Air Force is distressed at NASA attempts to take over space.  They 
will stress the importance of military missions in space.  They will point out 
that it is hard to get funds for pure science.  On the other hand, NASA has 
going for it the tremendous appeal of space.  The space effort should be 
pulled together under one agency.  The type of agency best suited to get 
money would be a combination of military and civilian.   
                                                            
7
 McDougall, the Heavens and the Earth, 204. 
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As between the scientific and political motivations (political in the 
international sense), political implications would rate highest. 
There will be a drive in Congress to make the US failure in space a reason 
to vote for more money for space.  This could result in the overriding of 
budgetary considerations.  NASA should be thinking how more money 
could be spent.  The motivation will be largely the prestige factor, but the 
excuse for action will be military implications. 
[Kruschev’s] current trip [to the US] is having a massive impact.  Even so, 
it is a somewhat transitory impact and covers only one aspect of the 
problem.  The uncommitted nations are thinking about which system could 
produce the best, the most, the soonest.  Sputniks have a tremendous 
impact on the leaders of these nations.  The image of a backward country 
coming up from nowhere has strong appeal.  The 1963-66 time period will 
be critical in international affairs.  The USSR will have moved out from our 
major counter-deterrent.  The eyes of the world will be directed toward the 
competition between the US and USSR.  They will be trying to judge 
which is the system for them.  The question will be how many more USSR 
successes we can stand.  The US is clearly on the spot in this time period.  
We will have to be forthright about our programs.  Our case is going to be 
pretty hard to sell in the face of things Mr. K[rushchev] has said in which 
he has clearly labeled this a race.  This is an issue which will be raised.  
When combined with the missile problem, with the exploding problems in 
the underdeveloped countries, we must look at the 2 or 3 years which 
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could be gained in the space field, not just any 3 years, but as 3 vital, 
important years.   
When the committee suggested that there were priorities other than prestige, 
such as reducing the missile gap, greater foreign aid, and building bigger 
boosters, Nixon agreed and continued, 
But insofar as other areas are concerned, we must recognize that from a 
political standpoint, that space and the new world concept captures the 
imagination.  It indicates power; the people do not downgrade the military 
potentiality of space.  I would hope otherwise, but I do not think this is the 
case.  What are we talking about when we talk about firsts in other 
areas—the cancer cure?  This would have impact.  Nonlinear 
mathematics?—space has it all over both of these from an appeal point of 
view.   
I think we can assume that the next administration, whichever party is in 
power, will have a balanced budget.  As far as additional money is 
concerned, I am afraid that Congress will not put it in foreign aid.  They 
might put it in the military, but I think they will put it in space so that as far 
as priorities are concerned, this is also a fact.  What are the alternatives?  
. . . We cannot categorically say to the Congress that it is not worth it to 
spend more in space.  It is not a matter of what they might do, but what 
they are willing to do.  If I thought that Congress would support a larger 
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program in the foreign aid area—dramatically larger—I would trade space 
for this, but they will not buy it.8            
Nixon’s perceptive read on the politics of space at the Greenewalt committee 
meeting shows that he supported going head-to-head with the Soviets for 
reasons of international prestige and believed that Congress would be ready to 
fund such an effort.  He even understood the romantic appeal of space to the 
human psyche, comparing people’s feelings about it to those associated with 
other potential scientific holy grails, such as a cure for cancer.   
 
Kennedy Before the 1960 Campaign 
By contrast with Nixon’s, John F. Kennedy’s thoughts about space before the 
1960 presidential campaign are harder to categorize.  Few of his public 
statements on the subject have entered the historical record.  Instead, we must 
rely on the accounts of the people who knew Kennedy.  The earliest account of 
Kennedy’s opinion on space matters comes from a friend who knew Kennedy as 
a young senator.  Charles Stark Draper, designer of the Apollo Guidance 
Computer that enabled the moon landings, recounted a dinner in a Boston 
restaurant with John and Robert Kennedy in the late 1950s in which he was 
unsuccessful in winning over the young Senator and his brother to an admiration 
of the wonders of space flight.  The Kennedy brothers “treated the ideas with 
                                                            
8
 Greenewalt Committee Notes, September 23, 1959, NASA History Office. 
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good-natured scorn” and “could not be convinced that all rockets were not a 
waste of money, and space navigation worse.”9  Kennedy’s lack of interest in 
space matters was perhaps due to his lack of knowledge on the subject.  Hugh 
Sidey believed that of all of the issues that Kennedy would later face as 
President, he “probably knew and understood least about space,”10 and Sidey 
considered this a policy weakness.11  Jerome Weisner, who became Kennedy’s 
science adviser, believed that Kennedy had simply not given much thought to 
space before he became President.12   
Kennedy was not enticed by the exotic allure of space travel; the thought 
Kennedy had devoted to space matters as a senator was strictly of a practical 
nature.  Roger Launius describes Kennedy’s approach to space as pragmatic: 
He was not a visionary enraptured with the romantic image of the last 
American frontier in space and consumed by the adventure of exploring 
the unknown.  He was, on the other hand, a cold warrior with a real sense 
of Realpolitik in foreign affairs, and worked hard to maintain balance of 
power and spheres of influence in American/Soviet relations.13 
                                                            
9
 Murray and Cox, Apollo, 45. 
10
 McDougall, Heavens, 302. 
11
 Murray and Cox, Apollo, 45. 
12
 Murray and Cox, Apollo, 45. 
13
 Launius, History, 55-6. 
 
15 
 
This assessment is especially intriguing when one considers that, as President, 
Kennedy employed exactly this type of romantic imagery and emotional appeal to 
sell his policies, which we will explore in Chapter Three.   
John Logsdon’s seminal book on John Kennedy and the Apollo program 
presents a telling insight into Kennedy’s view of the developing space race in 
February 1960.  In his answer to a college student’s letter to him requesting an 
escalation in the US space program to counter that of the USSR, Kennedy 
responded that 
whatever the scale and pace of the American space effort, it should be a 
scientific program. . . . In this interval when we lack adequate propulsion 
units, we should not attempt to cover this weakness with stunts. . . . When 
this weakness is overcome, our ventures should remain seriously scientific 
in their purpose. . . . With respect to the competitive and psychological 
aspects of the space program, it is evident that we have suffered damage 
to American prestige and will continue to suffer for some time. . . . [O]ur 
recent loss of international prestige results from an accumulation of real or 
believed deficiencies in the American performance on the world scene: 
military, diplomatic, and economic.  It is simply not a consequence of our 
lag in the exploration of space vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.”14 
This letter provides evidence that Kennedy understood that the space race 
should be situated within the larger context of the Cold War, and that he was 
                                                            
14
 Logsdon, Race, 7. 
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concerned that we lagged behind in booster development, a point that he would 
repeatedly drive home during the presidential campaign.  On the stump, he made 
multiple claims about a missile gap, which he often linked to space by referring to 
it as the “missile-space problem.”15  Kennedy also came out against the space 
race itself by dismissing it as a series of publicity stunts, and argued that any US 
space program should be of a scientific nature; he felt that any loss of national 
prestige was a result of more comprehensive deficits and gaps, not that we 
trailed the Soviets in space spectaculars.  
Perhaps the most obvious indication of Kennedy’s lack of personal interest in 
space comes from the mouth of Kennedy himself.  In the preface to the 
aforementioned book, Logsdon recounts a scene that occurred in the White 
House cabinet room on November 21, 1962, well after Kennedy’s dramatic 
challenge to the nation arguing that the US should go to the moon.  During a 
discussion with NASA administrator James Webb concerning budgetary matters, 
Kennedy frankly admits, “I’m not that interested in space.”16  This statement, 
taken in light of the epic pro-space public rhetoric and the immense amount of 
political capital that Kennedy risked on the moon landing program, is a stunning 
admission.  The lack of personal attraction to the mysteries and intrigue of space 
exploration places Kennedy’s decision to pursue a moon landing directly into the 
category of a political move, which we will further discuss in Chapter Two.   
                                                            
15
 Logsdon, Race, 6. 
16
 Logsdon, Race, xii. 
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That Kennedy was only interested in space as it related to politics is reinforced 
by Kennedy aide Ted Sorenson, who explained in 1964, 
It seems to me that [Kennedy] thought of space primarily in symbolic 
terms. By that I mean he had comparatively little interest in the substantive 
gains to be made from this kind of scientific inquiry.  He did not care as 
much about new breakthroughs in space medicine or planetary 
exploration as he did new breakthroughs in rocket thrust or humans in 
orbit.  Our lagging space effort was symbolic, he thought, of everything of 
which he complained in the Eisenhower administration: the lack of effort, 
the lack of initiative, the lack of imagination, vitality, and vision; and the 
more the Russians gained in space during the last few years in the fifties, 
the more he thought it showed up the Eisenhower Administration’s lag in 
this area damaged the prestige of the United States abroad.17 
While Sorenson’s statement seems to contradict Kennedy’s view on the scientific 
importance of space that was stated in the letter to the college student quoted 
above, it is clear that Kennedy believed that the subject of space mattered 
politically.  Its symbolic value mattered deeply to the public, both in the value of 
the US space program to world opinion, and in the fact that American 
deficiencies with respect to the USSR in space matters could be used as a 
political weapon against the Eisenhower administration and later in the 1960 
presidential campaign against Richard Nixon.  It is clear that Kennedy had little to 
                                                            
17
 Theodore C. Sorensen, recorded interview by Carl Kaysen, March 26, 1964, 
(1), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program. 
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no interest in space itself before he won the office of the presidency in November 
of 1960.  With this understanding of his views on space, it appears at first blush 
to be very unlikely that Kennedy would spearhead the greatest and most 
expensive space project in world history.   
It is in the context of politics that we can explain how this change occurred in 
Kennedy’s attitudes.  Once he decided to embrace a lunar landing program as a 
political tool, he came to embrace the trappings and benefits of a successful 
space program, such as being in the company of astronauts and sharing in 
NASA’s successes, if not becoming a space enthusiast himself.  Politics can also 
explain how Richard Nixon, who fully understood the implications of space and 
advocated a strong US space program, would later put an end to America’s 
ambitions in space by cancelling the final three moon landings and severely 
curtailing NASA’s ambitious plans at the moment of its greatest triumph, even as 
he personally benefitted from America’s space successes.  It is ironic that these 
two men, who arguably would have the greatest effect on NASA and the human 
spaceflight program for the next 40 years, should meet in the 1960 presidential 
election. 
   
The 1960 Presidential Campaign 
The 1960 presidential campaign was vigorously contested by two former Navy 
officers, congressmen, senators, Cold Warriors, and friends.  As mentioned 
previously, it was one of the closest presidential elections in US history, the first 
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in which general election debates were held, and the first in which television 
played a major role.  The first of the four televised presidential debates was 
watched by an estimated 66 million viewers (approximately one-third of the total 
US population of 179 million), considered by multiple commentators to be the 
most widely viewed presidential debate in history, with a substantial impact on 
the outcome of the election.  Technology had come to influence US presidential 
politics, and this influence has never waned.  Another technology, the US space 
program, played a role in the campaign, although the role of the space program 
was not decisive. 
While the space race had already captured the imagination of the American 
people, by 1960 the initial panic over the threat of Soviet domination of space 
had largely subsided.  While the US still did not have a launch vehicle that could 
match the Soviets’, the US had racked up a series of space successes after the 
initial flurry of disasters and led the USSR in successful missions by an order of 
magnitude.  In his work Defining NASA, W.D. Kay notes that “by the end of the 
decade the launching of satellites had become a familiar enough event (although 
by no means routine) that some of the deepest fears associated with the 
Sputniks had begun to decline.”18    
John Kennedy, as the challenger from the Democratic Party, ran primarily 
against the record of the Republican Eisenhower administration, and Richard 
Nixon, as Eisenhower’s two-term Vice President, was forced to defend 
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Eisenhower while at the same time laying out his own vision of the future of the 
nation.  As the primal fears associated with militarized space receded, the space 
race also began to fade as a political issue; when space was mentioned during 
the campaign, it was typically an attack by Kennedy on what he characterized as 
Eisenhower’s lethargic response to early Soviet space victories, and how this 
perceived weakness affected America’s standing in the eyes of the world.  This 
charge was often leveled in the form of an accusation that the Eisenhower 
administration had allowed the US to fall behind the USSR militarily in what 
Kennedy described as a missile gap.  Logsdon characterizes Kennedy’s evolving 
assault on the Eisenhower space record thus: 
Kennedy said little about space issues except in the context of the linkage 
between space launch vehicles and strategic missile capabilities.  That 
changed once he became the Democratic nominee for President in 1960.  
The growing disparity in global prestige between the United States and the 
Soviet Union under the Eisenhower administration became a central 
theme of JFKs campaign, and the fact that the United States was trailing 
the Soviet Union in space achievement was frequently cited by Kennedy 
as very visible evidence of this disparity.19 
While Kennedy hammered Nixon and Eisenhower for doing too little in space, in 
typical political challenger fashion he never outlined just how a Kennedy 
administration space policy would differ (and certainly did not call for a crash-
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program-level mobilization that he would later advocate as President).  Rather, 
his campaign rhetoric suggested “greater activism in space” without describing 
this “activism” explicitly.20  It could be argued that the accusation of a failure of 
the previous administration and allusion to ambitions in space were just political 
ploys by Kennedy.  There is scant evidence that Kennedy planned to pursue a 
strong space agenda if he won, or pursue a space policy at all.   
Space historians also have questioned the intentions behind Kennedy’s space 
rhetoric.  Murray and Cox note that candidate Kennedy referred to a “space gap” 
along with the missile gap during the campaign, but that Kennedy  
remained silent about what he had in mind for his own space program.  
Many in NASA had hoped for more.  Space flight, and especially manned 
space flight, had the dash and drama that would have seemed to fit 
perfectly with the spirit of the Kennedy campaign.  But Kennedy was only 
being honest.  At that time, he really wasn’t convinced that manned space 
flight had a place in his vision of the New Frontier.21 
There is evidence, however, that what little discussion about the space program 
during the campaign was political posturing, and perhaps even pandering.  When 
Kennedy campaign journalist Sid Davis was asked years later whether Kennedy 
talked about the space program while on the stump, he replied, 
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The missile gap, yes.  He did talk about the missile gap.  He talked about 
the fact that we weren’t as strong as we should have been, that we didn’t 
pay enough attention to the strength of the Soviet Union.  But at this date, 
looking back, I’m not sure I can recall, as part of the campaign, whether he 
discussed the space program in those terms.  He did address it when we 
were in places where [the members of the audience] were involved in the 
space program. 22 [emphasis mine]  
Another instance of potential political pandering (or at least playing to an 
audience) concerning the space program came in response to an open letter 
published in Missile and Rockets, a space industry journal, which solicited each 
of the candidates’ positions on the space program.  In a manner similar to what 
Davis described above, Kennedy responded as follows: 
We are in a strategic space race with the Russians, and we are losing. . . . 
Control of space will be decided in the next decade.  If the Soviets control 
space, they can control earth, as in past centuries the nation that 
controlled the seas has dominated the continents . . . We cannot run 
second in this vital race.  To insure peace and freedom, we must be first. . 
. . The target date for a manned space platform, US citizen on the moon, 
nuclear power for space exploration, and a true manned spaceship should 
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be elastic.  All of these things and more we should accomplish as swiftly 
as possible. 23  [emphasis mine] 
Once again, Kennedy plays to his audience; here he suggests an accelerated 
space program to an aerospace-minded readership.   
During his nomination acceptance speech given at the Democratic National 
Convention on July 15, 1960, Kennedy links space to his vision of the New 
Frontier:  
But I tell you the New Frontier is here, whether we seek it or not.  Beyond 
that frontier are the uncharted areas of science and space, unsolved 
problems of peace and war, unconquered pockets of ignorance and 
prejudice, unanswered questions of poverty and surplus.  It would be 
easier to shrink back from that frontier, to look to the safe mediocrity of the 
past, to be lulled by good intentions and high rhetoric—and those who 
prefer that course should not cast their votes for me, regardless of party.24   
However, despite this campaign rhetoric, the first few months of Kennedy’s 
administration saw no mention of or movement to address the issues of space 
that were delineated so vividly during the campaign.   McDougall also suggests 
                                                            
23
 Missiles and Rockets, October 10, 1960, 12-13. 
24
 John F. Kennedy: "Address of Senator John F. Kennedy Accepting the 
Democratic Party Nomination for the Presidency of the United States - Memorial 
Coliseum, Los Angeles," July 15, 1960. 
24 
 
that this was campaign rhetoric: “For all their ‘space gap’ talk, the Kennedy men 
had little notion of what to do with the space program after election day.”25   
In September of 1960, a position paper prepared for candidate Kennedy by 
physicist Ralph Lapp, veteran of the Manhattan Project, stated that if the US was 
to compete in a space race against the Soviets, it was imperative that the US 
land on the moon before their rivals.  Lapp argued that such an effort would fulfill 
more of a political objective than a scientific one, and that “in the psycho-political 
space race the rewards for being first are exceedingly great,” adding that “there 
was little payoff for being second.”26  Kennedy did not advocate this belief during 
the campaign, or during the first few months of his presidency, but it had been 
suggested by a prominent person connected to the administration.  If Kennedy 
had read this paper, and we have no evidence that he had, he might have 
considered it; in any case, Kennedy’s advisors had it on their mind.  
It wasn’t just Kennedy who made space a campaign issue, albeit in a minor role. 
The Democratic Party was of similar mindset, and the Democratic Party platform 
sought to use what it saw as Republican space race shortcomings as a blunt 
weapon against Nixon.  This was a chance to avenge Republican charges during 
the 1950s that the Democrats “lost China” to Communism and were weak on 
foreign policy issues.  Seeing an opportunity for a reversal, the Democratic 
platform stated, 
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The new Democratic Administration will press forward with our national 
space program in full realization of the importance of space 
accomplishments to our national security and our international prestige.  
We shall reorganize the program to achieve both efficiency and speedy 
execution.  We shall bring top scientists into positions of responsibility.  
We shall undertake long-term basic research in space science and 
propulsion.27 
The implications were that the Republicans had not prosecuted the space race 
against the USSR aggressively enough and had not placed sufficient emphasis 
on international prestige and science.  A later stump speech by Kennedy echoes 
the charge that the Eisenhower administration lost the opportunity to bolster US 
international prestige and presided over a decline in world standing: 
Because we failed to recognize the impact that being first in outer space 
would have, the impression began to move around the world that the 
Soviet Union was on the march, that it had definite goals, that it knew how 
to accomplish them, that it was moving and we were standing still.  This is 
what we have to overcome, that psychological feeling in the world that the 
United States has reached maturity.  That maybe our high noon has 
passed . . . and that now we are going into that long, slow afternoon.28 
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The linking of a watered-down space program to the international perception of 
American decline would again rise to confront the American President in the 
early 1970s, where it was invoked by Casper Weinberger to convince Nixon to 
approve the space shuttle program. We will discuss this rhetorical linkage fully in 
Chapter Three. 
But a decade earlier, Candidate Nixon was understandably very frustrated by 
Kennedy’s accusations of weakness in the face of Soviet space successes.  He 
knew, as Kennedy would later learn as President, that there was, in fact, no 
missile gap.  Nixon, privy to confidential intelligence information indicating as 
much, was prohibited from revealing the truth.  He therefore bristled at the 
suggestion that America was a distant second in space to the Soviets, and 
argued that Kennedy’s claims epitomized “irresponsibility of the highest sort for 
an American presidential candidate to obscure the truth about America’s 
spectacular achievements in space in an attempt to win votes.”29   
This animus took center stage during the final debate between Kennedy and 
Nixon, held on October 21, 1960.  The debate had been scheduled to discuss the 
matter of American-Cuban relations, but the topic of space was pushed to the 
forefront when Nixon accused Kennedy of damaging American prestige when 
incorrectly criticizing our efforts in space and science.  Kennedy denied the 
accusation and quickly turned the discussion to the missile gap and how that 
affected the perception of the US throughout the world: 
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Nixon: Now, when we have a presidential candidate, for example--Senator 
Kennedy-- stating over and over again that the United States is 
second in space and the fact of the matter is that the space score 
today is twenty-eight to eight--we've had twenty-eight successful 
shots, they've had eight;  . . .  that we're second in science because 
they may be ahead in one area or another, when overall we're way 
ahead of the Soviet Union and all other countries in science;  . . .  
when he makes statements like this, what does this do to American 
prestige?  Well, it can only have the effect certainly of reducing it. 
Well, let me make one thing clear.  Senator Kennedy has a 
responsibility to criticize those things that are wrong, but he has 
also a responsibility to be right in his criticism.  Every one of these 
items that I have mentioned he's been wrong--dead wrong. 
Kennedy: Now I didn't make most of the statements that you said I made. 
The s- I believe the Soviet Union is first in outer space.  We have--
may have made more shots but the size of their rocket thrust and 
all the rest--you yourself said to Khrushchev, "You may be ahead of 
us in rocket thrust but we're ahead of you in color television" in your 
famous discussion in the kitchen.  I think that color television is not 
as important as rocket thrust.  . . . What I said was that ten years 
ago, we were producing twice as many scientists and engineers as 
the Soviet Union and today they're producing twice as many as we 
are, and that this affects our security around the world.  And fourth, 
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I believe that the polls and other studies and votes in the United 
Nations and anyone reading the paper and any citizen of the United 
States must come to the conclusion that the United States no 
longer carries the same image of a vital society on the move with its 
brightest days ahead as it carried a decade or two decades ago. 
Part of that is because we've stood still here at home, because we 
haven't met our problems in the United States, because we haven't 
had a moving economy.  Part of that, as the Gallup Polls show, is 
because the Soviet Union made a breakthrough in outer space.  
Mr. George Allen, head of your Information Service, has said that 
that made the people of the world begin to wonder whether we 
were first in science.  We're first in other areas of science but in 
space, which is the new science, we're not first.30   
Space certainly played a role in the presidential campaign of 1960, but it was not 
a major role, and space exploration was largely used as a political weapon rather 
than a serious policy issue.   
The politicization of space during the presidential campaign of 1960 can be 
clearly seen when, after Kennedy won the presidency, there was no movement 
toward accelerating the space program during the transition period.  Nor was any 
action taken during the first three months of the administration—it took several 
months before a NASA administrator was even appointed.  Kennedy did not 
communicate with NASA at all during the period between the election and the 
                                                            
30
 "Presidential Debate in New York," October 21, 1960. 
29 
 
inauguration.31  NASA, eager to follow the lead of the new President, who, they 
well knew, had criticized the previous administration’s indifferent attitude toward 
space, anxiously looked for guidance from the White House.  According to NASA 
Associate Administrator Bob Seamans, “trying to read the tea leaves in the 
weeks after the election, it looked as if manned spaceflight was not only not at 
the top of the new President’s agenda, it might not be on the agenda at all.  And 
he was right.”32  Where, during the campaign, Kennedy had suggested that 
space was a vital area in which we had to vigorously compete with the Soviets as 
a matter of international prestige, during his inaugural address he called for US-
Soviet cooperation in space rather than competing directly, as he also did in his 
first State of the Union address.  At the start of Kennedy’s term, space took a 
back seat to other administration priorities.  Only later would it be thrust front and 
center, following a series of political setbacks to the administration, which we will 
examine in the next chapter.  The evidence suggests that space was not on 
Kennedy’s policy agenda at all.  The truth of the matter was that Kennedy was 
just not interested in space. 
This sets up the great irony of early NASA history and policy.  John Fitzgerald 
Kennedy, no lover of space, won the election of 1960 and became the President 
who drove NASA and America to its greatest space triumph over the Soviet 
Union.  Many historians believe that the Apollo lunar landings were the sole 
events that occurred during the 20th century that will be remembered one 
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thousand years from now.  Richard Milhous Nixon, space advocate, lost the 1960 
election, but went on to win the presidency in 1968 and again in 1972, became 
the President who shut down the ambitions of NASA, leaving it with an 
underfunded space shuttle program with no clear mission.  What is even more 
striking is that Nixon, the consummate politician, who presided over the Apollo 
moon landings, personally reaping the political benefits of Kennedy’s space 
legacy—Nixon’s name is on the plaques placed on the legs of all of the lunar 
landers, not Kennedy’s—then went on to cancel the last three Apollo missions, 
shut down the Saturn assembly lines, cancelled the moon base and Mars 
mission, and downsized America’s role in space, thereby confining NASA’s 
human spaceflight to LEO for the next 40 years.   
How did this historical irony occur?  Why did each man go against his natural 
inclinations toward space and act in an antithetical manner after assuming the 
presidency?  How did the two men who met in the presidential election of 1960 
go on to become the two most influential figures in NASA’s history for the next 
four decades?  The ironies flow from a combination of domestic politics, world 
events, presidential personalities, and a changing national culture that collided 
violently during a turbulent ten-year period to shape NASA’s future for the next 
forty years and, most likely, for the foreseeable future.  NASA is still influenced 
by (if not suffering from) the effects of these two men, the men who stood side-
by-side on stage at the ABC studios in New York City during the presidential 
debate in on that day in late October of 1960. 
 
31 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
 JOHN F. KENNEDY AND THE APOLLO DECISION 
 
John Kennedy’s decision to go to the moon remains among the more influential 
ever made by an American President.  It has been extensively chronicled by 
historians and political scientists alike.  Most rightfully attribute the decision to 
Kennedy’s reaction to world events and domestic politics.  What changes among 
the various accounts is the degree to which Kennedy’s decision was a rational 
response to events, or one born out of political desperation.   
Kennedy’s “space program by fiat” model was an act of political will that was 
used as a model for later presidents seeking to jump-start an ambitious space 
program.  In particular, George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush, who both failed 
to reproduce Kennedy’s spectacular and historic success in the area of space 
policy, drew upon the Kennedy model.  What the Bushes and other presidents 
failed to realize was that Kennedy’s Apollo decision was not a textbook case of 
how to marshal political will and spur a nation into action.  It was instead a 
historical and political anomaly, a once-in-a-lifetime event that would likely never 
again occur. 
For many reasons, it is difficult for those who chronicle the moon decision to 
report on it objectively.  The challenges largely arise from the historian’s personal 
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relationship with Kennedy, whether perceived or actual.  The historical accounts 
contain many examples of the Kennedy mythos, and the emotions that this 
mythos engenders among those who lived through Kennedy’s tenure as 
President and its tragic end seep into the reporting.  Kennedy’s assassination 
and the national sorrow it engendered continue to color the way that Kennedy 
and his presidency are viewed by historians even to this day.  Historians know 
that they must separate the fact from perceptions, and this task is especially 
difficult in the case of John Kennedy.  We are a mere 50 years from the Apollo 
decision and Kennedy’s murder, which might not constitute sufficient temporal 
and emotional distance to allow for the objectivity to which historians strive.   
Even so, historians have done an adequate job of dealing with Kennedy’s Apollo 
decision, but they appear to be more reluctant to attribute elements of the 
decision to Kennedy’s personal failings and less likely to engage in iconoclastic 
attributions of causes and effects, insofar as these can be determined.  (A similar 
situation exists when assessing Richard Nixon, which we do in Chapter Three, 
but it arises from the negative feelings engendered by Nixon for those who lived 
through his terms in office.)   
A second factor that can affect the accounts of Kennedy and Nixon is the political 
philosophy of the historian.  While some academics and historians are liberal and 
others conservative, and their political philosophy informs their opinions of 
political decisions made by our leaders, that philosophy can also color their 
interpretations of events and their evaluation of the factors that drove the 
decisions.  A history of the space age written by an admitted liberal like Roger 
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Launius contains different interpretations of events than does the history written 
by an admitted conservative like Walter McDougall.  As much as historians try to 
minimize the effects of these factors, historians are human and, as such, 
subjective creatures. 
A great deal of scholarly work has already chronicled the Apollo decision, 
partially due to the enormity of the event and the favored place it inhabits in 
American history and myth.  Another factor that ensures a considerable scholarly 
output is the simple fact that much of the mundane and official documentation of 
the actions of the individuals who played parts in the decision have been 
declassified and made available to the public.  We do not focus here on 
chronicling the series of events that occurred during the first months of John 
Kennedy’s presidency--this has been done far better than I could ever hope to 
achieve by John Logsdon, Professor Emeritus of Political Science and 
International Affairs and former director of the Space Policy Institute at George 
Washington University.  Logsdon’s John Kennedy and the Decision to Go to the 
Moon, originally written as his doctoral dissertation during the late 1960s, in the 
midst of Apollo’s triumph and filled with interviews of those who were directly 
involved in the project, was revisited by the author several years ago and 
republished in 2011, having been updated with the primary source material that 
had become available to scholars since the original book was written.  Logsdon’s 
study will likely serve as the final word on the event and the decision.   
We will instead recount the decision on a high level, only to draw a comparison 
with Nixon’s shuttle decision, in an effort to draw a distinction between the 
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natures of the two decisions.  For an in-depth discussion of the chronological 
chain of events, see Logsdon’s seminal book; here, we will touch instead on the 
role that Kennedy’s personality, world events, and domestic politics played in the 
decision and entertain a discussion of what caused Kennedy to quickly 
metamorphose from a person who had little interest in the US space program to 
its greatest advocate. 
The launch in 1957 of an artificial satellite by the Soviet Union sent a wave of 
existential panic throughout the Western world and triggered alarmist fears of 
impending nuclear attacks from space.  The “Sputnik moment” seemed to 
frighten every politician in the US except for President Eisenhower, who, 
although under siege by his political opposition and the media, reacted in a 
measured fashion.  Eisenhower approved the formation of NASA, and with it, a 
modest civilian space program, one that he sought largely as a cover for his 
military space ambitions.  Rejecting a large-scale accelerated space program, 
with the exception of aggressive ICBM and spy satellite development, 
Eisenhower instead favored a smaller national space program that would grow at 
a more natural pace, with limited cost to the US taxpayer.  This strategy stands in 
stark contrast to the next President, John Kennedy’s, reaction to the successful 
Soviet feat of putting a man in space on April 12, 1961. 
As discussed previously, Kennedy in 1960 campaigned on how his 
predecessors’ policies had resulted in the US losing global prestige to the USSR, 
a loss that, he argued, was evident in the growing Soviet lead in space 
capabilities.  Kennedy saw an increasing missile gap between the US and USSR, 
35 
 
and claimed that Eisenhower had neglected US capabilities in space to the 
detriment of the nation.  But just three months into his presidency, Kennedy 
suffered the twin political embarrassments of witnessing a Soviet military officer 
orbit the Earth before the US had even achieved a ballistic flight into space, 
followed closely by the Bay of Pigs debacle.  Kennedy responded by issuing a 
challenge to the nation of sending a human to land on the moon and achieving a 
safe return, and, to raise the stakes, of doing so before the decade ended.   
This bold challenge was announced during a special joint session of Congress 
shortly after the US put Alan Shepard into space for a few minutes, an 
accomplishment that nonetheless starkly illustrated to the world just how far 
behind the Americans were in space capabilities.  Why did Kennedy choose a 
risky path that would cost billions and ultimately involve over 400,000 of 
America’s finest minds?   
Logsdon’s work shows not a young and inexperienced President scrambling 
frantically to recover lost political capital, as other accounts of the decision have 
asserted; instead he portrays a rational and deliberate decision maker who took 
the advice of many trusted experts, sorted through the conflicting views, and 
determined what he thought would be the best course of action for the nation 
during the mortal struggle of the West to stem the advance of communism.  
Going to the moon was not a vanity program of a space enthusiast; indeed, as 
we have shown, Kennedy himself stated that he was “not that interested in 
space”—but was instead a vital component of the existential struggle between 
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the US and the USSR, “part of the battle along the fluid front of the cold war.”33  
Kennedy saw space as an integral part of the Cold War, and saw three ways in 
which he could prosecute the Cold War—militarily, economically, and 
technologically.  A direct military confrontation was not an option because a 
nuclear war would prove disastrous for both sides.  An economic competition 
was a possibility, but it would take years to develop to the point where the 
nonaligned countries would be able to see the difference between the two 
economic systems; indeed, while it was evident from the 1970s on that the US 
economy was greatly outproducing that of the USSR, it was not until the early 
1990s that the Soviet economy collapsed under the stress of competition and 
signaled the end of the USSR.  That left technology, of which the space program 
was the marquee feature, as the optimal means of competing with the Soviet 
Union for the hearts and minds of the world.  And Kennedy did not limit this 
technological “warfare” to the space program—he also desired to compete with 
Europe and the USSR in developing a supersonic airliner that would surpass the 
planned jetliners Concorde and the Tu -144.34   
 
 
The First Months of the Presidency 
 
As a senator, Kennedy’s opinions on space matters were confined to the area of 
national defense and what he saw as the growing distance between the missile 
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capabilities between the US and USSR—what he termed the “missile-space 
problem.”  At this point in his career during the late 1950s, Kennedy saw space 
as the domain of the ICBM and saw this “missile gap” purely as a national 
defense and foreign policy issue: the Soviets’ superiority in missile and space 
technology simply meant to him that the USSR could rain nuclear-tipped missiles 
down on the US.  This capability would at worst threaten the very existence of 
the US, and at best tip the tenuous balance of power toward the USSR.  The 
Soviets would thus be able to put some real muscle behind their aggressive 
foreign policy.  In addition, Senator Kennedy had begun to think of the changing 
balance of technological (as well as military, diplomatic, and economic) power as 
a means by which the USSR could mitigate American prestige among the 
uncommitted nations whom both nations were actively courting.  This theme of 
prestige would play a larger role in Kennedy's mind as President.   
When he assumed the presidency, Kennedy inherited Eisenhower’s version of 
NASA and its Mercury, Saturn, and F-1 programs; he also inherited NASA’s 
ongoing plans to go to the moon, which had begun internally in 1959.  Kennedy 
did not visibly change Eisenhower’s approach to a low-key space program.  
There was one key difference, however.  While Eisenhower favored a space 
program that grew at a natural pace without regard to what the Soviet program 
did, Kennedy thought of the space program as a tool of diplomacy.  During his 
inaugural address, Kennedy called for superpower cooperation in space when he 
suggested to the Soviets, “Together let us explore the stars.”35  Kennedy 
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returned to the topic of superpower space cooperation again and again during his 
presidency, and during his first State of the Union Address, he offered the option 
of space cooperation with the USSR: 
Today this country is ahead in the science and technology of space, while 
the Soviet Union is ahead in the capacity to lift large vehicles into orbit. 
Both nations would help themselves as well as other nations by removing 
these endeavors from the bitter and wasteful competition of the Cold War. 
The United States would be willing to join with the Soviet Union and the 
scientists of all nations in a greater effort to make the fruits of this new 
knowledge available to all—and, beyond that, in an effort to extend farm 
technology to hungry nations—to wipe out disease--to increase the 
exchanges of scientists and their knowledge—and to make our own 
laboratories available to technicians of other lands who lack the facilities to 
pursue their own work.36 
 
While Kennedy did bring up the topic of the US space program in public 
speeches, there was in fact little activity going on within his administration 
concerning space during his first several months in office.  He did not contact 
NASA at all during the two-plus months between the election and his 
inauguration, nor did he propose a NASA administrator.37   Despite the 
accusations leveled against the Eisenhower administration during the 
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presidential campaign concerning neglect of the space program and the Soviet 
lead, the evidence suggests that space policy was a low priority, at best.  Linda 
Krug points to the irony of this situation when she comments, “Interestingly, when 
Kennedy entered the White House, space exploration was not high on his 
political or political agenda.  Some have even asserted that space was not on 
Kennedy’s policy agenda at all.”38  This neglect is remarkable, especially when 
considering the composition of Kennedy’s cabinet.  A number of members of the 
Kennedy administration, including Vice President Lyndon Johnson (who believed 
that a focus on space policy would propel him to the White House), were far 
more disposed to think of US space policy in the terms of the Cold War, than 
were those of the previous administration.39  Kennedy’s Secretary of State, Dean 
Rusk, testified to the Senate Space Committee that he thought the US was in a 
“space race” against the USSR.  He further asserted that he feared the 
ramifications if the world misinterpreted the current state of the race regarding 
current US versus Soviet space capabilities as symbolic of America’s limited 
strategic future.40 
During the period between the election and the inauguration, NASA did not stand 
still while waiting for Kennedy to implement the space policy he implied while 
campaigning.  NASA continued development of its ten-year plan, which now 
included a post-Mercury program, named Apollo, that sought to land on the moon 
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by the late 1960s, and which was identified as a “prime NASA goal.”41  
Kennedy’s efforts to find a NASA administrator was not a simple task—many 
who were approached either doubted the future of NASA under the Kennedy 
administration or did not relish the idea of working with or under Lyndon Johnson 
who, as Vice President, would be head of the National Space Council.  Kennedy 
finally settled on James Webb, which was an inspired choice; Webb was 
arguably the best administrator that NASA ever had, possessing the right mixture 
of administrative talent and political savvy.   
Logsdon portrays Kennedy as a thoughtful and open-minded decision maker, 
one who did not seem averse to changing his mind in the light of compelling 
information that ran contrary to his opinion.   In the weeks after his inauguration, 
while Kennedy considered a modest increase in the NASA budget that he 
inherited from Eisenhower, he sought input from several sources because he 
was concerned that a budget increase for the F-1 engine and Saturn program 
might not result in increased US prestige.  
Kennedy’s science advisor, Jerome Weisner, strongly opposed what was then 
called “manned” spaceflight.  Weisner instead favored science-based missions 
carried out by instrument packages and robotic probes.  However, in March of 
1961, the National Academy of Sciences advocated a lunar landing as the 
ultimate objective of the US space program.42  (This endorsement seems to have 
had an influence on Kennedy’s decision several months later to call for an effort 
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to land a human on the moon, but to what extent is difficult to determine.)  What 
is clear is that Kennedy had seen the overwhelming public support for the 
Mercury program and realized that he needed to support it in an effort to coopt 
the political goodwill it engendered.43  But it was not a decision made without 
political calculation.  Historian Roger Launius describes Kennedy’s assessment 
of the risks: “[Project Mercury] was a risky enterprise—what if the Soviets were 
first to send humans into space, what if an astronaut was killed and Mercury was 
a failure—and the political animal in Kennedy wanted to minimize those risks.”44 
Also in March of 1961, new NASA administrator Webb wrote Kennedy’s budget 
director, David Bell, to request a 30% budget increase over the limited 
Eisenhower space budget, citing the need to increase U.S. international prestige 
through a robust space program.  Webb and Bell met in the White House to 
discuss whether the President should commit to an aggressive and more 
expensive space program, one that included a lunar landing.  Bell disagreed, 
reasoning that it was folly to run a race that we would probably lose anyway, and 
that Kennedy had more important issues to worry about.  While the 
administration did not support the accelerated program, they approved a modest 
budget increase to develop a more robust heavy-lift capability, which would 
eventually enable a lunar landing.45  During the heated discussions between 
NASA and the Bureau of the Budget (BoB), NASA Deputy Administrator Hugh 
Dryden made a prophetic statement.  After being told that Kennedy did not have 
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time to personally address a NASA budget increase request, Dryden told Bell, 
“You may not feel he has the time, but whether [Kennedy] likes it or not he is 
going to have to consider it.  Events will force this.”46   
 
 
The Events of April-May, 1961 
 
Those events occurred less than a month later, on April 12, 1961, when Kennedy 
received word that the Soviets had successfully launched Yuri Gagarin into orbit.  
The world media reacted with similar hysteria to that which accompanied the 
Sputnik launch in 1957, and Kennedy immediately saw this as a political setback 
for his new administration.  Kennedy special counsel Ted Sorenson commented, 
“Then came the first Soviet to orbit the earth – Gargarin [sic] I believe that was – 
and the President felt, justifiably so, that the Soviets had scored a tremendous 
propaganda victory, that it affected not only our prestige around the world, but 
affected our security as well in the sense that it demonstrated a Soviet rocket 
thrust which convinced many people that the Soviet Union was ahead of the 
United States militarily.”47  The newest evidence of Soviet technical prowess was 
especially damning in light of the charges that Kennedy had made during the 
presidential campaign that the previous administration had not done enough to 
compete with the USSR in space.  Kennedy now looked guilty of the same 
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charge.  Michael Beschloss suggests that Kennedy was not politically concerned 
over the Gagarin flight; he contends that Kennedy understood that he would not 
be held widely accountable for this latest example of Soviet space superiority, 
having only been in office for three months—hardly enough time to put his own 
space policy in place.48  Other historians, however, argue that “the specter of 
another Soviet space triumph haunted Kennedy and his advisers.”49  The event 
certainly forced Kennedy to circle back to the US space program, and raised the 
level of importance of the issue of the inferior position that the US occupied in the 
space race and its implications on world opinion.  But Kennedy was not yet ready 
to enter an all-out race. 
Krushchev characteristically played up this event as a victory for world 
communism over moribund capitalism.  Kennedy sent a congratulatory telegram 
to the Soviet premiere, using the occasion to again suggest space cooperation 
between the superpowers:  
THE PEOPLE of the United States share with the people of the Soviet 
Union their satisfaction for the safe flight of the astronaut in man's first 
venture into space.  We congratulate you and the Soviet scientists and 
engineers who made this feat possible.  It is my sincere desire that in the 
continuing quest for knowledge of outer space our nations can work 
together to obtain the greatest benefit to mankind. 
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JOHN F. KENNEDY 
[N. S. Khrushchev, Chairman, Council of Ministers, Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics]50 
 
It is clear that in the immediate aftermath of the Gagarin flight, Kennedy had not 
yet decided to go head-to-head against the Soviets in space.  A press release 
published on the same day by the White House press office hails the feat as a 
technological, but not a political, triumph: 
THE ACHIEVEMENT by the USSR of orbiting a man and returning him 
safely to ground is an outstanding technical accomplishment. We 
congratulate the Soviet scientists and engineers who made this feat 
possible.  The exploration of our solar system is an ambition which we and 
all mankind share with the Soviet Union and this is an important step 
toward that goal.  Our own Mercury man-in-space program is directed 
toward that same end.51  [emphasis mine] 
 
Kennedy congratulates the Soviet scientists and engineers, revealing that he fully 
understands the political implications that are in play.  These expressions were 
not an admission of an inferior political or economic system; they were an 
announcement to the world that Gagarin’s flight was merely a technological 
triumph, one that was shared by “all mankind,” and that the US shared the 
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Soviets’ ambitions to understand the universe and was, in fact, pursuing their 
own human spaceflight initiative.  Congress quickly jumped into the fray by 
turning the ongoing NASA budget hearings into an investigation of why Kennedy 
had not yet increased the budget for manned spaceflight, and seemed primed to 
increase the NASA budget in order to catch up to and surpass the Soviets.  
Pressure from Congress added to pressure from the public.  Logsdon reports, 
“Over the next few days, as he absorbed the political reaction in the United 
States and around the world to the Soviet achievement, Kennedy would change 
his mind.”52   While seeking to downplay the political implications of the Soviet 
triumph, Kennedy was beginning to feel this pressure, and he responded by 
calling a meeting of his top advisors. 
On April 14, Kennedy presided over a fateful meeting of his space advisors to 
determine how best to respond to the Soviet public relations coup.  Asked how 
the US could surpass the USSR in space primacy, Kennedy put the same 
question to the assembled team.  Science Advisor Jerome Weisner suggested 
that the US focus on communications, meteorological, and navigation satellites, 
the area in which the US stood the best chance of surpassing the Soviets.  
Kennedy solicited other opinions from around the table, and the topic soon 
turned to a manned moon landing.   
While a moon landing was deemed technologically feasible, the assembled 
advisers agreed that the costs would be staggering, and there would be no 
guarantees that the US could beat the Soviets at the task.  Time Magazine 
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reporter Hugh Sidey, who was present at the meeting, reported that “the main 
thing everybody was hung up on was the projected cost that might be at the 
outset as much as forty billion dollars.”53  While budget director Bell was 
intimidated by the $40 billion figure, Kennedy seemed to agonize over the 
decision, “running his hands through his hair, tapping his front teeth with his 
fingernails, a familiar nervous gesture.”54  Logsdon states that attendees at that 
meeting got the sense that it was then that Kennedy began to see a moon 
landing as important both to his presidency and to the US in the struggle against 
the USSR.55  But while Kennedy was visualizing a moon landing as the way to 
beat the Soviets, he was still not willing to sign off on the program because in his 
mind the potential payoff was not worth the cost; during the discussion, he 
uttered, “the cost—that what gets me.”56  Kennedy had started to believe that 
“nothing was more important” than beating the USSR in space capabilities, but 
was reluctant to spend the nation’s treasure in doing so.   
That is, until the Kennedy administration suffered a second political humiliation in 
a week.  The attempted invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs, conducted between 
April 17-19, 1961, by the CIA and Cuban refugees, failed miserably and very 
publicly.  Although, like the space program, Kennedy inherited the military 
operation from the Eisenhower administration, the second political debacle in a 
week shook the new presidency to its core.  Historians generally agree that the 
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Bay of Pigs fiasco greatly upset Kennedy and filled him with self-doubt.  Public 
opinion questioned whether the young President was up to the task of 
prosecuting the Cold War. The public fallout for the president was substantial, but 
Logsdon believes that Kennedy’s vulnerable emotional state was a contributing, 
not a decisive factor in his moon-landing decision.57   
Beschloss gives us perhaps the most vivid description of the effect of the Bay of 
Pigs on the Kennedy presidency: 
No matter how much Kennedy’s aides tried, through background 
interviews with reporters, to shift the blame for the Bay of Pigs fiasco onto 
Eisenhower—and they did—Kennedy knew that the debacle had the 
power to shatter his entire administration.  The Bay of Pigs had suggested 
to Americans that they had elected a President who was at least 
inexperienced and at worst incompetent. . . . He was desperately in need 
of something that would divert the attention of the public and identify him 
with a cause that would unify them behind his administration.58 
Hardesty and Eisman consider the Bay of Pigs debacle to be a critical influence 
on Kennedy’s view of the US space program: “While the debacle was not cited 
explicitly as a reason for the Apollo go-ahead, Kennedy clearly sought a new 
initiative to help restore the nation’s tattered prestige.”59  Heppenheimer, too, 
cites this incident, coming close on the heels of the Gagarin flight, as deeply 
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affecting Kennedy: “This was humiliation.  Yuri Gagarin’s flight had suggested 
Soviet strength and American weakness, but here was the real thing,”  and he 
goes on to assert that this humiliation caused Kennedy to make “his decision 
intuitively, knowing the cost would be frightful but accepting that this challenge 
was one he had to face, then and there.”60  Launius also attributes the 
acceleration of the space program to these two events: “A nonchalant space 
program might have remained the standard for the US civil space effort had not 
two important events happened to force Kennedy to act.”61   
The unfavorable and somewhat panicked world reaction to Gagarin and the Bay 
of Pigs ultimately convinced Kennedy that “prestige was a real and not a public 
relations factor in world affairs.”62  As Kennedy came around to the realization 
that space would be the symbol of the 20th century and that the US had to be the 
leader, rather than being merely a way to score political points during a 
campaign, he decided that something needed to be done in space. Yet even at 
this stage, he remained troubled over the costs that would be incurred by a moon 
landing program.   
In search of answers to this crisis of presidential confidence, both from without 
and within, Kennedy on April 20 asked Lyndon Johnson to prepare a report 
suggesting options for taking the lead in space from the Soviets.  Ted Sorensen 
recalls: 
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[H]e asked the Vice President [Lyndon B. Johnson], as the chairman of 
the Space Council, to examine and to come up with the answers to four or 
five questions of a similar nature: What were we doing that was not 
enough?  What could we be doing more?  Where should we be trying to 
compete and get ahead? What should we have to do to get ahead?  And 
so on.  That inquiry led to a joint study by the Space Administration and 
the Department of Defense.63 
 
Kennedy followed up this discussion with a memo formalizing the terms of 
Johnson’s inquiry.  The memo, described by Beschloss as being “redolent of 
presidential panic,”64 reads as follows: 
 
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT 
In accordance with our conversation I would like for you as Chairman of 
the Space Council to be in charge of making an overall survey of where 
we stand in space.  
1. Do we have a chance of beating the Soviets by putting a laboratory in 
space, or by a trip around the moon, or by a rocket to go to the moon and 
back with a man.  Is there any other space program which promises 
dramatic results in which we could win? 
2. How much additional would it cost? 
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3. Are we working 24 hours a day on existing programs?  If not, why not?  
If not, will you make recommendations to me as to how work can be 
speeded up. 
4. In building large boosters should we put out emphasis on nuclear, 
chemical or liquid fuel, or a combination of these three? 
5. Are we making maximum effort?  Are we achieving necessary results?  
I have asked Jim Webb, Dr. Wiesner, Secretary McNamara and other 
responsible officials to cooperate with you fully.  I would appreciate a 
report on this at the earliest possible moment.  
John F. Kennedy65 
 
Whether the memo truly conveys a state of “panic” is uncertain, but it certainly 
stresses the urgency of the matter.  Considerations related to a moon landing 
were surely on the President’s mind the next day, April 21st, when he was 
pressed on the matter during a press conference: 
Question: Mr. President, you don’t seem to be pushing the space program 
as energetically now as you suggested during the campaign that you 
thought it should be pushed.  In view of the feeling of many people in this 
country that we must do everything that we can to catch up with the 
Russians as soon as possible, do you anticipate applying any sort of crash 
program? 
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The President: . . . We have to consider whether there is any program 
now, regardless of its cost, which offers us hopes of being pioneers in a 
project.  It is possible to spend billions of dollars in these projects in space 
to the detriment of other programs and still not be successful.  We are 
behind, as I said before, in large boosters.  We have to make a 
determination whether there is any effort we could make in time or money 
which could put us first in any new area. 
Now I don’t want to start spending the kind of money that I am talking 
about without making a determination based on careful scientific 
judgments as to whether a real success can be achieved or whether we 
are so far behind now in this particular race we are going to be second in 
this decade. 
So I would say to you that it is a matter of great concern, but I think that 
before we break through and begin a program that would not reach a 
completion, as you know, until the end of this decade; for example, trips to 
the moon, may be ten years off, maybe a little less, but are quite far away 
and involve, as I say, an enormous sum, I don’t think we should rush into it 
and begin them until we really know where we are going to end up.  And 
that study is now being undertaken under the direction of the Vice 
President. 
Question:  Mr. President, don’t you agree that we should try to get to the 
moon before the Russians, if we can? 
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The President:  If we can get to the moon before the Russians, we should. 
[emphasis mine] 
Question:  Isn’t it your responsibility to supply the vigorous leadership to 
spark up this program? 
The President:  When you say ‘spark up the program,’ we first have to 
make a judgment, based on the best information we can get, whether we 
can be ahead of the Russians to the moon.  We are now talking about a 
program which may be—which is many years away.66 
Here the President first mentions the moon landing program publicly and in doing 
so seems rational rather than panicked.  He argues against rushing into such a 
massive endeavor, and asserts that all aspects of the potential project should be 
analyzed, especially whether it would be likely to fulfill its objective (which he 
defines as “being ahead of the Russians to the moon”), before making the 
decision.  He confirms that Johnson is currently working on the analysis. 
Johnson, long a space advocate for political purposes, spent two weeks soliciting 
input from all stakeholders in a typically Johnsonian way—meeting personally 
with the stakeholders when possible, getting in their faces, twisting arms when 
necessary.  Johnson engaged in the type of personal politics at which he 
excelled:  “Whenever he heard reservations, Johnson used his forceful 
personality to persuade. ‘Now,’ he asked, ‘would you rather have us be a 
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second-rate nation or should we spend a little money?’”67  At Kennedy’s 
prompting, Johnson put all of his prodigious political gifts to work to drum up 
support for an expanded space program.   
Kennedy’s science advisors, space advisors, NASA, and the Department of 
Defense (DoD) presented their views to Johnson, and later, other stakeholders 
such as Congressional leaders did the same.  In a foreshadowing of the funding 
issues that we will discuss in a later chapter, Vice Admiral John Hayward 
“stressed the need for an integrated, orderly space program rather than an 
emphasis on one project at the cost of neglecting others.”68  Hayward’s prophetic 
statement, which was ignored, pointed to the post-Apollo problems that the US 
space program faced—Apollo, because of its singularity of purpose, which was 
primarily due to the end-of-decade time constraint, used technologies that could 
not be leveraged for non-lunar purposes and as such, proved an engineering 
dead end.  Ultimately, the stakeholders whom Johnson queried suggested a 
lunar landing as the optimal way to gain the lead from the Soviets in space and to 
rebuild America’s lost prestige.  They recommended an increased space budget 
and a marked acceleration of effort.  Members of Congress who were consulted 
responded that “the United States must do whatever is necessary to gain 
unequivocal leadership in Space Exploration.”69  Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara explicitly agreed to the idea of going to the moon to increase national 
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prestige.  In a memo to Johnson, he said, “What the Soviets do and what they 
are likely to do are . . . matters of great importance from the viewpoint of national 
prestige.  Our attainments constitute a major element in the international 
competition between the Soviet system and our own.”70  In a foreshadowing of 
the Nixon shuttle decision ten years later, McNamara also opined  that an 
accelerated space effort that would be a gift to the aerospace industry, which 
was set to suffer under the planned cutbacks in the defense budget.71   
Space pioneer Wernher von Braun agreed that we should race the Soviets to the 
moon, but with a caveat; in his written reply to Johnson’s query, von Braun 
prophetically commented that 
in the space race we are competing with a determined opponent whose 
peacetime economy is on a wartime footing.  Most of our procedures are 
designed for orderly, peacetime conditions.  I do not believe that we can 
win this race unless we take at least some measures which thus far have 
been considered acceptable only in times of national emergency.72 
 
 
Not all of the stakeholders were on board, however.  NASA administrator Webb 
was reluctant to commit NASA to such an endeavor without first ascertaining 
whether it was technologically feasible.  He also lacked confidence that NASA 
had the long-term political support such a massive project like a moon landing 
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would take—he did not want to set NASA up for failure.  A consummate politician 
himself, Webb understood the nature of the US political system and budget 
process, and he also understood that NASA needed the administration’s 
unstinting, long-term commitment and political capital.73  Science Advisor Jerome 
Weisner, who argued for the scientific aspects of space exploration over political 
ones, became “resigned to the inevitable.  The decision to go to the moon was ‘a 
political, not a technical issue,’ as he would later put it, ‘a use of technological 
means for political ends.’”74  
Alan Shepard’s flight of May 5, 1961 flight was critical, not just to NASA, but to 
the Kennedy administration. The administration greatly feared that a failure 
(especially one on live television) would compound the national humiliation of the 
twin shocks of Gagarin and the Bay of Pigs.  The US had a history of public 
space failures, and now the stakes had never been higher, especially in the 
context of international prestige.  Several prominent Senators suggested that the 
flight be postponed and later conducted in secret to mitigate any negative effects 
of another very public failure.75  This advice was not heeded, and Shepard’s flight 
was a success.  The fact that it was conducted in public actually worked in favor 
of the US and against the USSR, which was criticized for their blatant 
propagandizing of their successes, conducted under a sham cloak of secrecy.  
Logsdon reports that: 
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A May 1961 report of the US Information Agency comparing international 
reactions to the Gagarin and Shepard flights noted that in terms of public 
reaction, “the US reaped a significant psychological advantage over the 
Soviet Union.”  This was due in large part to the “openness” surrounding 
the Shepard flight, plus the flight’s “technological refinements and the 
poise and humility of the US astronaut.”76 
 
The resulting perceptible gain in US prestige was probably a major contributing 
factor in convincing Kennedy to back a push to the moon, since he witnessed the 
cause-effect relationship firsthand; a failure surely would have prevented 
Kennedy from making that decision and most likely would have doomed any of 
the President’s nascent lunar ambitions.  Later that day, Kennedy announced at 
a press conference that the US would next undertake a “substantially larger effort 
in space.”77 
Johnson, who was leaving the country for several weeks, passed the task of 
reporting his findings back to Kennedy on to a team headed by Robert 
McNamara and that included key members of the DoD and NASA, as well as 
members of the Bureau of the Budget (BoB).  Before he left, Johnson briefed 
Kennedy on his interim findings in a memo that states, “If we do not make a 
strong effort now, the time will soon be reached when the margin of control over 
space and over men’s minds through space accomplishments will have swung so 
far on the Russian side that we will not be able to catch up, let alone assume 
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leadership,” and that a successful moon mission would be an “achievement with 
great propaganda value” and one in which we would have the possibility of being 
first.78  Johnson’s memo to Kennedy addressed the relationship between national 
prestige and space: 
The US has greater resources than the USSR for attaining space 
leadership but has failed to make the necessary hard decisions and to 
marshal those resources to achieve such leadership. . . . This country 
should be realistic and recognize that other nations . . . will tend to align 
themselves with the country they believe will be the world leader—the 
winner in the long run.  Dramatic accomplishments in space are being 
increasingly identified as a major indicator of world leadership.79 
The memo went on to answer Kennedy’s last question, whether the US was 
doing all it could to take the lead over the Soviets: “We are neither making 
maximum effort nor achieving results necessary if this country is to reach a 
position of leadership.”80   
The team met and reviewed the responses from Johnson’s queries to the various 
stakeholders.  Webb, for reasons already stated, was reluctant to consent to a 
program as ambitious as a moon landing.  But he was eventually persuaded by 
the others and signed on to the findings.   
                                                            
78
 Kay, Defining NASA, 74. 
79
 Johnson, “Memorandum for the President,” April 28, 1961. 
80
 Johnson, “Memorandum for the President,” April 28, 1961. 
 
58 
 
The thirty-page report that emanated from Johnson’s and the team’s work was 
authored by McNamara and Webb.  It argued that the US should pursue an 
aggressive space policy that featured a lunar landing by 1970 for the purposes of 
national prestige, and should abandon the natural progress of the Eisenhower 
administration approach in favor of a crash program.  “Our [space] attainments 
are a major element in the international competition between the Soviet system 
and our own.  The non-military, non-commercial, non-scientific but ‘civilian’ 
projects such as lunar and planetary exploration are, in this sense, part of the 
battle along the fluid front of the Cold War.”81  The report recommended that the 
US space program be placed on a war footing and would be accorded the types 
of resources available only during times of national emergency.  The report itself 
provided four reasons for pursuing a robust space program: scientific research, 
commercial enterprise, defense, and national prestige.   While the US was ahead 
in the first three categories, the report stated, it lagged behind in the area of 
prestige.  The report conceded that the US was behind in “space spectaculars” 
that bestow prestige in the world community and suggested pursuing a lunar 
landing program as its focus: 
We recommend that our National Space Plan include the objective of 
manned lunar exploration before the end of this decade.  It is our belief 
that manned exploration to the vicinity of and on the surface of the moon 
represents a major area in which international competition for 
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achievement in space will be conducted.  The orbiting of machines is not 
the same as the orbiting or landing of man. It is man, not merely 
machines, in space that captures the imagination of the world.  
The establishment of this major objective has many implications.  It will 
cost a great deal of money.  It will require large efforts for a long time.  It 
requires parallel and supporting undertakings which are also costly and 
complex.  Thus, for example, the RANGER and SURVEYOR Projects and 
the technology associated with them must be undertaken and must 
succeed to provide the data, the techniques and the experience without 
which manned lunar exploration cannot be undertaken. 
The Soviets have announced lunar landing as a major objective of their 
program.  They may have begun to plan for such an effort years ago.  
They may have undertaken important first steps which we have not begun.  
It may be argued, therefore, that we undertake such an objective with 
several strikes against us.  We cannot avoid announcing not only our 
general goals but many of our specific plans, and our successes and our 
failures along the way.  Our cards are and will be face up--theirs are face 
down. 
Despite these considerations we recommend proceeding toward this 
objective.  We are uncertain of Soviet intentions, plans or status.  Their 
plans, whatever they may be, are not more certain of success than ours.  
Just as we accelerated our ICBM program we have accelerated and are 
passing the Soviets in important areas in space technology.  If we set our 
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sights on this difficult objective we may surpass them here as well.  
Accepting the goal gives us a chance.  Finally, even if the Soviets get 
there first, as they may, and as some think they will, it is better for us to 
get there second than not at all.  In any event we will have mastered the 
technology.  If we fail to accept this challenge it may be interpreted as a 
lack of national vigor and capacity to respond.82 
Kennedy received the report on May 8, and two days later, he held a meeting to 
review the findings.  It was at this meeting that Kennedy finalized his decision to 
go to the moon.  He clearly understood that the massive, lengthy, and almost 
prohibitively expensive effort would likely “reduce our flexibility as a nation to 
undertake large-scale, all-out efforts in other areas not now foreseen which may 
suddenly appear to be of comparable national importance.”83  This was a 
prescient statement, and later in the decade presented a challenge to President 
Johnson as he tried to prosecute the Vietnam War and implement Great Society 
social programs while sustaining the Apollo project.  Recollecting the formation of 
the report and the April 10 meeting, Ted Sorensen commented that “Inasmuch as 
that study was going on simultaneously with the studies and reviews we were 
making of the defense budget, military assistance, and civil defense, and 
inasmuch as space, like these other items, obviously did have some bearing 
upon our status in the world, it was decided to combine the results of all those 
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studies with the President’s recommendations in the special message to 
Congress.”84 
Kennedy then called a joint session of Congress on May 25th to sell his lunar 
landing program (along with several other elements of the space program) to the 
Congress, the American people, and the world.  The “Urgent National Needs” 
speech is perhaps Kennedy’s most often quoted one, with the possible exception 
of his inaugural address.  (It appears that no book, movie, or television 
documentary on the US space program starts without a clip from Kennedy’s 
address to Congress or from his later speech at Rice University.)  In his televised 
speech to both houses of Congress and to other dignitaries, given in an 
environment typically associated with States of the Union addresses and national 
emergencies such as declarations of war, Kennedy discussed various pressing 
matters: national defense, economic and social progress at home and abroad, 
the nature of the Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union.  Finally, Kennedy laid 
out his vision of America’s future in space and issued a challenge to the nation.  
In the May 25th speech, Kennedy clearly ties the space program to the larger 
Cold War, and sets it on a war footing. 
Finally, if we are to win the battle that is now going on around the world 
between freedom and tyranny, the dramatic achievements in space which 
occurred in recent weeks should have made clear to us all, as did the 
Sputnik in 1957, the impact of this adventure on the minds of men 
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everywhere, who are attempting to make a determination of which road 
they should take.  Since early in my term, our efforts in space have been 
under review.  With the advice of the Vice President, who is Chairman of 
the National Space Council, we have examined where we are strong and 
where we are not, where we may succeed and where we may not.  Now it 
is time to take longer strides—time for a great new American enterprise—
time for this nation to take a clearly leading role in space achievement, 
which in many ways may hold the key to our future on earth. 
I believe we possess all the resources and talents necessary.  But the 
facts of the matter are that we have never made the national decisions or 
marshaled the national resources required for such leadership.  We have 
never specified long-range goals on an urgent time schedule, or managed 
our resources and our time so as to insure their fulfillment. 
Recognizing the head start obtained by the Soviets with their large rocket 
engines, which gives them many months of lead time, and recognizing the 
likelihood that they will exploit this lead for some time to come in still more 
impressive successes, we nevertheless are required to make new efforts 
on our own.  For while we cannot guarantee that we shall one day be first, 
we can guarantee that any failure to make this effort will make us last.  We 
take an additional risk by making it in full view of the world, but as shown 
by the feat of astronaut Shepard, this very risk enhances our stature when 
we are successful.  But this is not merely a race.  Space is open to us 
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now; and our eagerness to share its meaning is not governed by the 
efforts of others.  We go into space because whatever mankind must 
undertake, free men must fully share. 
I therefore ask the Congress, above and beyond the increases I have 
earlier requested for space activities, to provide the funds which are 
needed to meet the following national goals: 
First, I believe that this nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, 
before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him 
safely to the earth.  No single space project in this period will be more 
impressive to mankind or more important for the long-range exploration of 
space; and none will be so difficult or expensive to accomplish.  We 
propose to accelerate the development of the appropriate lunar space 
craft.  We propose to develop alternate liquid and solid fuel boosters, 
much larger than any now being developed, until certain which is superior.  
We propose additional funds for other engine development and for 
unmanned explorations—explorations which are particularly important for 
one purpose which this nation will never overlook: the survival of the man 
who first makes this daring flight.  But in a very real sense, it will not be 
one man going to the moon—If we make this judgment affirmatively, it will 
be an entire nation.  For all of us must work to put him there. 
[Kennedy here then asks for funding for nuclear rocket engines, 
communications satellites and weather satellites] 
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Let it be clear—and this is a judgment which the Members of the 
Congress must finally make—let it be clear that I am asking the Congress 
and the country to accept a firm commitment to a new course of action, a 
course which will last for many years and carry very heavy costs: 531 
million dollars in fiscal '62—an estimated seven to nine billion dollars 
additional over the next five years.  If we are to go only half way, or reduce 
our sights in the face of difficulty, in my judgment it would be better not to 
go at all. . . 
Kennedy then appeals to the emotions of the American people who have 
witnessed first the Sputniks, then Gagarin: 
It is a most important decision that we make as a nation.  But all of you 
have lived through the last four years and have seen the significance of 
space and the adventures in space, and no one can predict with certainty 
what the ultimate meaning will be of mastery of space. 
I believe we should go to the moon.  But I think every citizen of this 
country as well as the Members of the Congress should consider the 
matter carefully in making their judgment, to which we have given 
attention over many weeks and months, because it is a heavy burden, and 
there is no sense in agreeing or desiring that the United States take an 
affirmative position in outer space, unless we are prepared to do the work 
and bear the burdens to make it successful.  If we are not, we should 
decide today and this year. 
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This decision demands a major national commitment of scientific and 
technical manpower, materiel and facilities, and the possibility of their 
diversion from other important activities where they are already thinly 
spread.  It means a degree of dedication, organization and discipline 
which have not always characterized our research and development 
efforts.  It means we cannot afford undue work stoppages, inflated costs of 
material or talent, wasteful interagency rivalries, or a high turnover of key 
personnel. 
New objectives and new money cannot solve these problems.  They could 
in fact, aggravate them further—unless every scientist, every engineer, 
every serviceman, every technician, contractor, and civil servant gives his 
personal pledge that this nation will move forward, with the full speed of 
freedom, in the exciting adventure of space.85 
His address on “Urgent National Needs” was pitch-perfect and very well 
received.  Space advocates were both shocked and delighted—“they realized 
that this was their chance to make their wildest dreams of space exploration 
come true.”86  In a manner that was also similar to that which only occurs at times 
of national emergency, Congress approved Kennedy’s request almost 
unanimously and “practically without debate,”87 and dramatically increased 
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NASA’s budget.  The US budget for space was increased by 50 percent in 1961.  
The next year, it exceeded all pre-1961 space budgets combined.88  Congress, 
which had already been discussing an appropriate response to Gagarin (and 
which had been heavily worked over politically by Johnson to reach a consensus 
in his favor), clearly agreed with the President.  
Kennedy had correctly assessed the mood of the nation and harnessed their will 
to solve the problem of his recent political setbacks.  Behind the scenes, 
Kennedy saw a problem and then sought advice from his team of trusted experts 
to develop the best solution.  However, to the public, Kennedy had a vision for 
the future of America, which he articulated very well.  In the fashion of a true 
leader, he brought the people to agreement.  Logsdon notes, “His commitment 
captured the American imagination and was met with overwhelming support.  No 
one seemed concerned either about the difficulty or about the expense at the 
time.”89  In hindsight, it seems like a crazy idea—landing on the moon—
especially since Kennedy issued the challenge in an unprecedented public forum 
at a time when the US had logged a total of just 15 minutes in space, and had yet 
to put a human into orbit.  The daunting risk that Kennedy took speaks to the 
severity of his political quandary in 1961.  The nation was hungry for a large 
gesture to combat their geopolitical foe, the menacing Soviet bear.  Kennedy 
sensed this mindset, and in an act of supreme leadership, he brought the 
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American people along with him and showed them a way out of its, and his, 
predicament.   
The idea of landing on the moon fit perfectly into Kennedy’s theme of the New 
Frontier, and it had a certain romance surrounding it, not to mention a quite a 
large measure of patriotism.  In a time of complicated technologies like rocket 
science, and when considering the difficulties in measuring whether the US, with 
its lead in successful launches and unmanned exploration, or the USSR, with its 
success in human spaceflight, were in the lead in space exploration, Von Braun 
commented on the simplicity, clarity, and elegance of Kennedy’s challenge: 
“Everybody knows what the moon is, everybody knows what the decade is, and 
everybody can tell a live astronaut who returned from the moon from one who 
didn’t.” 90  Once it was selected as the best way to beat the USSR, the selling of 
the moon landing program to the nation was perfectly executed.  Kennedy, 
NASA, and the nation got their moon landing program.    
 
After the Decision 
 
Despite the overwhelming support from Congress and the American people, not 
everyone was on board with the moon landing program.  Kennedy’s most notable 
critic was, understandably, Dwight Eisenhower.  Eisenhower had advocated a 
more organic program that did not compete with the Soviet program for public 
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relations victories through space “spectaculars”; as outlined in NSC 5520, he 
advocated a policy and program that took care of America’s needs, especially 
those of national defense.  He advocated the Vanguard program as a civilian 
cover for the development of reconnaissance satellites and the means to launch 
them.  The launchers would be repurposed ICBMs, whose development would 
aid in the defense of the nation.  After unanticipated humiliation surrounding the 
fallout from the Soviet Sputnik triumph, Eisenhower began to support Project 
Mercury and NASA, but only as a civilian program (largely to avoid intra-service 
rivalries and for international optics).  To shore up the civilian program, 
Eisenhower took rocket-related projects from the military, such as part of Army 
Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) in Huntsville (that contained von Braun’s team) 
and JPL at Caltech, and gifted them to the newly-formed NASA, a civilian 
agency.  He allowed the military to pursue their own space initiatives, however, 
because Eisenhower knew that the US led the USSR in nuclear technology and 
would soon lead in ICBMs.  The Soviet R-7, while a capable heavy-lift launch 
vehicle, was a poor ICBM—it was inaccurate, took an inordinate amount of time 
to prepare for launch, and was produced in numbers too insignificant to pose a 
threat to the US.  Eisenhower also knew that there was in fact no missile gap; he, 
like Nixon during the 1960 presidential campaign, was prohibited from saying this 
publicly because the information was classified and of strategic value to the 
nation.  Knowing this, and being a practical and very cost-averse leader, he did 
not want to spend the huge sums of money required to produce what he 
considered “space stunts” to compete for illusory international prestige.  As such, 
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he criticized Kennedy’s Apollo decision over the years in various public forums.   
In August of 1962, Eisenhower published an article in the Saturday Evening Post 
questioning the moon landing initiative being pursued by Kennedy and NASA.   
Why the great hurry to get to the Moon and the planets?  We have already 
demonstrated that in everything except the power of our booster rockets 
we are leading the world in scientific space exploration.  From here on, I 
think we should proceed in an orderly, scientific way, building one 
accomplishment after another, rather than engaging in a mad effort to win 
a stunt race.91 
Eisenhower was not a believer in reckless national spending (as President, he 
advocated strengthening America’s nuclear capabilities because they were 
cheaper than conventional forces), and he himself was unjustly attacked by 
Kennedy and the Democrats during the run-up to the 1960 election over the non-
existent “missile gap” issue and accused of putting the nation at risk by allowing 
the USSR to achieve dominance in space.  In 1963, Eisenhower wrote a letter to 
Republican House Minority Leader Charles Halleck criticizing Kennedy’s reaction 
to Gagarin and Bay of Pigs as “almost hysterical” and immature.92  During a 
press conference in April of 1963, Kennedy was asked about Eisenhower’s 
criticism: 
Q. Mr. President, General Eisenhower has taken a crack at the national 
budget. He told Charlie Halleck in a letter that he thought it could be 
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reduced by about $13 billion. The General was especially critical of your 
space program. He said that there were enormous sums being wasted in 
that field. Would you care to comment?  
THE PRESIDENT  . . .  the United States Congress almost unanimously 
made a decision that the United States would not continue to be second in 
space. We are second in space today because we started late. It requires 
a large sum of money. I don't think we should look with equanimity upon 
the prospect that we will be second all through the sixties and possibly the 
seventies. We have the potential not to be. I think having made the 
decision last year, that we should make a major effort to be first in space. I 
think we should continue to do so.  
Now President Eisenhower--this is not a new position for him. He has 
disagreed with this, I know, at least a year or year and a half ago when the 
Congress took a different position. It is the position I think he took from the 
time of Sputnik on. But it is a matter on which we disagree.  
It may be that there is waste in the space budget. If there is waste, then I 
think it ought to be cut out by the Congress, and I am sure it will be.  But if 
we are getting to the question of whether we should reconcile ourselves to 
a slow pace in space, I don't think so.93  
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In this exchange, Kennedy goes on the offensive against Eisenhower, again 
blaming him for the US’ inferior position in space versus the Soviets and citing 
his policies as the reason for the need to play catch up, at greater expense.  In 
1965, the former President complained to astronaut Frank Borman that Kennedy 
took what Eisenhower considered a well-constructed and balanced space 
program, featuring a panoply of diverse activities that would benefit the country in 
many areas, and traded in that approach in a moment of panic in exchange for 
an all-out competition.  Eisenhower felt that the balanced space policy “was 
drastically revised and expanded just after the Bay of Pigs fiasco. . . . It 
immediately took one single project or experiment out of a thoroughly planned 
and continuing program involving communication, meteorology, reconnaissance, 
and future military and scientific benefits and gave the highest priority—
unfortunate in my opinion—to a race, in other words, a stunt.”94  Eisenhower 
criticized Kennedy’s decision publicly and privately.  And despite his public 
defense of it, there is some evidence that Kennedy himself had doubts about his 
decision to race the Soviets to the moon. 
After making his decision, Kennedy never stopped worrying about the costs of 
the Apollo program.  The Cold War cooled off noticeably following the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, and Kennedy began to question whether the cost, nearly 4% of the 
federal budget, was justified.  He revisited the decision several times before his 
death, each time soliciting his advisors’ opinions.  In addition, he made several 
public attempts to defray the costs by suggesting cooperation with the Soviets, at 
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times even offering a joint US/USSR mission to the moon. Each time, however, 
Krushchev tied any offers of Soviet cooperation to progress in nuclear 
disarmament; this was not a realistic proposal because at that time, the US had a 
decided advantage in nuclear capabilities that it was not willing to surrender.  
Later gestures to encourage space cooperation by Kennedy were met with 
Soviet demands to eliminate reconnaissance satellites, which was also 
unacceptable to the US.  In September of 1963, Kennedy told US ambassador to 
the USSR Foy Kohler that a joint mission to the moon would “save a great deal of 
expense if we could come to some type of agreement with the USSR on the 
problem of sending a man to the moon.”95  At this point, he had begun to see the 
moon program not only as a means of gaining and maintaining prestige, but as a 
powerful tool to improve international relations.  But Krushchev was not the only 
opponent of such teamwork in space.  In an attempt to head off any cooperation 
with the Soviets, the House of Representatives passed an amendment to the 
NASA appropriations bill in early October prohibiting NASA from partnering with 
“any Communist, Communist-controlled, or Communist-dominated country.”96  In 
early November of 1963, Krushchev seemed ready to accept Kennedy’s offer of 
cooperation, but further negotiations were cut short by an assassin’s bullet on 
November 22.   
That the Apollo decision was never far from Kennedy’s mind is not debatable—
there is too much evidence to the contrary to conclude that Kennedy had no 
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second thoughts about the merits of his decision.  In typical Kennedy style, he 
continued to solicit advice from many people, including other heads of state. 
At a state dinner for Tunisia’s president Habib Bourguiba the day after 
Shepard’s flight, Weisner was standing in a corner chatting with Bourguiba 
when Kennedy joined them.  ‘You know, we’re having a terrible argument 
in the White House about whether we should put a man on the moon,’ 
Kennedy said to Bourguiba.  ‘Jerry here is against it.  If I told you you’d get 
an extra billion dollars a year in foreign aid if I didn’t do it, what would be 
your advice?’  Weisner watched as Bourguiba stood silent for several 
moments.  Finally Bourguiba said, ‘I wish I could tell you to put it in foreign 
aid, but I cannot.’  ‘Kennedy went around like that all the time, to get a feel 
for what he was doing,’ Weisner said.  And the probes kept coming back 
with the same answer.  The United States did not have the option of 
withdrawing from the space race.97 
 
Before he died, Kennedy made a trip to Cape Canaveral to see firsthand the 
progress that the US space program had made under his watch.  The trip took 
place amid growing public calls to slow the pace of Project Apollo and decrease 
the NASA budget.  During his visit, Kennedy was particularly impressed by the 
Saturn I vehicle that was being prepared on the launch pad.  After learning that 
the Saturn I would carry a heavier payload than any Soviet booster, Kennedy 
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responded that the US’ lead in booster capabilities was “very, very significant.”98  
Under Kennedy’s leadership, the US had surpassed the Soviets.  Although some 
historians feel that had Kennedy lived, he would likely have slowed the trajectory 
of the space program, Logsdon argues against this belief, pointing out that a 
speech that was scheduled to be delivered by the President on November 22 
mentioned that America had no intention of finishing second in space.99   
Once Kennedy was dead, the moon landing program became, in the minds of the 
American public, a holy quest, a national obsession, a memorial to their fallen 
leader.  Less than a week after Kennedy’s death, President Johnson announced 
that Cape Canaveral would be renamed Cape Kennedy and that the launch 
facilities would be called the John F. Kennedy Space Center.  Johnson and 
Webb both at times used political appeals to Congress and others that Apollo 
should continue because it was a fitting tribute to Kennedy.  The image of John 
Kennedy and the project Apollo are still inseparable.  Kennedy, a man who had 
no interest in space, challenged the nation to land a human on the moon and 
return him safely, then drove the political process of developing the moon landing 
program to the day of his death.  Few Presidential acts since Kennedy’s death 
can match the mastery and sheer force of will that Kennedy exhibited while 
birthing Apollo, a masterpiece of leadership and political skill that stands as a 
lesson in leadership to all who follow. 
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Nature of the Decision 
 
Kennedy’s decision to race the Soviets to the moon was undoubtedly influenced 
by the events of April 1961—the triumphant flight of Yuri Gagarin and the tragic 
events in the Bay of Pigs, Cuba.  While NASA had been planning a moon 
mission, and the Kennedy administration had finally begun negotiating with 
NASA over a budget increase at this time, there were absolutely no discussions 
of a crash program to go to the moon to the exclusion of other NASA priorities.  
Historians and political scientists have their own explanations for why Kennedy 
decided that a grand action was needed.   
The evidence strongly suggests that Kennedy’s decision was based on a 
confluence of factors: international events, domestic politics, and Kennedy’s 
personality.  As we discussed in Chapter One, Kennedy was a gregarious man 
who enjoyed being in the company of others, especially others who were not like 
him.  He filled his administration with Ivy Leaguers, and leaned heavily on them 
for advice before making a decision.  This reliance seems to suggest both self-
confidence and insecurity at the same time: self confidence in the sense that 
Kennedy felt comfortable enough about himself to be seen soliciting advice from 
various sources without having to constantly assert his power as President; 
insecure in that he sought the advice of others, and may not have trusted his own 
instincts as well as he should.  Kennedy was a very complex man with a complex 
personality.  While he was alive, his competitive nature was often on display, 
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including during touch football games on the White House lawn with staff and 
reporters.   
Decades after his death, reports have surfaced of Kennedy’s risk-taking 
personality—he was not a risk-averse person—whether this involved taking 
chances publicly with the Apollo decision or during the Cuban Missile Crisis, or 
privately during his frequent dalliances and extramarital affairs.  As a young man, 
he had a relationship with a German spy while his father was Ambassador to 
England and later, while President, an affair with Judith Exner, the girlfriend of 
mobster Sam Giancana, as well as with various young White House employees.  
These affairs were conducted with the full knowledge of, and some participation 
by, Kennedy’s staff, the Secret Service and the White House press corps.  But 
unlike during the post-Watergate era, the media observed a code of silence 
about a sitting president and could be counted on to keep unfavorable facts from 
the public, whether it be President Roosevelt’s confinement to a wheelchair from 
polio or the playboy lifestyle of John Kennedy before and during his presidency.  
Stories have emerged describing how Kennedy and members of his staff would 
frolic in the White House pool with young secretaries and interns, and would be 
alerted by the Secret Service that Jacqueline Kennedy was arriving at the White 
House, at which point the women would be escorted hurriedly off the White 
House grounds.  The need for excitement evinced by such behavior may have 
played a role in Kennedy’s decision to take risks during his term.  Kennedy also 
seemed to favor tactics over long-term strategy.  This habit of mind is evident in 
his committing troops to Vietnam without a long-term plan, and also in the Apollo 
77 
 
decision—in neither case did Kennedy seem to consider the long-term 
implications of his decisions, just the immediate or near-term effects.  To be fair, 
this seems to be a weak spot in many modern presidents, not just Kennedy—
often, presidential decisions are made only after assessing the political calculus 
of the effects on their own presidential terms and legacies, and not based on how 
these decisions will affect their successors or the nation in the long term.  
Unfortunately, this is one of the major disadvantages of our system of 
government—that it is run by politicians who make political choices. 
Another secret about Kennedy that was kept from the public was his poor health.  
Kennedy suffered from constant back pain due to his World War II injury in the 
Pacific, constantly wore a back brace, and was taking painkillers most of the 
time.  He suffered from Addison’s disease, which was treated by Kennedy 
physician Max Jacobson with massive doses of steroids and amphetamines.  
Jacobson was found to have visited Kennedy at the White House no fewer than 
38 times before May 1962, and the FBI found five vials of steroids and 
amphetamines in the presidential residence.  Robert Kennedy became 
concerned with John’s relationship with Jacobson and had fifteen vials tested by 
the FDA.  Jacobson was later found guilty of 48 charges of unprofessional 
conduct by the New York State Board of Regents' Review Committee.  Kennedy 
was also the first Addison’s sufferer to survive surgery when he underwent back 
surgery in the 1950s.  Addison’s disease and the unconventional treatments by 
Jacobson on Kennedy may be an issue in an examination of the push for the 
moon because, as Oxford University’s esteemed Quarterly Journal of Medicine 
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reports, if Kennedy did in fact undergo this non-traditional medical regime, the 
symptoms of such a treatment would be impetuousness, irritability and tension.  
All of these psychological side-effects could have affected Kennedy’s decision-
making process during this time.  QJM goes on to say, however: “In fairness 
these [symptoms] were not displayed in his public life, even in the abortive Bay of 
Pigs invasion of Cuba early in his presidency.  His risk‐taking seems to have 
been mainly confined to his private life, such as seeing a Mafia leader's girlfriend 
in the White House.”100  Whether or not the steroids and amphetamines had an 
effect on Kennedy’s decision-making and, more broadly, his personality, it is 
likely that a risk-taking thrill-seeker like Kennedy could have been affected by the 
potent pharmacological cocktail coursing through his system.  Yet Kennedy’s 
decision-making abilities did not appear to be impaired during the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, in which Kennedy displayed a rational coolness that prevented a nuclear 
war. 
The events of April certainly caused Kennedy to act on space policy sooner than 
he had intended.  After using Eisenhower’s space policy and alleged failings as a 
blunt instrument against candidate Nixon during the 1960 campaign, space 
dropped almost completely off Kennedy’s radar for several months.  Kennedy 
clearly did not believe in space exploration as a worthy enterprise in itself, but 
rather, as a tool to gain and keep American prestige, and he certainly had no 
personal affinity for it.  Space was simply a tool for achieving political ends.  It 
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was only after the Gagarin flight that Kennedy called for a review of US options in 
space, and after the Cuban debacle, Kennedy became even more determined to 
use space as a way out of his predicament.  The President had found himself in 
the same position into which he and the media had placed Eisenhower after 
Sputnik:  “But suddenly it was he, not the gentlemanly general, who was 
becoming target of restive wrath in Congress and in the press.”101  The young 
President was definitely feeling the heat. 
Those who were present when the decision was made, or who knew Kennedy, 
felt that the previously mentioned events had a definite impact on Kennedy.  T. 
Keith Glennan, the first NASA Administrator (he retired in January of 1961) felt 
that both the Gagarin flight and the Bay of Pigs misadventure were the reason for 
Kennedy to ask for a “reevaluation” of US space program and policy.102  
According to Launius, Science Advisor Jerome Weisner believed that the aborted 
invasion of Cuba “had an impact,” though he was unsure as to how large that 
impact was on Kennedy; he stated “I think the President felt some pressure to 
get something else in the foreground” of public opinion a classic case of political 
misdirection of public attention.103  Logsdon quotes Weisner as saying, “I think 
the Bay of Pigs put him in a mood to run harder than he might have.”104  Weisner, 
who argued against an accelerated space program in meetings with Kennedy, 
shared some additional insights into Kennedy’s thought process in an interview 
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with Logsdon: “I think he became convinced that space was the symbol of the 
twentieth century.  It was a decision he made cold-bloodedly.  He thought it was 
good for the country.”105  While Weisner recalls that Kennedy was feeling 
immense pressure after the two events, he still suggests that there was 
rationality behind the decision.  In light of Kennedy’s later possible misgivings 
about the decision before his death, Wiesner’s characterization of the decision as 
“cold-blooded” may be interpreted to connote hasty or without sufficient 
consideration.  Special assistant to the president Arthur Schlesinger, however, 
felt that there was a definite link between the events and Kennedy’s decision.106 
Logsdon relates an interesting anecdote that provides some insight as to the 
nature of Kennedy’s space aspirations.  After Alan Shepard had been awarded 
the NASA Distinguished Service Medal by Kennedy at the White House on May 
8, the seven Mercury astronauts, Kennedy, NASA officials, and other 
administration figures gathered in the Oval Office.  Full of pride and flushed with 
success over Shepard’s flight, Kennedy “gushed with questions” for the 
assembled NASA personnel.  Kennedy announced that he aspired to US space 
primacy when he announced, “I want to be first.”107  Bob Gilruth, Director of 
NASA’s Space Task Group, which was responsible for human space flight, 
explained that in order for the US to be first, American engineers would need to 
do something so difficult that the USSR could not use their existing launch 
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systems—the Soviets would need to build a new launcher from the ground up 
and would thereby lose their current advantage.  Gilruth suggested that going to 
the moon would require entirely new systems on both sides, and that the US 
stood a good chance of winning because of that fact.  To that, Kennedy replied, “I 
want to go to the moon.”  Gilruth observed to Logsdon that Kennedy “was a 
young man; he didn’t have all the wisdom he would have had.  If he’d been older, 
he probably would never have done it.”108  Here Gilruth reflects that Kennedy’s 
youthful exuberance had a role in his accepting the risky moon landing proposal.   
Kennedy confidante Ted Sorensen thought the twin shocks of Gagarin and the 
Bay of Pigs had the effect of convincing Kennedy of the power of spectacles over 
the public imagination.109  Sorensen believed that a risky idea with a dramatic 
payoff, like a moon landing, appealed to the President’s personality: “The very 
notion of a manned flight to the moon, as impossible as that seemed, was one 
that I knew would engage President Kennedy’s keen interest.”110  While Kennedy 
had little interest in space before, Sorensen believed that after the Gagarin flight, 
the President was fully committed to “a race to the moon.”111  Sorensen later said 
that Kennedy wanted three things in space: 1) demilitarization; 2) No Soviet 
monopolization of space; 3) American scientific prestige and effort as priorities.   
“Those three goals all would have been assured in a space effort which 
culminated in our beating the Russians to the moon.  All three of them would 
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have been endangered had the Russians continued to outpace us in their space 
effort and beat us to the moon.”  But Sorensen goes on to bring up Kennedy’s 
later thoughts on space cooperation with the Soviets after the US pulled even 
with the USSR in space:  
But I believe all three of those goals would also have been assured by a 
joint Soviet-American venture to the moon. 
The difficulty was that in 1961, although the President favored joint effort, 
we had comparatively few chips to offer.  Obviously the Russians were 
well ahead of us at that time in space exploration, at least in terms of the 
bigger, more dramatic efforts of which the moon shot would be the 
culmination.  But by 1963, our effort had accelerated considerably.  There 
was a very real chance that we were even with the Soviets in this effort.112 
This seems to suggest that, as discussed earlier, Kennedy began to reevaluate 
his moon landing mandate in the light of US space parity.  Sorensen’s analysis 
suggests that Kennedy regretted committing the nation to such an expensive 
undertaking and that, even though the accelerated effort had drawn America 
even with the USSR in space and in the lead in some areas by the end of his 
term as President, he was reconsidering that commitment. 
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There is no evidence that James Webb thought Kennedy had been affected by 
Gagarin or Bay of Pigs.113  Nor did Lyndon Johnson seem to believe that there 
was any connection between Kennedy’s decision and the events of April 1961.  
Johnson wrote that Kennedy “never gave the least indication in any of our 
discussions that he thought there was any relationship.”114  Neither of these 
figures could be considered impartial sources, however; they were both 
administration figures with large stakes in an accelerated space effort.  Another 
administration member, Willis Shapley (son of astronomer Harlow Shapley), who 
worked for the BoB and was part of the decision-making process, recounted:  
after having been through quite a few major decisions, there was never a 
major decision like this made with the same degree of eyes-open, 
knowing-what-you’re-getting-in-for character.  President Kennedy, at first 
uncertain but finally convinced that the United States should accept the 
Soviet challenge in space, decided that “whatever mankind must 
undertake, free men must share.”115 
We also have eyewitness accounts of the two journalists we have already 
mentioned who knew Kennedy personally.  Hugh Sidey, who was present at 
several of the key meetings, later opined that the idea of a risky moon program 
appealed to Kennedy’s personality; the lunar landing “was a classic Kennedy 
challenge.  If it hadn’t been started, he might have invented it all, since it 
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combined all those elements of intelligence, courage, and tenacity that so 
intrigued John Kennedy.”116  Sidey believed that to the President “it was 
inconceivable that there was no way to accept the challenge and win the race if it 
was worth it and the country wanted to do it.”117  This assessment suggests a 
certain jingoistic naïveté on the part of the President.  Reporter Sid Davis in 
2003, soon after the Columbia accident, commented on how the risky nature of a 
moon landing challenge appealed to Kennedy’s personality:  
That flimsy crate, the lander, was a flimsy piece of machinery. If it didn’t 
get back in orbit up there, these guys were gone.  They were going to be 
left on the moon.  I mean there were a lot of gambles in this thing.  That’s 
still dangerous, as we learned just recently, last week.  But Kennedy was 
a visionary in that sense.  I think it came in those Kennedy genes.  They 
were gamblers.  They’re going to do it.118 [emphasis original] 
Both men knew Kennedy and spent time with him in social situations and on the 
golf course; they had a good idea of what he was like as a man.  They both felt 
that the courage/risk aspect of the moon program appealed to Kennedy’s 
psychological makeup. 
Few contemporary histories of the decision were written around the time of the 
moon decision or even during the late 1960s.  Of those that exist, two discuss the 
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Apollo decision: political scientist Vernon van Dyke’s Pride and Power: The 
Rationale of the Space Program, published in 1964, and John Logsdon’s The 
Decision to Go to the Moon: Project Apollo and the National Interest, published in 
1970 and revisited in 2011.      
Van Dyke’s book is interesting because it comes right on the heels of the 
Kennedy presidency and does not have the advantage that time and hindsight 
affords a historian or political scientist.  As such, it is a fascinating look into the 
thought processes of the time.  One must keep in mind that at the time this study 
was written, America was still a year away from the first Gemini flights, and the 
moon landing was still very much an unknown possibility.  The longest 
spaceflight for an American was Gordon Cooper’s 34-hour, 22-orbit Faith-7 flight 
in Project Mercury—America was still taking its first steps into LEO.   
In Pride, Van Dyke directly addresses whether the Bay of Pigs had an effect on 
Kennedy’s decision to race to the moon: 
Many in the United States, as we have seen, were already smarting under 
the relatively bad showing of the country in space.  NASA officials have 
cited the Gagarin flight as a factor that helped to sting the country into 
action.  The Cuban failure came a week later, carrying American prestige 
and pride to a very low point; and it may well have had a sharp impact on 
the new President personally, because responsibility for the miserable 
episode was his.  Certainly it would not be surprising if his advisers 
thought that in such circumstances he might be especially likely to 
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respond to proposals of a bold and dramatic sort, with considerable 
potential appeal, and if in fact the circumstances did affect his attitudes.  
Such speculations may or may not ever be confirmed.119 
Van Dyke goes on to discuss the types of grand gestures in space that the 
Kennedy team could have alternately selected: 
It is arguable (though doubtful) that we could gain deference more surely 
by stressing the development of capabilities in near space—especially 
military capabilities—than by stressing a lunar landing.  It is also arguable 
that other goals are more important than the attempt to enhance prestige 
by beating the Russians to the moon.  But for prestige purposes it would 
be hard to imagine any national achievement in space that would have a 
value comparable to a successful manned lunar mission and return to 
earth—unless it be a manned exploration of Mars.120 
The moon landing was still seen at this time as the essential act needed to 
combat the Soviets in space; however, it was still viewed as a unitary act rather 
than as a complex technological feat, with tens of thousands, if not millions, of 
elements, variables, and procedures, all of which needed to function correctly.   
Van Dyke ascribes the decision to go to the moon as one dominated by national 
pride, which had been bruised by Sputnik, then Gagarin and the Bay of Pigs; the 
moon program decision was one of foreign policy, although a foreign policy 
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decision that relied primarily on technological means for resolution: “The 
evidence is abundant that the complex of values here identified with pride was a 
powerful factor in influencing the President and Congress to expand and 
accelerate the space program in the spring of 1961, and that it has remained an 
important factor ever since.”  Unfortunately, Van Dyke’s account follows the 
events too closely in time for him to be afforded access to the inner workings of 
Kennedy and his advisors.  The documents he needed to make his case were 
still classified as secret. 
Logsdon’s original version of The Decision to Go to the Moon cites Van Dyke’s 
book as a stimulus for choosing the moon landing decision as the topic for his 
doctoral dissertation.  Logsdon had the good fortune of interviewing many of the 
people who were directly involved with the Apollo program and who had access 
to many of NASA’s resources, so he is able to give us an inside view of the 
decision-making process.  One mistake that Logsdon makes, however, is 
claiming that understanding how the Apollo decision was made can lead to a 
better understanding of how to influence those type of decisions in the future.  
The Apollo decision was a unique decision made during unique circumstances; a 
similar situation will probably never be repeated.  As discussed earlier, “space 
exploration by presidential fiat” was a misrepresentation of the genesis of the 
Apollo program and although it has been tried by other presidents, all of them 
have failed.   
In any case, Logsdon’s book was a vital analysis of the Apollo decision, and the 
insights it provides form the basis for how we understand the decision that 
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Kennedy made.  Any serious discussion of the decision since the early 1970s 
cites this reference, which remains the seminal account of the event, only 
eclipsed by Logsdon’s own revision.  The second edition fills out the narrative on 
the Kennedy administration side with primary source material, such as 
administration memos, letters, and recorded conversations documenting the 
actual turn of events, items that were not available to researchers or the general 
public at the time of the writing of the original account.  Many of Logsdon’s 
insights in this book have been revisited, illuminated, and placed into context.  
When discussing Logsdon’s take on Kennedy’s decision, we will draw from the 
accounts and sources in his later book.   
In a 1979 article for Astronautics & Aeronautics, Logsdon makes a very insightful 
and salient point.  Whether the US had ever met its goal in beating the Soviets to 
the moon by the end of the decade or had failed to achieve this goal, Kennedy’s 
challenge served a more immediate short-term effect.  In announcing such a 
large and audacious ambition, Kennedy thereby neutered the effects of Soviets 
space successes to come.  Unless the Soviets were to land on the moon, their 
efforts would be measured against America’s desire to land on the moon and be 
found wanting: the proposed moon landing became the measuring stick by which 
all space activities would be measured.  “By entering the race with such a visible 
and dramatic commitment, the United States effectively undercut Soviet space 
spectaculars without doing much except announcing its intention to join the 
contest.”121 
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Modern accounts of the moon landing decision, as we have discussed, have the 
benefit of hindsight and of more available primary source materials.  What will 
always be missing, however, is a memoir of the period written by the President 
himself—he never had a post-presidential period of reflection and memoir writing.  
Such an account surely would have served to help sort out what Kennedy had in 
fact been thinking, rather than relying on eyewitness accounts, testaments to 
Kennedy’s character, or primary source documents.   
Walter McDougall comes to the conclusion that it is impossible to know what 
Kennedy had been thinking at the time of the decision.  He infers that what “may 
have tipped the balance for him and for many was the spinal chill of leaving the 
moon to the Soviets.  Perhaps Apollo could not be justified, but, by God, we 
could not not do it.”122  Kennedy had been placed in a tough situation, but the 
ramifications of inaction, Soviet mastery of space and world opinion, were worse 
than the downside of the moon program.  (McDougall also asserts that Kennedy 
fell prey to his liberal belief that certain behaviors should be subject to political 
control, resulting in large, technocratic projects moving from the military into the 
private realm.)  Kennedy thought of himself as a man of action—W.D. Kay notes 
that during the presidential campaign of 1960, Kennedy wanted to impress this 
idea on the populace.  Perhaps to counter any claim that Kennedy was too young 
and inexperienced for the White House, he turned his youth and energy into an 
advantage as he campaigned (one wonders how much of this was compensation 
for Addison’s Disease, which sapped his energy).  “Kennedy was a younger man 
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[than Eisenhower] who wished to convey an impression of vigor and vitality.  He 
campaigned on a pledge to ‘get America moving again.’”123  This image stood in 
stark contrast to the previous administration, which Kennedy painted as old and 
slow-moving.  Kennedy promoted a public persona of dynamism and forward 
thinking, and the Apollo decision was a dynamic, dramatic, and forward-thinking 
gesture.  Moreover, Kennedy could not not do anything, especially after he spent 
months criticizing Eisenhower of inaction and now found himself in a similar 
predicament to that of the elderly general. 
Other historians have also agreed that Gagarin and the Bay of Pigs had a 
definite effect on the decision.  J. Henry Lambright feels that the twin events of 
April 1961 forced Kennedy’s hand.  “Although no explicit evidence links the Bay 
of Pigs to Kennedy’s actions on space, the fiasco created an atmosphere in the 
White House in which the President felt he had to exert leadership right away.”124  
Nathan Goldman believes this to be the case, and argues that the events forced 
Kennedy to look seriously at US space efforts.  While Kennedy campaigned on 
missile and space issues, he did little on either once in the White House.  It was 
“only after the Gagarin flight did Kennedy undertake a major review of space 
technology and space planning and make the calculated decision that the only 
way to meet the Russian challenge was to meet it at the source of Russian 
prestige—in the space arena.”125  Hardesty and Eisman also concur—the 
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decision to go to the moon was a Cold War-based decision that “must be viewed 
through the prism of the rivalry between the two superpowers.  The intense 
competition engendered a strongly felt American need to respond to Soviet 
space triumphs by showing that America was at least capable as the Soviets in 
this area.”126   
T.A. Heppenheimer ascribes Kennedy’s decision to this Cold War competition 
and Kennedy’s sense of the march of history. 
Waging total cold war, Kennedy believed that it was essential to deny 
Moscow propaganda victories as well as military ones. A prime topic for 
propaganda was spaceflight, and in no way would Kennedy concede that 
the Soviets might concentrate resources into this area while failing their 
citizens in a host of ways that were far more important. The issue was one 
of national prestige, what in earlier times had been known as national 
honor: if the world viewed space as important and saw that the Soviets 
were ahead, then America would have to meet this challenge and take the 
lead.127 
Heppenheimer also suggests that Kennedy’s sense of his own legacy had much 
to do with the decision.  “Apollo suited his sense of history, his view of the future, 
his spirit as a man.  It was also very important in that it could deny Moscow 
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further victories and help to hold the line in the Third World.”128  Kennedy had a 
keen sense of history, having written two books on the subject, and understood 
the effects that such an ambitious challenge would have on the nation and the 
world.  Heppenheimer does not seem to think that the decision was rushed, 
short-term, or panicked.  He believes that Kennedy fully understood that the 
moon program decision was a way to put all of America’s advantages to work 
against the Soviets, including technology and economic powers as well, where 
Kennedy understood America held an advantage.  In an argument similar to Bob 
Gilruth’s, Heppenheimer lays out Kennedy’s reasoning: 
[The moon program] represented a simple and dramatic goal that 
everyone could understand.  It appeared reachable during that decade, 
and would not impose a prolonged effort that might lose public interest.  In 
addition to this, the moon was demanding enough to call for an entirely 
new array of launch vehicles and spacecraft, requiring far more power 
than the Soviet rockets of the day could provide.  The Soviet lead in 
rocketry would not help them; like the Americans, they would have to start 
afresh.  Kennedy believed, correctly, that in the resulting competition the 
U.S. would prove more capable in coming up with the enormous sums of 
money that would be necessary to reach the moon.129 
Eugene Emme agrees with Heppenheimer and attributes the decision to 
Kennedy’s personality and sense of history.  “John F. Kennedy’s quick memory 
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and his acute political instincts, his love of competition, debate, and winning, his 
intellectual and his managerial sense of history—these unsimple virtues were to 
be increasingly evident in the course of space history.”130  The moon landing 
decision satisfied Kennedy’s predilection for all of these skills: it is a way to solve 
a political problem with a political solution; it sets up a direct competition with the 
Soviets that his predecessor avoided; he had to win the nation and Congress 
over with his oratory, a form of public debate; he expected that this was a way to 
win against the Soviets, who boasted of an advantage; and it certainly appealed 
to his sense of history in that it would take its place among great American 
triumphs over implacable foes, much like the Manhattan Project.  Kennedy’s 
solution to his immediate problem satisfied all of his personal needs as well as 
resolving a national need for increased prestige.  It also fulfilled his desire for 
risk-taking, since at the time it was the riskiest of endeavors from a national 
perspective and would at the time of the missions involve great personal risk and 
heroism for the astronauts involved.    
Logsdon’s original assertion that Kennedy’s decision was an example of the 
“Rational Choice Model,” first asserted in his 1970 book, is reiterated unchanged 
in his 2011 update.  The rational choice model assumes that after a desired 
outcome is identified, a decision-maker analyzes various options, deciding on the 
option that appears to offer the best cost-to-benefit ratio.  The decision is thus 
made by being deliberate and pragmatic, although the desired outcome or 
solution to a problem does not necessarily need to be pragmatic.  Logsdon 
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places the Apollo decision squarely in the context of the Cold War, considering it 
to be the last major political act of the Cold War.  Once Kennedy decided that 
beating the Soviets in space was the solution to the national and his personal 
problems, the rational choice model for decision-making became active, and 
Kennedy began a deliberative process that ended with selecting a moon landing 
as the solution.  The rational choice model makes sense in the context of 
meeting the objective, but was the objective itself, or Kennedy’s reaction to the 
crisis rational?  Logsdon argues that the nature of determining the objective is 
irrelevant to the rational choice model.   
Logsdon argues that after the historian analyzes his decision-making process, 
President Kennedy “emerges as a pragmatic political leader who soon after 
entering office came to see the US civilian space program as an important tool to 
advance US foreign policy and national security goals.  He was flexible in his 
approach to space activities, willing to compete if necessary but preferring to 
cooperate if possible.”131  Logsdon argues that Kennedy did not make a single, 
irrational, spot decision, but rather a series of decisions, each one after careful 
deliberation of facts and anticipated effects.  Kennedy may have been willing to 
cooperate before the Bay of Pigs event and after he made the Apollo decision, 
but the idea that the US could cooperate with the USSR as a solution for the 
crisis was never considered.  Logsdon considers Kennedy’s emotions and 
examines the President’s personality, but cites insufficient evidence for factoring 
them into his equation.  “How much Kennedy’s emotional state and competitive 
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character determined or merely reinforced his resolve to proceed rapidly in space 
cannot be definitively known, but most evidence shows that they were influential 
but not decisive factors.”132 Instead, Logsdon attributes Kennedy’s decision to a 
basic rationality, as he did with Eisenhower: 
Eisenhower had come to a different judgment of the importance of space 
achievement (or rather its lack of importance) in terms of preserving US 
global leadership, which he saw as being based more on a sound 
defense, fiscal soundness, and social stability.  John Kennedy, with his 
much more activist approach to government, had an opposing view.  
Kennedy was not at all a visionary in the sense of having a belief in the 
value of future space exploration; rather, his vision was that space 
capability would be an essential element of future national power, and 
thus that the United States should not by default allow the Soviet Union to 
have a monopoly of large-scale capabilities to operate in this ‘new ocean.’  
I believe that this was a wise judgment, one from which the United States 
has benefitted over the past half century.133 
Logsdon does take into consideration that Kennedy’s solution resolved his 
personal political problems at the same time that he resolved the nation’s issues, 
but prioritizes the nation’s problems over Kennedy’s problems in terms of the 
objective that the decision sought to address.  “Certainly the immediate stimulus 
to the decision to go to the Moon was the threat to US global leadership posed 
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by the world’s reaction to Soviet space successes at the same time as the United 
States looked weak in its conduct in the Bay of Pigs fiasco.  Kennedy’s desire to 
regain his personal prestige and his administration’s momentum were also 
problems addressed by the Apollo choice.”134  Logsdon argues that Kennedy’s 
decision was not a personal one, but that of a great leader.  That the decision 
solved Kennedy’s personal political issues were coincidental.  Logsdon sums up 
his case with the closing argument: 
In summary then, I conclude that President Kennedy’s commitment to a 
lunar landing program as the centerpiece of an effort to establish US 
space leadership was the result of thoughtful consideration, particularly 
given that it was reiterated a number of times between May 1961 and 
November 1963.  The commitment was publicly embellished with 
rhetorical flourishes, but at its core was a Cold War-driven but rational 
policy choice.”135 
In a surprising conclusion to his book, Logsdon’s evaluation of Apollo’s effect on 
the US space program as being a negative one is brutally honest for someone 
who clearly loves Kennedy and the Apollo program.  He agrees with Kennedy’s 
decision, but believes that the prosecution of the program has ultimately hurt 
NASA.  Logsdon feels that Apollo was the product of a particular moment in time, 
one not to be repeated; this moment in time, the moon landing, was the first 
globally-shared human experience.   
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Roger Launius, the Head Curator of the National Air & Space Museum’s Human 
Spaceflight collection and a prolific space historian, has authored countless 
books, collections, and articles on the US space program, and pn Apollo in 
particular.  His view on Kennedy’s decision is that it was driven by events, a 
once-in-a-lifetime set of circumstances that allowed such an unlikely decision to 
be made.  To Logsdon, it wasn’t simply the Gagarin and Bay of Pigs incidents, 
but a larger set of historical forces, that influenced the decision.  “A unique 
confluence of political necessity, personal commitment and activism, scientific 
and technological ability, economic prosperity, and public mood made possible 
the 1961 decision to carry out an aggressive lunar landing program.”136  The 
geopolitical effects of World War II were still being felt, and the two superpowers 
were slugging it out for world opinion and world supremacy.  Modern 
communications methods such as radio, television, and newspapers guaranteed 
that the press’ impression of events had become as influential as the events 
themselves had in years past.  Kennedy needed to not only battle the Soviets in 
military, political, and economic arenas, but also in the world press which, in its 
influence as shaper of world opinion, became another front of the Cold War.  And 
on many of these fronts, Apollo seemed like an ideal solution.  “As Apollo was a 
remedial action ministering to a variety of political and emotional needs floating in 
the ether of world opinion.  Apollo addressed these problems very well, and was 
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a worthwhile action if measured only in those terms.”137  Launius seems here to 
suggest that only when taken in terms of geopolitical value could the Apollo 
decision be deemed a good one.  Launius is not as positive regarding Kennedy’s 
decision as is Logsdon, and has some reservations.  He cites the Bay of Pigs as 
the trigger for the decision, much as the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand by 
Gavrilo Princip was the trigger that started the First World War; other, larger 
factors had built over years, and the incident served to set things in motion—the 
same may be said regarding Apollo.  “While the Bay of Pigs invasion was never 
mentioned explicitly as a reason for stepping up US efforts in space, the 
international situation certainly played a role as Kennedy scrambled to recover a 
measure of national dignity.”138  Launius mentions, as do most of the other 
historians, that the President sought to restore national dignity, but I find it 
interesting that Launius uses the word “scramble” here—“scrambling” denotes an 
element of chaos and perhaps a touch of desperation.  And what Launius does 
not mention is that Kennedy was also scrambling to restore a semblance of his 
own political dignity, which had suffered more than our national dignity.   
Launius takes issue with Logsdon’s assertion that Kennedy’s decision followed 
the “Rational Choice Model” and that the decision was a logical one.  Launius 
argues that Kennedy’s decision was politically pragmatic, but that it was not 
entirely rational in nature.  Launius suggests that the decision was “muddled 
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through” rather than decided upon rationally.  Launius believes that Kennedy’s 
personality comes into play much more than does Logsdon: 
Kennedy’s tortured background and aggressive tendencies may have 
affected his decision making process, causing him to take a more 
combative approach towards the Soviet Union than required and 
necessitating “winning” at whatever challenges came his way.  At some 
level, Kennedy may have created some crisis situations wherein he 
reaffirmed his quintessential masculinity and enhanced his own 
dominance over everyone and everything.   Most of these analyses depict 
Kennedy in an unfavorable light and focus on his tendencies towards 
competitiveness, recklessness and ambition.  
President Kennedy’s assertive self-confidence may have provided an 
important element of the “Camelot mystique” but carried to a logical 
conclusion, it also led to tense Cold War situations in which on more than 
one occasion nuclear holocaust became a probable outcome.  At the 
same time, that assertiveness hid a Kennedy weakness for indecisiveness 
and procrastination until pressed to take a stand.  That, coupled with the 
lack of any essential ideology beyond a basic anticommunism and a faith 
in active government, ensured that there was more to the Apollo decision 
than rational action.139   
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Launius takes the view that Kennedy’s rationality and his emotions contributed  
to his decision to go to the moon.  Kennedy’s initial reaction was emotional, since 
his leadership was being questioned, but once he decided he needed a “big” 
solution, he methodically worked through the possible solutions with his trusted 
advisors, of which there were many. 
I must agree more with Launius than I do Logsdon.  Kennedy’s personality traits 
are well-documented.  To think that just three months after taking office that a 
confidence shattering series of events took place in full view of the world, that a 
man with Kennedy’s temperament would reaction in a totally logical manner is, I 
think, a stretch.  Having grown up after Kennedy’s murder (I was born in 1962), I 
was not affected by his tragic death, but was surrounded by those who were.  He 
was always a martyred President, much like Lincoln—tragic to say the least, but 
a historical figure for whom I had no emotional memories.  All of the presidents 
since Kennedy were affected by their diverse personalities and predilictions.  I 
must assume that Kennedy’s decision emanated from an emotional response to 
events as much as it did from his rational response to events and conditions, in 
the absence of convincing data to suggest otherwise. 
This brings us to Michael Beschloss, who wrote an essay in 1997 that criticized 
Kennedy’s moon landing decision as being emotional, irrational, and ill-
considered.  Beschloss agreed with Eisenhower that Kennedy’s decision 
suggested panic and immaturity. 
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It is a measure of Kennedy’s aversion to long-term planning and his 
tendency to be rattled by momentary crises that one may conclude that in 
the absence of a Gagarin triumph and the Bay of Pigs fiasco in April 1961, 
he might never have gone to the length of asking Congress to spend $20 
billion on a crash Moon program.  Kennedy’s desire for a quick, theatrical 
reversal of his new administration’s flagging position, especially just before 
a summit with Krushchev, is a more potent explanation of his Apollo 
decision than any other.  Johnson’s desire for turf, McNamara’s desire to 
use aerospace overcapacity, and Kennedy’s own conviction that a Moon 
program was consistent with what Sorensen called ‘the New Frontier spirit 
of discovery’—these things helped the decision along, but none was so 
important.140 
Beschloss’ damning rationale for Kennedy’s decision assumes that the worst 
attributes of a person’s personality override the nobler.  While Beschloss 
believed that Kennedy’s behavior during the Cuban Missile Crisis was 
exemplary, his view that Kennedy, while achieving his immediate political 
objectives, “did not necessarily think much about the long-term 
consequences.”141  Beschloss goes further with his assessment that the Apollo 
program was a wrong decision: 
As Kennedy concluded, his decision for an accelerated Moon landing was 
ultimately a political decision made in terms of cold war strategy.  How 
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does it stand up now that the cold war is over?  Not well.  We now know 
that the reason the Soviet Union gave up in that struggle was that it 
recognized that it could not compete with the Western economies and 
Western societies in those areas of life and death that mattered.  Although 
the Moon program contributed a great deal to the United States, the tens 
of billions of dollars spent in the 1960s on what Kennedy essentially 
thought of as world propaganda could probably have been better devoted 
to US defense or the American domestic economy, and that might have 
convinced the Soviets more quickly of the fruitlessness of the tragic 
conflict with the United States.142 
There is no conclusive evidence either way as to why Kennedy made his 
decision to set America on the path to the moon, such as a diary entry or a 
memoir that Kennedy himself wrote.  Historians and political scientists alike have 
argued that the decision was a rational one and others have argued that it was a 
reaction to a momentary crisis.  The answer probably lies somewhere in 
between. 
It is also interesting to consider whether Kennedy would have made the Apollo 
decision had the Bay of Pigs invasion not turned out so poorly.  I tend to think 
that because space was not an issue on the forefront of Kennedy’s mind when 
the incident occurred, the US space program would have progressed at a more 
natural rate.  After the Gagarin mission, Kennedy began to consider a moon 
mission to establish American dominance in space, but the cost was considered 
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too high—the very definition of the Rational Choice Model.  It was not until the 
political fallout of the Bay of Pigs hit that the issue was raised to crisis level.  It is 
here that the Rational Choice Model rationale breaks down.  The choice would 
have the same outcome as it would have had just after Gagarin.  However, the 
cost was now deemed to be acceptable in a cost-benefits analysis—the Rational 
Choice Model fails.  Roger Launius sums up this alternate reality neatly: 
Had the balance of power and prestige between the United States and the 
Soviet Union remained stable in the spring of 1961, it is quite possible that 
Kennedy would never have advanced his Moon program and the direction 
of American space efforts might have taken a radically different course.  
Kennedy seemed quite happy to allow NASA to execute Project Mercury 
at a deliberate pace, working toward the orbit of an astronaut sometime 
before the middle of the decade, and to build on the satellite programs that 
were yielding excellent results both in terms of scientific knowledge and 
practical application.  Jerome Weisner reflected: ‘If Kennedy could have 
opted out of a big space program without hurting the country in his 
judgment, he would have.’143 
While some historians view Kennedy as weak and not totally in charge of events 
and foreign policy, and while others view Kennedy as strong, in charge, and an 
insightful leader, the full narrative that is laid out in Logsdon’s book and in the 
accounts of the other historians and political scientists illustrate that Kennedy 
                                                            
143
 Launius, History, 58. 
104 
 
was a “complex figure whose personality embraced elements of both images.”144  
Kennedy’s vision that space capabilities would be intricately entwined with 
national power is a view with which Logsdon agrees: “I believe that [the moon 
program] was a wise judgment, one from which the United States has benefitted 
over the past half century.”145   
Kennedy’s decision was a complex one that provided America with perhaps its 
proudest moment—two humans walking on the surface of another planet.  It also 
cost the nation dearly in treasure, and was scaled back after the mid-1960s due 
to conflicting priorities as judged by President Lyndon Johnson, who was 
prosecuting the war in Vietnam, a Kennedy legacy (although Johnson 
accelerated the effort), the Apollo program, another Kennedy legacy, and the 
Great Society initiative, Johnson’s legacy.  The budgetary pressure from these 
three factors eventually caused Congress to slash NASA’s budget, and the war 
eventually destroyed Johnson politically.   
However, despite the Apollo 1 tragedy and delays, Neil Armstrong and Buzz 
Aldrin planted the American flag on the plains of the Sea of Tranquility on July 
20, 1969, six months ahead of Kennedy’s deadline, and ahead of the Soviets, 
who had unsuccessfully prosecuted their own moon program.  The Apollo 
program, and in particular, the first lunar landing of Apollo 11, has been hailed as 
the high point of the century.   
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Several days after the historic landing of Eagle, as the world was still celebrating 
that humanity was now a multi-planet species, the engineers in the mission 
control room were reminded why they were all there.  When the Columbia 
splashed down, the center view screen in Houston’s Mission Control room, which 
had up to now displayed trajectory data, went black.  When it relit, it displayed: 
I believe that this nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before 
this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely 
to earth.    
--John F. Kennedy to Congress, May 1961 
Then the right-hand screen, which had been showing the mission patch, 
displayed: 
 Task Accomplished. July 1969. 
Kennedy’s decision, made over the course of several weeks, drove 400,000 
Americans for eight years, at unprecedented cost, through tragedy and triumph, 
culminating in an event inconceivable just 20 years earlier.  Although he never 
lived to see the results of his challenge, John Kennedy and the Apollo program 
will likely be the one event from the 20th century remembered centuries years 
from now.   
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CHAPTER III 
RICHARD M. NIXON AND THE SHUTTLE DECISION 
 
Apollo in an Era of Change 
 
In the late 1960s, NASA had brought triumph to the United States by fulfilling 
John Kennedy’s challenge to get to the moon and back by the end of the decade.  
The task had taken tens of billions of dollars, the tireless efforts of over 400,000 
people, and eight years to accomplish.  During that time, getting to the moon 
within Kennedy’s mandated timeframe and before the Soviets was NASA’s 
monomaniacal quest.  As discussed in Chapter Two, the spirit of the martyred 
President animated and drove NASA’s activities during this period.  Both 
President Lyndon Johnson and NASA Administrator James Webb appealed to 
Kennedy’s legacy when waning public and Congressional interest resulted in 
decreasing budgets after 1966, deftly avoiding program cancellation, even after 
the Apollo 1 accident and inquiry.  As the Golden Era neared its peak with the 
planned series of ten lunar landings, NASA began to plan for their next ten years, 
which they saw as even more grand and dramatic than the preceding ten.  NASA 
envisioned a space station, a space shuttle to get there, a permanent moon 
base, a space tug, a trip to Mars, and other spectacular and ambitious projects. 
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Until now, NASA had operated with an unprecedented budget (although it had 
been scaled back from 4% of the federal budget) and maximum political clout in 
the person of James Webb, a veteran politician who knew just how to work 
Congress in NASA’s favor.  But while Webb was a political master, he had 
steered NASA through a largely favorable political climate.  Apollo had been 
spearheaded by Kennedy, had been approved almost unanimously by Congress, 
and had enjoyed the good will of the nation.  After Kennedy’s death, it became 
something of a sacred tribute to Kennedy’s memory, and although President 
Johnson had become entangled with the Vietnam war and the escalating costs of 
his Great Society social initiatives, Apollo was in no real danger of being 
cancelled before it could fulfill its destiny by landing on the moon. 
The events that would soon take place would change the nation and NASA 
forever.  The Cold War was largely on hiatus, and although the Soviets continued 
to engage the US in proxy wars and in space, the threat of nuclear annihilation 
had largely abated after the Cuban Missile Crisis.  The national culture shifted 
over the decade from a Cold War mentality to a more liberal, socially-conscious 
culture that enabled the Civil Rights movement, the anti-war movement, the 
environmental movement, feminist movement, growing counterculture and social 
permissiveness, and a general lack of trust in the government, which spread 
throughout the nation.  Assassinations, race riots, domestic terrorism, and a 
general unrest shifted the national mood from one that was tense because of the 
perceived Soviet threat to one of internal tension caused by shifting priorities and 
changing mores.   
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NASA was oblivious to much of this shift because their employees were working 
long hours to meet Kennedy’s deadline, and they missed the changes that were 
occurring on the street and on television.  One need only compare the colorful 
clothes and long hair worn by people on the street at that time to the white shirts, 
crew cuts, and pocket protectors evident in the NASA control rooms to see that 
the culture had shifted without NASA.  As an organization, NASA seemed frozen 
in the early 1960s, and the management’s thought process was seemingly stuck 
in that mode as well.   NASA was born of Cold War competition and grew to an 
enormous size in that environment.   Having missed the cultural revolution, they 
planned for a future under the old assumptions—that NASA was fighting a quasi-
military battle on the frontlines of the Cold War.  This was no longer the case, but 
NASA had not changed its internal mindset to reflect the changes.  Perhaps it 
was bureaucratic inertia or the hubris that comes with competing head-to-head 
with a mortal enemy in full view of the world and winning, but NASA was 
suddenly out of phase with the rest of the nation and its priorities.  NASA 
administration believed that their triumph and their elevated place in the theater 
of geopolitics would guarantee continued growth, but the soil that had nourished 
it for so many years would no longer support its inflated budget. 
Astronaut William Anders’ iconic photograph of the “Earthrise” taken during the 
Apollo 8 mission in late December 1968 elicited a visceral reaction for the 
astronauts who witnessed the event firsthand and for all who viewed the 
photograph.  It pictured the Earth with no political boundaries, floating solitary in 
the blackness of space with a wispy-thin atmosphere, appearing very vulnerable 
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and alone in the cosmos.  The image prompted epiphanies in many minds, 
revealing that the Earth was fragile and that humans needed to become better 
stewards of it.  This image, with the associated concept, was immediately 
appropriated by the budding environmental movement, and it quickly became a 
popular poster that hung in many American bedrooms.  The “Earthrise” revelation 
was indicative of a more general “awakening” in the public that while traveling 
into space was admirable, it was our duty to solve problems back on the planet 
first and foremost.   
President Johnson, worn down by prosecuting the War in Vietnam and the War 
on Poverty, decided not to run for reelection.  Richard Nixon won the presidency 
in 1968, and assumed office over a very different America than in 1960.  Nixon 
also inherited a flourishing Apollo program, one that was ready to land on the 
moon and fulfill Kennedy’s challenge.  It is arguable whether Nixon would have 
chosen the same path as Kennedy in going to the moon; the evidence strongly 
suggests that Nixon would have continued Eisenhower’s organic space program, 
which operated at a natural pace and certainly did not attempt to race against the 
Soviets.  Original NASA Administrator T. Keith Glennan would likely have stayed 
on had Nixon beaten Kennedy in 1960, and he probably would not have pushed 
for Apollo to the degree that Webb did under Kennedy.  What Nixon did with this 
thriving program is the opposite of what Kennedy did: Nixon sought to scale the 
US space program back drastically.  Nixon was more fiscally conservative and 
wanted to dramatically reduce government spending on the War, on the Great 
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Society initiatives, and in space; he felt that the federal budget was bloated, as 
did Eisenhower, and sought to slash it.   
Nixon’s governing style was very different from Kennedy’s.  While Kennedy was 
gregarious and sought input from many quarters (including threatening to ask the 
White House janitors for an answer to how the US could beat the Soviets in 
space), Nixon sought to isolate himself from others, trusting only a few long-time 
friends and aides, from whom he took counsel.  Nixon held very few meetings 
with people outside these few aides, preferring to rely on his trusted inner circle.  
Unfortunately for NASA, there were few in this group who advocated for the 
aggressive space policy that NASA envisioned.  Nixon also differed from 
Kennedy on foreign policy.  Where Kennedy often found himself aggressively 
challenging the Soviets head-to-head, Nixon adopted a more statesmanlike 
approach, preferring diplomacy and negotiation to conflict.  Since NASA was 
structured at that time to compete directly with the Soviets, Nixon sought to 
change it.  And finally, the political will that enabled Kennedy to appeal to 
Congress and the nation and win their approval for an aggressive space program 
had vanished.  The Congress was currently more concerned with the domestic 
problems of the United States.  The war against communism in Vietnam had 
bogged down and was draining the national treasury; many in Congress thought 
that money would be better spent at home rather than either halfway around the 
globe or on the moon. “The conditions that made Apollo possible in the 1960s 
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were not present in the new decade.  For NASA, the policy problem was not how 
to go to Mars but how to keep the space program alive.”146 
NASA, once enjoying favored status within the nation and the government, now 
had to take its place beside the nation’s other more pressing priorities.  For the 
first time in its history, NASA had to become political, had to justify its existence 
and even had to fight for its survival.  After Nixon failed to approve NASA’s lofty 
plans for the future, it was forced to fight for anything, something for which it was 
not culturally equipped.  The national space agency was forced to transform itself 
from an idealistic institution fighting for the American way to a political animal 
fighting for whatever it could get. 
The shuttle decision gave NASA its political baptism.  Unable to get their 
overall vision approved, NASA scientists and engineers plunged into the 
morass of incremental politics.  They had to negotiate shuttle design 
details with the White House staff.  They felt obliged to accept a 
technologically inferior program in order to win political support, and they 
had to engage in the game of bureaucratic politics, seeking outside 
support from groups like the military, who came to NASA’s aid.147 
NASA no longer had an advocate in the White House and found itself in very 
different and new territory.  The agency tried to continue on in the same mode as 
it had in most of the 1960s, but this approach was soundly rejected by the new 
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administration, in preference for a minimalist approach to space.  Lambright and 
Van Nijnatten captured the mood of the era accurately when they made the 
following assessment: 
The heroic years of NASA were followed in the 1970s by less-spectacular 
actions in a very different decade.  NASA may have wanted to go to Mars, 
but political leaders and the general public had other priorities.  When von 
Braun died in 1977, his original step-by-step paradigm continued, but 
NASA was back at an earlier point in the trajectory than it had been in 
1969.148 
President Nixon denied NASA’s plans for a suite of grand projects, instead 
asking them to select one project from the list as a consolation.  “Faced with a 
choice between the Space Transportation System and a space station, NASA 
officials selected the former.  They also decided to pursue the remaining 
elements in their unapproved long-range plan incrementally, one by one, waiting 
to advance the space station until the shuttle became operational.”149   Nixon 
approved the space shuttle plans, but the incredible technical infrastructure 
created for the Apollo program was left to wither and die.  How did this happen?  
Why was NASA denied the support it thought it had earned at the very moment 
of its greatest triumph?  Why did a man who was an advocate of the space 
program slash NASA nearly to the bone and leave it with a vehicle in search of a 
mission? 
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Early Nixon Presidency 
 
Richard Nixon, who we have seen was an advocate of space exploration when a 
presidential candidate in 1960, was again nominated by the Republican Party to 
run for president in 1968 against Senator Hubert Humphrey.  Nixon campaigned 
on the argument that the US should never be second in space, but, like Kennedy, 
he did not back up his words with actions once he won the presidency.  The 
same phenomenon took place under Johnson, before Nixon—Johnson was a 
space advocate until he became President, at which point, he oversaw a steady 
decline in NASA’s budget, just as Nixon did.  And like Kennedy, Nixon would 
probably not have addressed space at all, but circumstances forced the issue.   
Rather than world events’ forcing a decision on Nixon, it was Johnson who did 
so, leaving the formulation of space policy for his successor.  James Webb, 
NASA Administrator under both Johnson and Kennedy, tried unsuccessfully to 
get Johnson to dictate NASA’s future the way Kennedy had done.  Webb wanted 
the full support of the President, whose leadership would drive political 
consensus.  Johnson would not comply, and the effect was to make no decision 
at all on the strategic direction of NASA. The decision and direction were left for 
Nixon to determine.  Joan Hoff comments that “this is unsurprising, because 
Johnson also deliberately postponed implementing desegregation of southern 
schools so that this controversial task would likewise fall on the Nixon watch.  
Had it not been for Johnson’s procrastination, Nixon would not have immediately 
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turned his attention to space policy.”150  In February 1969, Nixon commissioned a 
Space Task Group (STG), which was charged with making recommendations on 
the future direction of NASA.  However, Nixon had in his mind that he wanted to 
reduce NASA for fiscal and political, but also very personal reasons.   
Well before the moon landing, Richard Nixon was calculating how he 
could minimize the space program’s further influence on popular and 
political culture, since he believed—rightly, as it turned out—that the glory 
of the moon program would be forever associated with his predecessors 
Kennedy and Johnson, whom he loathed.151 
Nixon considered shutting NASA down entirely, but he did not want to be the 
President who ended human spaceflight, which was very popular after the Apollo 
11 success.  However, with each successive moon shot, the American people 
became less and less interested, television coverage withered after Apollo 11.  
Nixon greatly enjoyed being the President when humans first landed on the 
moon, which he displayed by grandstanding.  For example, several minutes after 
the astronauts left the LM to walk on the surface of the moon for the first time in 
history, Nixon called Armstrong and Aldrin on the lunar surface in perhaps the 
greatest presidential photo opportunity ever.  It was, in typical Nixon style, 
awkward, but Armstrong, as always, was gracious and found elegant words in 
the strangest of situations.  It was Nixon’s name, not Kennedy’s, that was etched 
on the plaques on the LM legs that were left on the lunar surface, and it was 
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Nixon who greeted the Apollo 11 astronauts on the deck of the USS Hornet on 
their arrival back on Earth.  The political benefits for Nixon bestowed by NASA 
and the crew of Apollo 11 and of subsequent moon landings were incalculable, 
but Nixon persisted in believing that the landings would be Kennedy’s legacy, 
which he could not tolerate.  Accordingly, Nixon cancelled the scheduled Apollos 
18, 19, and 20, even though the money had already been spent in building the 
Saturn V launch vehicles and Apollo CSM and LMs for the three missions.  
Nixon, while frugal, was even more petty.  As we will see, Nixon took the findings 
of the STG, which advocated NASA’s vision of a grand plan designed to garner 
unparalleled scientific knowledge and national prestige, and put it in his desk 
drawer, where it sat for six months before he enunciated his own vision of US 
space policy. 
 
 
Changing Culture and Language 
 
To be fair to him, Nixon took office in a vastly different America than the one he 
would have presided over had he won in 1960.  1969 was shaping up to be the 
most turbulent period in US history since the Civil War.  Civil unrest, 
assassinations of public figures, and a general feeling that the anger and 
dissatisfaction felt by much of the nation were about to boil over gripped the 
country.   
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When Kennedy took office, he promised a New Frontier, seizing upon a uniquely 
American trope—Frederick Jackson Turner’s frontier metaphor.  Turner, a 19th 
century historian, delivered a seminal paper, “The Significance of the Frontier in 
American History,” to the American Historical Association in 1893, which argued 
that the spirit and success of the United States were directly tied to the country's 
westward expansion in the 19th century, that the forging of the unique American 
identity occurred in the crucible between the civilization of settlement and the 
savagery of wilderness, and that taming the wild had developed American 
strength, individuality, and exceptionalism.  The idea of American 
Exceptionalism, which still persists, was first suggested in Turner’s paper, which 
swept the nation’s intelligentsia and became a dominant concept.  Because of 
the frontier experience, Americans were no longer Europeans, but had become 
“rugged individualists,” and this unique national experience engendered the 
characteristics of the American persona: egalitarian, democratic, aggressive, and 
innovative.  Jackson’s thesis argued that every positive quality that Americans 
possess had its genesis in the frontier experience, and that the frontier calls on 
the adventurous spirit of the American people and offers the promise of change 
in society.   
This idea was a natural fit for Kennedy, who campaigned for public office on the 
image of his youthful strength and the themes of dynamism and change, all of 
which set him in stark contrast to Kennedy’s depiction of Nixon as an agent of the 
Eisenhower administration’s stasis, entropy, and inaction.  During Kennedy’s 
speech at Rice University in September of 1962, he promoted the Apollo project 
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through appeals to the theme of frontier exploration leading to societal change: 
“We set sail on this new sea because there is new knowledge to be gained, and 
new rights to be won, and they must be won and used for the progress of all.”152    
To Kennedy, at least rhetorically, space was a place to be conquered in the 
same way that the mythical frontier of the American West was conquered, and 
the benefits would be shared by all.  Kennedy’s addresses were rife with frontier 
metaphors and the notion that we were involved in a space “race” with the 
Soviets.  The idea of a “race” evoked the image of the settlement of the US west 
in the 19th century: a race to expand to the West Coast, Manifest Destiny, and 
the race by settlers to stake out their own territory in the wilderness before it was 
settled by more eager homesteaders.  Humanity was destined to expand into the 
cosmos just as the American settlers were destined to conquer the savage 
continent.  In a speech celebrating John Glenn’s orbital flight in 1962, Kennedy 
employed this motif: “We have a long way to go in the space race. We started 
late. But this is the new ocean, and I believe the United States must sail on it and 
be in a position second to none.”153   Kennedy’s language had an outward thrust, 
just as space exploration was leading humanity outward into the unknown—in 
Kennedy’s view, humanity was moving out into space, expanding the frontier into 
space, racing into space.  And Kennedy was highly effective in inextricably 
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harnessing his (and the nation’s) current political situation to the historical 
aspirations and ethos of the American people. 
The race metaphor was key to this rhetorical edifice.  As discussed in Chapter 
Two, Kennedy was a competitive individual, as was American society.  
Competition drove the American economic system, the American obsession with 
sports, and the competition with the Soviets for world domination was intense.  
Competition with the Soviets in space, especially in the context of the Cold War, 
kept the Americans enthusiastic about the space program, although this 
enthusiasm would wane with the decline in tensions that accompanied the 
cooling off of the Cold War.  The space race metaphor, while invaluable in the 
short term to maintain Congress’ and the public’s interest and support, ultimately 
doomed NASA’ prospects for continued interest and funding.  This is because all 
races eventually come to an end.   
When the US beat the Soviets to the moon with the Apollo 11 landing, the entire 
raison d’être for the space program was invalidated.  President Kennedy 
challenged the entire nation to beat the Soviets to the moon, and the country 
dutifully pitched in, sacrificed, won the race, and enjoyed the outpouring of love 
and respect that the feat brought about from the world community.  Now the race 
was over; the US had won—what was next?  Jonathan Allday describes the 
situation: “The problem NASA faced was the perception that Apollo had been 
staged primarily as a race against the Soviets.  The scientific benefits of the 
program were dubious and had not been emphasized.  The race had been won.  
In order to justify the continual staging of flights, the science now had to be 
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stressed.”154  In the late 1960s, the end of the race was the issue that NASA 
struggled with—justifying their continued existence and, more importantly, their 
large budget in a period of changing priorities and economic hardship. 
A Gallup poll conducted in the early 1970s just after the final Apollo landing 
indicated that 59% of the American polls favored spending less in space, while 
only 7% favored spending more.  What is strange about this result was that the 
same poll showed that public confidence in the space program was high—people 
still loved the space program, but no longer wanted to pay for it.155  Congress 
had the same opinion: they liked the results of the space program, but balked at 
the high cost.  This contradiction would set the stage for a shift in the rationale for 
NASA’s justification for its programs from one of national prestige to one of cost-
efficiency as the driving factor.  As we will see, this new emphasis on cost drove 
the process by which NASA wound up with the space shuttle. 
The “Earthrise” photographs from Apollo 8 and similar images from subsequent 
Apollo missions affected anyone who witnessed it in person or who saw the 
images in a very basic and emotional way.  The “Earthrise” image changed the 
way that people viewed their home, the planet Earth.  A day after the photograph 
was published, poet Archibald MacLeish published a short essay on the effects 
of seeing the image, titled “Riders on Earth Together, Brothers in Eternal Cold,” 
which ended with a line summing up the experience: “To see the earth as it truly 
is, small and blue and beautiful in that eternal silence where it floats, is to see 
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ourselves as riders on the earth together, brothers on that bright loveliness in the 
eternal cold—brothers who know now they are truly brothers.”  On Apollo 8 and 
subsequent moon shots, astronauts who were religious talked of having religious 
experiences when witnessing this sight; those who were not religious had 
spiritual reactions or were profoundly affected in other ways.  This realization 
occurred at the same time that America was waking up spiritually to the 
environmental movement, which was called the ecology movement at the time.  
The first Earth Day was declared in April of 1972, and President Nixon founded 
the Environmental Protection Agency to look after the biosphere, which was now 
seen not only as fragile and vulnerable, but under siege from the forces of human 
progress.  This was part of the larger “awakening” of the younger generation, 
who had an innate distrust of government, was virulently anti-war, and harshly 
judged the values on which their generation had been raised. 
Where earlier generations of Americans had looked outward to progress and an 
expansive future, the new generation coming of age in the late 1960s began to 
look inward, to look back at Earth, to question ideas that five years earlier had 
been taken for granted.  A social sensitivity replaced the Cold War mindset.  
While some members of Congress began to question the rationale and great 
expense of the Apollo program during the early 1960s, that point of view gained 
widespread acceptance toward the end of the decade, just as Apollo began to 
realize its objectives.   
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Although some Republican members of Congress had, in the first few 
days after the Gagarin flight, attacked the President for not investing 
enough in the space program, by 1963 GOP representatives and senators 
had taken to criticizing him for spending too much.  In May, for example, 
the Senate Republican Policy Committee released a report urging that 
Apollo be scaled back and that the money be redirected to—using a 
phrase that would be heard more and more frequently in the years 
ahead—“problems here on earth.”156 
This sentiment grew over the course of the decade until NASA found itself 
moving against the flow of popular opinion.  Nixon’s first NASA Administrator, 
Thomas Paine, either did not realize this disparity or refused to acknowledge that 
times had changed, and continued to fight for NASA’s budget using the old 
Kennedy-era rationale, which no longer was effective.  In fact, this approach 
served to alienate the Nixon administration rather than to sway it.  There is 
evidence that some in NASA had seen the cultural shift and recognized that the 
rules had changed.  George Low became NASA Deputy Administrator in 
December 1969 and saw firsthand the cultural changes and the stress that they 
placed on NASA administration.  He was a key player in the fight for the space 
shuttle, and his personal notes, preserved within the NASA History Office 
archives, give us an inside view into this turbulent period in NASA history.  Low’s 
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observation on the difference between the NASA of the 1960s and the NASA of 
the 1970s is startling in its prescience, coming as it did in 1970: 
In the 1960’s, the country was definitely looking outward, and national 
priorities included the Apollo goal, because this would establish clearly in 
our minds and in the minds of the world technological leadership by the 
United States.  Therefore, the single-purpose goal was to beat the 
Russians to the moon.   Everything else in space flight was tacked onto 
this goal.  The situation in the beginning of the 1970’s is very different.  
We are now an introspective nation.  We will do only those things that help 
ourselves and help ourselves at an early date.  We’re looking inward 
rather than outward.  This is why anything we say about the environment 
or the quality of life or ecology has a great deal of appeal, as does health, 
education, and welfare, while both national defense and space have very 
little appeal.  Space, in particular, has received very negative opinions on 
every poll that has recently been conducted and, of course, the very close 
vote in the Senate also bears this out.157 
Not only did Low perceive the shift, but he also foresaw the role that NASA would 
take in the future.  It was no longer sufficient to explore space and achieve 
wondrous objectives, or, for that matter, to win a victory for the nation in a quasi-
military competition.   
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It is clear, therefore, that if we are to move forward with a strong space 
program, it, too, must be useful to the people here on earth.  This means 
that a space applications program and, specifically, an earth resources 
program should be the keystone for the space effort of the 1970’s.  It is 
also clear that a strong United States must continue manned flights and, 
therefore, there must be some association between the manned 
spaceflight program and the earth resources programs.158 
President Nixon certainly recognized this cultural shift, since he was one of the 
foci at the center of the storm.  Nixon’s 1969 inaugural address reflected this 
cultural shift and also manifested his preference for diplomatic cooperation rather 
than direct competition.   
Those who would be our adversaries, we invite to a peaceful competition--
not in conquering territory or extending dominion, but in enriching the life 
of man.  
As we explore the reaches of space, let us go to the new worlds together--
not as new worlds to be conquered, but as a new adventure to be shared.  
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With those who are willing to join, let us cooperate to reduce the burden of 
arms, to strengthen the structure of peace, to lift up the poor and the 
hungry.159 
Nixon’s rhetoric in his first Inaugural Address thrusts out into space, only to turn 
and look back at the Earth, where space should be used not to compete, but to 
solve the problems of the people of the planet. (Interestingly, this rhetorical U-
turn co-opts the promises of communism to create a global community in which 
want and greed are both conquered as all receive just enough to be satisfied.)  In 
finishing his Inaugural address, Nixon discusses the effects of and the lessons 
learned from the Apollo 8 mission: 
Only a few short weeks ago we shared the glory of man's first sight of the 
world as God sees it, as a single sphere reflecting light in the darkness.  
As the Apollo astronauts flew over the moon's gray surface on Christmas 
Eve, they spoke to us of the beauty of earth—and in that voice so clear 
across the lunar distance, we heard them invoke God's blessing on its 
goodness.  
. . . 
In that moment of surpassing technological triumph, men turned their 
thoughts toward home and humanity—seeing in that far perspective that 
man's destiny on earth is not divisible; telling us that however far we reach 
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into the cosmos, our destiny lies not in the stars but on earth itself, in our 
own hands, in our own hearts.160 
After he describes the Apollo 8 astronauts’ transcendental experience in spiritual 
terms, we understand that Nixon, too, has been touched by the Earthrise 
experience (or at least his speechwriters were).  Nixon again evokes the 
“outward-inward” motif here in stating that by reaching for the stars, we have 
been able to see Earth (and its problems) with clarity.  And by implication, these 
problems are those that should occupy our attention. 
While the Apollo 11 astronauts were still on the moon, Nixon spoke to students 
about the meaning of the moon landing, using the same U-turn motif: 
I realize the kind of teamwork, the kind of scientific achievement, the kind 
of idealism that we saw in that space shot, that landing on the moon. If we 
could just bring all that to bear on the problems here on earth, the 
problems of our environment, the problems of adequate food, health, and 
shelter, and progress, a fair share for everybody in this earth—if that can 
be done, what a world we can create.161  
On the return of the Apollo 11 astronauts to Earth several days later, standing on 
the deck of the USS Hornet, Nixon evokes the same motif: “this is the greatest 
week in the history of the world since the Creation, because as a result of what 
happened this week, the world is bigger, infinitely . . ., [yet] as a result of what 
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you have done, the world has never been closer together.”162  Several weeks 
later, during Nixon’s post-Apollo 11 world tour, he remarked in Bucharest, “I 
believe that if human beings can reach the moon, human beings can reach an 
understanding with each other.”163  Nixon’s other usages of this trope when 
discussing the space program in his public remarks are too numerous to list here 
and the analysis of them could fill a book.  Suffice it to say, the President was not 
only aware of the cultural shift and its relationship to the US space program, but 
he had also internalized the underlying concept and had begun to think of the US 
space program in those terms.  Linda Krug summarizes this new understanding 
of the relationship between the space program and the American people: 
It takes us from the realization that the discovery of the moon cannot 
occur without a simultaneous discovery of the earth, it brings us face to 
face with the understanding that our quest for understanding is a mainstay 
of American character, and it forces us to accept that we have moved 
beyond the pioneering stage and must now work on improving our 
efforts.164 
After ignoring the STG report, Nixon finally released a statement on space policy 
on March 7, 1970.  Here, Nixon continues usage of the “outward-inward” 
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metaphor of having to go into space to be able to truly see the Earth.  This time, 
however, he uses it to define US space policy: 
Over the last decade, the principal goal of our nation's space program has 
been the moon.  By the end of that decade men from our planet had 
traveled to the moon on four occasions and twice they had walked on its 
surface.  With these unforgettable experiences, we have gained a new 
perspective of ourselves and our world.  
I believe these accomplishments should help us gain a new perspective of 
our space program as well.  Having completed that long stride into the 
future which has been our objective for the past decade, we must now 
define new goals which make sense for the Seventies.  We must build on 
the successes of the past, always reaching out for new achievements.  
But we must also recognize that many critical problems here on this planet 
make high priority demands on our attention and our resources.  By no 
means should we allow our space program to stagnate.  But—with the 
entire future and the entire universe before us—we should not try to do 
everything at once.  Our approach to space must continue to be bold—but 
it must also be balanced.165  
Nixon’s new argument is that in going forward, the space program should 
continue to be “bold,” but “balanced.”  That is, the US space program needed to 
aspire to great achievements, but it also needed to take its place alongside other 
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national priorities, like pressing social and economic issues—space projects 
needed to “take their place within a rigorous system of national priorities,” among 
which are “many critical problems here on this planet make high priority demands 
on our attention and our resources.”   
In this policy statement, Nixon lays out the three goals that the US program must 
accomplish moving forward under his administration.  The first purpose was 
exploration; the second purpose was the attainment of scientific knowledge (“a 
greater systematic understanding about ourselves and our universe”); and the 
third was a practical application, of “turning the lessons we learn in space to the 
early benefit of life on earth.”  He goes on to say that “these lessons will not apply 
themselves; we must make a concerted effort to see that the results of our space 
research are used to the maximum advantage of the human community.”166   
In the same policy statement, Nixon goes on to discuss the specific objectives of 
US space policy in his administration.  He lays out six goals that NASA should 
accomplish.  The first is  that the US “should continue to explore the moon,” 
which we did for the next two years; however, Nixon’s elimination of the final 
three planned Apollo lunar landings put a premature end to lunar exploration, and 
we have not returned since.  The second goal is that NASA “should move ahead 
with bold exploration of the planets and the universe,” which it did with the 
Voyager, Viking, Mariner, Explorer, and Pioneer probes of the 1970s.  Nixon here 
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alludes to a human mission to Mars, which he later refused to approve.  The third 
goal drove the decision-making process that resulted in the space shuttle, when 
Nixon decided that NASA “should work to reduce substantially the cost of space 
operations.”  That the third goal was related to the shuttle program becomes 
explicit when Nixon mentions studies underway for a reusable shuttle.  The 
impulse to reduce costs as a driving force in space policy had adverse 
implications, which will be discussed at length later.  The fourth goal was that the 
US space program “should seek to extend man's capability to live and work in 
space,” which was undertaken under the auspices of the Apollo Applications 
Program with the launch of Skylab and the three crewed missions to it using 
equipment from the cancelled moon missions.  The fifth goal is that NASA 
“should hasten and expand the practical applications of space technology,” 
returning to Nixon’s trope of “outward-inward” and public utility. He argues that 
the “very act of reaching into space can help man improve the quality of life on 
earth.”   The sixth and final objective is that NASA “should encourage greater 
international cooperation in space,” a very Nixonian desire to use space as a tool 
of foreign policy, which was done during the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) of 
1975, and through the various global goodwill tours taken by both Nixon and the 
astronauts themselves.167 
The US now had a new space policy, one that was markedly different from that of 
John Kennedy and distinctly Nixonian.  Both policies were products of their time 
                                                            
167
 Nixon, "Statement About the Future of the United States Space Program," 
March 7, 1970. 
130 
 
and reflected the distinct characteristics of the respective presidents.  And 
despite the very different global political climate when they were formulated, both 
policies were actually born of the Cold War; Kennedy’s came during the most 
acrimonious period of the Cold War, and assumed his personal characteristics of 
competition, aggression, and confrontation, while Nixon’s space policy was 
forged during a “cooler” period of the Cold War, and reflected his preference for 
frugality, diplomacy, and international cooperation.  Each also reflected the tenor 
of the times: Kennedy’s came during a period of world polarization and out of a 
US need for “battle” with their mortal foe, the Soviet Union; in contrast, Nixon’s 
policy was formulated during a period in which domestic issues largely trumped 
international ones—the US, weary of a long war in Vietnam, sought to take care 
of the ailing social and political infrastructure at home. 
Another entry from George Low’s personal notes perfectly illustrates the 
difference between the times and the strategies that NASA had to adopt in each 
in order to thrive.  In an addendum to his personal notes from 1970, Low writes: 
FY ’72 Strategy 
1. Strategy of the ‘60s 
a) The American way of life is the best 
b) It is of the highest national priority to demonstrate this—and to help 
preserve our way of life where it is endangered. 
c) We will do this with force if necessary. 
d) Since the Soviets have selected space as an arena to demonstrate 
their state of technology, we must compete in that arena—we must 
clearly demonstrate our preeminence there. 
e) (should have been ‘a’) Given—the Soviet Union offers a real threat 
to us and our way of life 
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2. Question—Can we measure results?  Did our beating the Russians to 
the moon have the desired effect? 
 
3. Situation in 1970 
 
a) There are domestic problems (and an awareness thereof) that did 
not exist in 1960. 
i. Opposition to war 
ii. Campus unrest 
iii. Integration 
iv. Environment and quality of life 
b) Soviets [are] no longer a threat 
c) We have demonstrated superiority in space 
 
4. Strategy for ‘70s 
 
Alternative 1- 
– Assume continued international competition (demonstration) 
is required to keep US viable and young 
– Military intervention (i.e., SE Asia) is fruitless 
– Let us firmly establish space as an arena for international 
demonstrations—i.e., let us stay first and best 
 
Alternative 2- 
– The country wants to look “inward”—no interest in “being 
first,” “preeminence,” etc. 
– Space can contribute to that inward look 
– Let us establish a program that derives the maximum from 
space to solve our domestic problems168 
 
Once again, Low’s perceptive eye has captured the spirit of both ages and has 
preserved them for posterity. 
 
 
                                                            
168
 George Low, Handwritten Addendum to Personal Notes No. 30, September 6, 
1970, NASA Historical Office archives. 
132 
 
The Space Task Group Report 
 
In early 1969, the new President called for a Space Task Group (STG) to reduce 
NASA costs, to determine options for the post-Apollo period, and to look for ways 
to increase international cooperation.  The team, chaired by Vice President Spiro 
Agnew, was to study the situation for six months and report back to Nixon.  The 
STG planned to issue its report in September, ostensibly in time to influence the 
1971 Fiscal Year budget process; however, the budget process was being 
conducted in parallel to the STG study.  The newly appointed NASA 
Administrator, Tom Paine, saw this timing as an opportunity to lobby Agnew, and 
by extension, Nixon, on a very expensive crewed Mars mission.  In doing so, 
Paine overestimated both Agnew’s and NASA’s clout with Nixon, but he 
stubbornly refused to see that the environment for post-Apollo projects had 
changed drastically.  Bureau of the Budget (BoB) director Robert Mayo had 
repeatedly stressed the new budgetary reality, but Paine brushed off his advice.  
Paine refused to follow BoB reporting procedures and demands, believing that 
NASA was so popular that it was entitled to continue to receive its historically 
large outlays.  Joan Hoff reports that Paine’s arrogance was both evident and 
unprecedented: “He ignored BoB’s requests for budget analysis not once, but 
twice in the spring and fall of 1969.  That Paine’s efforts were poor in this regard 
was evident from the moment that he tried to comply with the STG for its long-
range plans.”169   
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While the STG was undertaking their study, Paine bypassed them and 
approached Nixon directly, urging him to publicly release a space policy that 
included a Mars mission before the Soviets announced their space station 
initiative (or before the STG study had been completed).  Nixon did not like 
Paine’s imperious demeanor, nor did he care to deal directly with people outside 
his inner circle of advisors.  Nixon’s inner circle advised him not to respond to 
Paine’s attempt to subvert the process, so Paine decided to take a different tack.  
He began attempts to influence the STG group’s findings, alienating both the 
BoB officials and Nixon’s aides, the very two groups Paine would need to have 
on his side in order to get his way with the President.  Peter Flanigan, Nixon’s 
assistant for internal economic affairs, under whose purview the space program 
fell, personally telephoned Paine and “instructed him to stop public advocacy of 
early manned Mars activity because it was causing trouble in Congress and 
restricting Presidential options.”170    
It was becoming clear that Nixon was not in favor of expanding NASA programs, 
but rather desired to reduce them.   After Nixon made it clear that the new federal 
budget would be smaller, special assistant to the president Clay Whitehead, who 
had been asked by Flanigan to monitor the NASA budgetary process, reported 
back to Flanigan as follows: 
As you know, I have expressed in the past some uneasiness about the 
review of the future of our space program. My main concern is that NASA 
and others will use the enthusiasm generated by a success of Apollo 11 to 
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create very strong pressures on the President to commit him and the 
Nation prematurely to a large and continuing space budget.171    
Whitehead also expressed the belief that Nixon wanted to reduce NASA’s budget 
from $3.7 billion in 1970 to below $3 billion (and perhaps as low as $2.5 billion) in 
1971.172  This impulse would be addressed by BoB director Mayo, who was 
unwilling to reduce NASA’s budget to $2.5 billion.  Mayo began an internal BoB 
study that started with the $3.7 billion allocation for 1970 and explored the 
consequences of reducing it further.  The first option, estimated at $3.5 billion a 
year, cancelled the nuclear engine, NERVA, and closed the Saturn V and Apollo 
production lines, but kept Skylab, with three crewed visits, and six Apollo moon 
missions. This option would also allow for a space shuttle and a permanent 
space station by the end of the 1970s.  A second budget option, priced at $2.5 
billion, continued Skylab, again with three crewed visits, six Apollo lunar 
missions, and a permanent space station, carried into orbit on Titan IIIs and 
using Gemini capsules for transportation to and from; however, it would not 
provide a space shuttle, and the Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville would 
close.  A third price point, at $1.5 billion, would take NASA out of human 
spaceflight altogether after Apollo 14; Marshall, the Manned Spacecraft Center in 
Houston, and the Saturn facilities at the Kennedy Space Center in Florida would 
all be shuttered; but NASA would still be able to maintain its robotic missions, 
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with six Viking Mars landers, and a Voyager mission to the outer planets of the 
solar system.173 
By early September, the STG report was complete.  Committee member Russell 
Drew was selected to brief the President at a meeting on September 15.  “Nixon 
listened attentively, and met as well with STG members and observers, giving 
them opportunities to comment.”174 The report recommended that NASA neither 
pursue a crewed Mars mission by 1981 (it was listed as an “eventual” mission, 
which is how Nixon would describe it in his later space policy statement), nor 
abandon human spaceflight altogether; Nixon agreed with both of these 
recommendations.  The STG instead set out three options, one that would grow 
NASA’s budget to $9.4 billion by 1980, a second that would grow the budget to 
$7.65 billion by the same date, and a third that would grow the budget to $5.5 
billion.  In its report, the STG favored the $9.4 billion option, but the task force 
eventually settled on the low figure.  The report did not list specific 
recommendations on programs, but instead mentioned possibilities: a trip to 
Mars; extension of moon missions and a permanent lunar base; a permanent 
space station; and a space shuttle.   
While the report did not make specific suggestions, it did provide the following 
guidelines for post-Apollo programs: 
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Focus: Develop new systems for space operations with emphasis upon 
the critical factors of: commonality, (2) reusability, and (3) economy.  
Exploration and exploitation of space is costly with our current generation 
of expendable launch vehicles and spacecraft systems. This is particularly 
true for the manned flight program. Recovery and launch costs will 
become on even more significant factor when multiple re-visit and 
resupply missions to on Earth orbiting space station are contemplated. 
Future developments should emphasize:  
Commonality - the use of a few major systems for a wide variety of 
missions.  
Reusability - the use of the same system over a long period for a number 
of missions.  
Economy - for example, the reduction in the number of "throw away" 
elements in any mission; the reduction in the number of new 
developments required; the development of new program principles that 
capitalize on such capabilities as man-tending of space facilities; and the 
commitment to simplification of space hardware.175 
This three-part recommendation would become the driving force behind the 
space shuttle—it was a single system with many uses, it would be reusable, and 
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it was supposed to be economical.  These three elements were the overriding 
criteria for designing the next generation of crewed systems, and would affect 
NASA for the next forty years.   
William Burrows observes that the most vital part of the STG report is its defense 
of human spaceflight: 
The manned flight program permits vicarious participation by the man-in-
the-street in exciting, challenging, and dangerous activity.  Sustained high 
interest, judged in the light of current experience, however, is related to 
availability of new tasks and new mission activity—new challenges for 
man in space. 176 
The STG report reinforces the idea that humans that perform “heroic tasks” in 
space is mandatory to maintaining the interest and support of the public.   
Robotic missions are cheaper and safer than crewed missions, but human 
spaceflight keeps the public interested in NASA.   
Two weeks after the meeting, BoB director Mayo advised Nixon not to endorse 
any of the STG recommendations, because his support would cause increased 
NASA budgets and result in the President losing “effective fiscal control of the 
program.”177  Any endorsements should come after review by the other 
government stakeholders.  Nixon took the advice and put the report in his desk 
drawer, not making a decision on space policy for another six months.  
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Eventually, Nixon would reject all of the STG suggestions, save one.  Although 
the space shuttle is listed in the STG report as one of the potential options, 
through a series of related decisions, it became the sole item of negotiation for 
NASA and its only hope of continuing human spaceflight; what had been 
conceived as a support vehicle for other programs would have to be justified as a 
standalone project.   
 
 
The Economic Case for the Shuttle 
 
Richard Nixon sought to change the way that the nation spent its money.  He 
reorganized the BoB to give it more power to manage and evaluate government 
programs.  The new organization, called the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB), would not only evaluate departmental budgets, but would also measure 
the effectiveness of the departments and programs.  The OMB would have a 
much greater voice in the budgeting process than did the BoB, which was 
already a powerful group.  Nixon, ever frugal, would now have increased control 
over how the government spent the people’s money. 
This change came at a time of need.  Inflation was very high, spending on the 
war and on social programs was draining the federal coffers, and Nixon felt that 
drastic cuts in spending were urgently required.  Domestic politics also played a 
role in this belief.  Nixon was one of the few presidents of the 20th century, along 
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with George H. W. Bush, whose party did not control at least one house of 
Congress, so he was more susceptible to spending matters, since Congress 
controlled the purse strings.  Majorities in both houses of Congress, regardless of 
party affiliation, were opposed to the current level of spending on space when 
there were more pressing social and domestic matters to address.  As a result, 
Nixon “was constantly trying to co-opt liberal opinion on certain issues, such as 
welfare, to minimize liberal opposition to the war”178 and to garner support for 
other legislation in the Congress.  Nixon was not about to continue, or to 
increase, as Tom Paine had wished, NASA’s budget, which was seen by the 
public as too costly, although they were pleased with the results.  Just as 
Johnson had found before him, Nixon knew that prosecuting the war and tending 
to social issues did not leave much desire or money left for the space program, 
which many critics saw as an unnecessary expense.   
Where Kennedy had a space program that drove a budget, Nixon’s situation 
dictated a budget that drove a space program.  Coming on the heels of a huge 
political boost to Nixon from the Apollo lunar landings, the budget he supported 
reflected the reality that Nixon did not desire to get out of the space business 
altogether—he did not want to be the president who ended human space flight (a 
dilemma that continues to confront contemporary presidents).  Because of the 
mounting budget pressures and the desire to retain human spaceflight, the cost 
of the program became a paramount concern.  NASA budgets would be lower for 
the near future, and NASA had to adjust to the new reality.  The new procedures 
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put in place by the OMB regarding the budgeting process gave the OMB more 
power; they now played an active role in the budgeting process.  In addition to 
having an abrasive personality, NASA Administrator Paine did not understand 
the old rules, and had even more difficulty understanding the new ones.   
Neither Paine nor [his successor] Fletcher seemed to grasp the necessity 
of not only complying with, but actually understanding the new cost 
accounting methods instituted by the Johnson, Nixon, and Carter 
administrations.  Neither grasped the importance of knowing the with 
whom in the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) and later the office of the Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) they absolutely had to maintain 
relations in order to receive serious consideration for their projects during 
the complicated process that went into determining the yearly expenses of 
government.179 
It was quite clear that Paine was not James Webb, who, while admittedly 
operating in a more NASA-friendly environment, had understood the intricacies of 
the budgeting process from his time spent at BoB under President Harry S 
Truman.  In addition, Webb knew how the political portion of the budgeting game 
was played; although Kennedy did not like Webb personally (he felt Webb spoke 
too much), Webb, much like Lyndon Johnson, was an excellent politician.  Paine, 
on the other hand, came to NASA from General Electric, where he was a Ph.D.-
holding metallurgist and then a manager with no prior political experience.  Paine 
made few friends in Nixon’s administration or in the OMB, and his departure in 
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September of 1970 was viewed with relief by the Nixon administration.  In a 
memo to Peter Flanigan, Clay Whitehead lays out what the Nixon administration 
needed from the next NASA administrator: 
We need a new Administrator who will turn down NASA's empire-building 
fervor and turn his attention to (1) sensible straightening away of internal 
management and (2) working with OMB and White House to show us 
what broad but concrete alternatives the President has that meet all his 
various objectives.  In short, we need someone who will work with us 
rather than against us, and will seek progress toward the President's 
stated goals, and will shape the program to reflect credit on the President 
rather than embarrassment.180 
The exit of Paine left Deputy Director George Low as the interim director of 
NASA during arguably the most critical phase in NASA’s history. 
Shuttle proponents at NASA found themselves in a bind.  When the shuttle was 
first proposed in the 1960s, it was part of an overall system, one that could ferry 
equipment and people to and from a permanent space station.  When it became 
apparent that NASA would not gain approval for both the space station and 
space shuttle, NASA was forced to find another rationale that would justify the 
cost of the new system to the taxpayers.  The STG report dictated that any new 
system would have to be utilitarian, reusable, and economical.  The shuttle as 
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envisioned was utilitarian—it could carry up to 7 astronauts into LEO, and had 
the capability for both deploying satellites and retrieving satellites that needed 
repair.  It was reusable: the orbiter, taking the form of a space plane, could be 
used repeatedly, unlike the current Apollo system and its predecessors, all 
single-use systems.  Some of the shuttle designs used a fly-back, piloted first 
stage on which the orbiter would be carried into orbit, also reusable.  “Neither the 
space station nor [NASA’s] exploration goals had been approved, however, so 
NASA officials adopted a more utilitarian rationale.  They turned to Earth-bound 
arguments, in particular the cost effectiveness of the system for delivering 
payloads into orbit.  They promised to make the shuttle cost-effective when in 
fact their primary motivation for building it was not economic.”181  The shuttle 
would be expensive to build.  It featured all-new technology, new materials, and 
new techniques, some of which had yet to be invented.  “One internal NASA 
memo set initial development costs at $10 billion to $13 billion.  In order to get 
the shuttle program approved, NASA executives felt obliged to propose a shuttle 
design with start-up costs estimated at only $5.5 billion, which required rocket 
engineers to [eventually] substitute two liquid-fueled boosters for the reusable 
first stage.”182  Although shuttle reusability would cut down on recurring costs, the 
R& D costs were not in line with the Nixon administration’s budget priorities.   
Interim Director Low’s personal papers indicate that he fully understood the 
budget situation.  In January of 1970, he wrote that “The entire budget situation 
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has been tremendously confused.  It is clear that in this period of inflation, the 
president has to balance the budget and this, of course, is the right thing to 
do.”183  All concerned parties clearly saw little chance that NASA’s budget would 
be increased under Nixon, who only increased budgets in response to a crisis. 
Though some at NASA might have disagreed, he did not feel that the space 
program was in a crisis, even with drastically reduced funding.184  Low found this 
out first hand from National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, who told Low that 
“both he [Kissinger] and the President were very much for the space program 
and all that it represented.  However, he indicated that at this time period, it was 
difficult for the President to support it publicly or to support it with large amounts 
of funds because of the overall economic situation in the country.”185 
Within this new reality, Low searched for a way to fit the shuttle into the fiscally 
constrained budget, and the high development costs made this a difficult feat.   
Several days later, Low decided that shuttle functionality should be weighed 
against development costs, and that cost should be the main driver of the design: 
We really need to state only one objective for the space shuttle: to develop 
a low-cost space transportation system.  This implies that we must have 
low development costs as well as low operational costs. . . . The other 
factors that we have previously stated, such as cross-range, go around 
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capability, fly-back capability, and even payload weight and size, should 
be categorized as requirements and not as objectives.  Many of these 
requirements will be in conflict with the basic objectives and should 
therefore be examined in terms of overall cost before they are included.186 
Much of this would be revisited when taking into account the Department of 
Defense’s (DoD) requirements.  NASA officials found themselves in the 
unfamiliar territory of selling the space shuttle to the White House, the OMB, and 
Congress on an economic basis rather than on the strength of capabilities and 
occupant safety, which were the traditional deciding factors.  In past project 
funding cycles, cost had been a factor, but not the determining factor. The Apollo 
program also weighed time of development very heavily due to the priority of 
beating the Soviets to the moon.  In short, with the Apollo program, time was 
more important than cost.   
The present budget situation had reversed the paradigm.  Economic factors now 
drove the decisions, and they took primacy over other factors; the space shuttle 
was being sold like a commodity, as a system that would drive down costs rather 
than provide superior capabilities and safety.   Suddenly, the shuttle became a 
way to drive down launch costs for everything related to space exploration and 
research: 
NASA officials sought to package the program in a way that fit the new 
ethic surrounding US space policy, which meant emphasizing its 
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economic benefits.  A reusable spacecraft, they argued, would 
dramatically lower launch costs (as low as $100 per pound), thereby 
providing “routine access to space.”  This, in turn, would open up the 
space environment to more users than ever before: commercial 
opportunities and scientific research, for example, would be greatly 
expanded.  In addition, since its costs were to be below that of expendable 
launch vehicles, the shuttle could be used to launch satellites (including 
those of the Department of Defense, a key selling point) and deep-space 
probes, as well as to repair, maintain, and even return objects from earth 
orbit.187 
Out of this drive to sell the shuttle on an economic basis originated the mantra of 
“cheap and routine access to space.”   The promise of cheap and routine access 
to space sold the idea of the space shuttle (and this promise continues to drive 
NASA and the NewSpace markets).  Part of this argument was directed not just 
at Nixon, his advisors, and Congress, but at the American people, who were 
convinced that the government had been spending too much money in space.  It 
was not just NASA advancing this public relations campaign, but also space 
advocates, who were also lobbying for an increased American presence in 
space.  Howard McCurdy comments on this campaign: “Rather than announce 
that they needed larger developmental outlays, space advocates perpetuated the 
myth of cheap and easy space flight by announcing that the era had arrived.  
Dissent was largely ignored.  Optimism prevailed.  The public, as a result, was 
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largely unprepared for a catastrophe.”188  The idea of a shuttle was sold as not 
only a cheaper and easier, but a safer, means of access to space. This idea later 
came crashing down to Earth after the Challenger accident in 1986; the shuttle 
had proven not to be cheap, routine, or even very safe.   
Roger Launius notes this subtle shift in the economic argument for the shuttle, 
one that he points out has affected the cost of space access ever since.   
As a result of deliberations between NASA and the White House’s Office 
of Management and Budget, the question of access to space was shifted 
from ‘what is the least costly design for access to space’ to ‘what design 
will provide low-cost access to space.’  As a result, NASA’s rationale for 
the Shuttle become much narrower; and instead of talking about the 
benefits of the vehicle in toto, its rationale became just that it be low 
cost.189   
This new emphasis, as we will see, caused NASA to offset costs by raising the 
number of planned flights for each shuttle, thereby presumably taking advantage 
of economies of scale.  Since the shuttle would be too expensive to mass-
produce, the number of flights per year had to be increased to drive the price 
down.  The combination of reducing development costs, thereby forcing design 
compromises, and increasing the frequency of flights in a system that would be 
anything but routine, would unnecessarily decrease the safety of the shuttle itself.   
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Using the analogy of the airline industry to paint the space program as another 
potentially competitive market, shuttle advocates claimed that the US 
government had subsidized the airline industry until the equipment became 
sound enough and the flights numerous enough for the industry to become 
profitable and self-sufficient, and prices were thus driven down.  This argument 
was used to sell the space shuttle, and to claim that the shuttle would drive down 
the cost of access to space.  This was an incorrect analogy—the forces acting on 
a shuttle are manifestly greater than those acting on an airliner.  As a direct result 
of this simple fact, space flight is inherently more dangerous, more difficult, and 
more expensive than operating an airline.  The thinking that drove the 
comparison with the aviation industry was found to be faulty by the Rogers 
Commission that investigated the Challenger accident; the unrealistic launch 
schedule was found to be a potentially contributing factor because it greatly 
increased the stresses on the materials and system as a whole.  
In addition to the argument for savings coming from an increased number of 
launches, NASA began to look at how the revenues that would be received for 
launching payloads would drive down the costs of operation.  In effect, the space 
shuttle could be a profitable delivery service, taking the place of the ELVs 
currently in use.  George Low notes this concept in an entry in his personal notes 
from March of 1970: “[M]uch of the cost savings for the shuttle will come from 
payload savings, as opposed to coming from the savings in operational costs.  
This makes it mandatory once again that all of NASA’s payloads should be 
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planned for the space shuttle.”190  While Low argues here for all of NASA’s 
payloads to be launched by the shuttle, the thinking eventually turned to the 
shuttle carrying commercial payloads, as well as all military payloads, which we 
discuss below.   
Not everyone at NASA was on board with the reduced cost rationale for the 
shuttle.  According to Low, Wernher von Braun, who originated the space shuttle 
concept, was ironically not a supporter of the shuttle idea, and might have even 
opposed it.  Apparently, von Braun felt that NASA estimates for developing the 
shuttle were unrealistic and that NASA could not afford it.191   As it turned out von 
Braun was correct; NASA could afford neither the development nor the 
operations of the shuttle, and as we will see in Chapter Four, the high cost of the 
shuttle was to hobble NASA for thirty years. 
 
Mathematica, Inc. 
 
The stagnant state of the US economy, a declining public and congressional 
opinion of the necessity for a large space program, and a frugal President 
determined to get the US budget under control all contributed to a reduction of 
NASA’s budget request by one billion dollars, with more cuts likely on the way; as 
a result, NASA abandoned plans for a space station and instead focused solely 
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on the shuttle.  The new focus on a balanced US budget and the requirements of 
the newly-formed OMB had forced NASA to justify the shuttle on an economic 
basis.  George Low commented on this rationale in retrospect in 1979 in a letter 
to John Logsdon: 
The economic analysis was something that we were forced to do by the 
OMB, and it was probably wrong from the beginning for NASA to accept 
this approach.  A major capability in space, like the shuttle, should not be 
sold purely on economic grounds, and, yet, once we had started the 
economic analysis, it was very difficult not to be wedded to it.192 
To provide data to support its new rationale for the shuttle’s providing cheaper 
and more routine access to LEO, NASA turned to a Princeton, NJ, think tank 
called Mathematica.  Mathematica performed an economic feasibility study for 
the space shuttle in 1971, which was conducted by economist Klaus Heiss.  The 
study, which cost NASA $600,000, concluded that by conducting a particular 
number of flights per year, the shuttle could in fact save NASA money over ELVs, 
and these findings were used to justify the shuttle on economic grounds.  The 
issue is that Mathematica’s original findings did not justify the expense, so NASA 
instructed them “to recalculate the savings based on an almost mind-boggling 
714 flights over that twelve-year period, or a little more than a flight a week with 
each flight carrying a 65,000-pound payload.  The numbers were being bent with 
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desperation.”193  Later in the decision process Heiss determined that a particular 
configuration of the shuttles called TAOS (Thrust Assisted Orbiter Shuttle) would 
work under the budgetary conditions; this configuration involved an orbiter with 
engines, an external tank large enough to allow the orbiter engines to burn from 
liftoff to orbit, and two external strap-on boosters, which could be either liquid- or 
solid-fueled, would fall away at staging velocity.194  While the Mathematica study 
was flawed in estimating the number of flights needed per year to achieve 
economic savings, whether due to Heiss or NASA’s dictum, Heiss was 
successful later in identifying the ultimate configuration of the shuttle.  The liquid-
fueled boosters were eventually abandoned in favor of solids in order to keep 
development costs down; solids were cheaper and less complicated, but unlike 
liquid-fueled boosters, could not be shut down in an emergency. 
The assumptions going into the study were flawed.  Rather than deriving a 
realistic number of flights per year for each orbiter, and calculating costs from 
that, Heiss was ordered to start with a desired figure of savings and determining 
the number of flights that it would take to achieve those numbers.  The number of 
flights used to justify building the shuttle was unrealistically high, as high as 55 
flights a year—in reality, the shuttle program was never able to achieve more 
than 9 launches, which it did in 1985 with 3 of the 4 existing orbiters.  George 
Low later surmised that the Mathematica study had an “influential and 
unfortunate” effect on the shuttle decision because it supported the idea that the 
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shuttle was a great investment strictly on financial terms.195   Heppenheimer 
comments, 
The work of Mathematica was brilliant.  If its sole purpose had been to 
allow one of Klaus Heiss's graduate students to win a PhD, it would have 
succeeded magnificently.  At the OMB, however, key people hardly 
believed a word of it.196 
The shuttle remained in limbo, without a sponsor in the Nixon administration, 
Congress, or in the OMB.  The administration wanted a cheaper version of the 
shuttle, and the task was to find a way to build a program with the available 
budget. 
 
The Grand Compromise 
 
During the early days of the Space Shuttle design in the 1960s, many types of 
design ideas were developed.  The early thinking was that the permanent space 
station would be put into orbit by Saturn-class boosters, not by the shuttle itself.  
The shuttle was “merely a handmaiden, a logistics vehicle that was poorly 
defined,” according to Heppenheimer.197  By 1970, the shuttle was the main 
vehicle pursued by NASA, and the Saturn boosters were exceedingly rare due to 
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budget cuts and production line closings.  Any space station would now need to 
be built in modules, which increased the importance of the shuttle.  With the 
postponement of the station, the shuttle needed to become an all-purpose 
vehicle, fulfilling the STG report’s utility mandate.  NASA would now need to find 
other customers aside from NASA for its payload launch services.  They would 
turn to two other sources: commercial enterprises, such as telecommunications 
companies, and the Department of Defense (DoD). 
NASA’s relation with the DoD stretched back to before its founding in 1958.  In 
1955, when Eisenhower was formulating the first national space policy, there was 
a strong military/defense link with space.  Eisenhower wanted, among other 
things, a reconnaissance satellite program run by the CIA and ICBMs for delivery 
of the US nuclear arsenal.  The reconnaissance satellites would be put into orbit 
by ICBMs, which would become dual-use systems.  Eisenhower would pursue 
this military objective under the guise of a civilian program.  Project Vanguard 
was a Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) endeavor managed and designed by 
civilians, and headed by Milt Rosen.  The project featured a launcher that was 
designed for civilian purposes, and integrated from other rockets, including the 
scientific-use Viking; Vanguard was given a civilian/science public face.  Wernher 
von Braun’s team in Huntsville, part of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) 
had a superior launcher, the Jupiter-C, but it was a version of the Army’s 
Redstone missile, and von Braun’s team was inextricably linked with the Third 
Reich, all of which constituted a public-relations risk.  It was only after the 
Vanguard test flight failed on live television that von Braun was given permission 
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to use his system, which he had been developing in secret, and, working with 
MIT and JPL, his team put Explorer-1 into orbit on January 31, 1958.   
Eisenhower insisted that the proposed NASA space agency be a civilian 
organization, but it retained strong military ties.  The early launchers were all 
modified ICBMs, and the astronauts were all military test pilots.  The various 
branches of the US military also pursued separate space programs, although in 
1956 the Army was limited to tactical missiles with a maximum 200-mile range.  
When NASA was created on October 1, 1958, it was given NACA, the Army’s 
JPL, part of the Army’s ABMA (including the von Braun team), and parts of the 
Navy’s NRL.  The Saturn-class of rockets started as the Army’s Super Jupiter 
design and its F-1 engines began as an Air Force project.  While NASA was not 
a military organization, it had military genes. 
In February 1961, the DoD signed an agreement with NASA that moving forward, 
neither organization would develop a new launch system without “seeking the 
consent” of the other.198  Heppenheimer also reports that between 1958 and 
1964, the DoD and NASA signed 88 major agreements binding them together, 
including a joint Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board (AACB) that 
coordinated launch vehicles, spacecraft, and crewed space flight, and that in 
1966, the AACB researched concepts for reusable launch vehicles.199  In light of 
this relationship, it is not surprising that NASA turned to the DoD for support in 
their quest to win budgetary support for their new launch vehicle, the shuttle. 
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While the economic studies could be massaged to show the cost savings that the 
shuttle promised, the OMB was not convinced.  There were simply not enough 
NASA payloads to justify the number of flights dictated by the economic 
analyses.  NASA needed another customer or partner that would rely on the 
shuttle.  NASA also needed an ally in their struggle, especially one that had 
significant clout and intimately knew the political process that had to be navigated 
in order to get the shuttle approved; that the Air Force had deep pockets and 
could help to pay for the staggering development costs made this partnership an 
even better fit.  That ally would prove to be the DoD—NASA would need the 
support and development money of the DoD if they were to stay in the human 
spaceflight business. 
NASA determined that they would need to carry all of the DoD’s payloads to 
justify the shuttle.  George Low documents this reality in his discussions with Bob 
Seamans, who had served as NASA Associate Administrator, Co-Chair of the 
AACB, and who now served as the Secretary of the Air Force; Low reports after 
a meeting with Seamans in late January of 1970 that Seamans “would not be 
able to support the space shuttle unless NASA would work jointly with the Air 
Force on it to meet Air Force requirements.” He adds that “on the technical 
subjects, Bob and I saw eye-to-eye in that we both believe the most important 
thing is to build a shuttle that will get economical space operations for both the 
Air Force and for NASA.  We also both agree[d] that we should not so over-
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specify the shuttle that we [would] never be able to build one.”200  The shuttle 
would now have to accommodate not only NASA’s requirements, but those of the 
Air Force, which would drastically change its configuration; the tricky part, they 
realized, was not to “over-specify” the shuttle.  It would have to be even more 
utilitarian than had been originally envisioned in order to win and keep a critical 
ally.  “According to an analysis by the President’s Science Advisory Council 
(PSAC), 12 different launch systems could be replaced ‘with a STS used jointly 
by both DoD and NASA as a national transportation system capability.’”201  The 
shuttle would now need to be economical and satisfy the needs of the DoD—the 
game had changed again.   
It was vital for NASA to have the support of the Air Force, but the Air Force did 
not need the shuttle (or NASA, for that matter) to the same degree.  Although the 
Air Force had seen their Dyna-Soar winged spacecraft and MOL space station 
projects cancelled in the mid-1960s and had no way to put military astronauts 
into orbit, they still had several launch systems that could launch their payloads, 
which typically consisted of reconnaissance and communications satellites.  This 
asymmetrical relationship tipped the balance of power in the Air Force’s favor, 
and the Air Force was in the perfect position to dictate the terms of the 
relationship.  As Heppenheimer explains, 
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These Air Force leaders knew that they held the upper hand.  They were 
well aware that NASA needed a shuttle program and therefore needed 
both the Air Force's payloads and its political support.  The payloads 
represented a tempting prize, for that service was launching over two 
hundred reconnaissance missions between 1959 and 1970.  In addition to 
this, Air Force support for a shuttle could insulate NASA quite effectively 
from a charge that the Shuttle was merely a step toward sending 
astronauts to Mars.202 
The shuttle’s capabilities would have to be altered to accommodate those that 
the Air Force required, and negotiations between the two entities began. 
The two sides met in Williamsburg Virginia, on January 19-20, 1971, to negotiate 
requirements, although “negotiate” is too strong a word; NASA, coming from a 
much weaker position, conceded to the Air Force everything it wanted.  In 
addition, the Air Force would not have to contribute to the development process, 
but would instead be responsible for building its own launch site at Vandenberg, 
called SLC-6.  The Air Force had some very specific requests due to the nature 
of their payloads.  They demanded a 60-foot payload bay, the ability to fly polar 
orbits, an 1,100 mile cross-range glide capability and 40,000 pound polar orbit 
capacity, and a once-around capability that allowed the shuttle to return to 
Vandenberg Air Force Base in California after one orbit. The 60-foot payload bay 
was needed to both launch and retrieve the Air Force’s Big Bird reconnaissance 
satellites, which were larger than a school bus.  Previous reconnaissance 
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satellites de-orbited film capsules, which were then snared in flight by a specially 
equipped plane, a complicated procedure; the ability to retrieve a spy satellite 
from orbit if necessary would be a big plus for the Air Force.   
The 1,100-mile cross-range capability was also a key element of shuttle 
functionality for several reasons.  Spy satellites could weigh up to 40,000 pounds 
and typically flew in polar orbits, which involve orbiting from pole to pole rather 
than the more common equatorial orbit of communications satellites.  In 
executing a polar orbit, each orbit of 90 minutes finds the satellite (or shuttle in 
this case) approximately 1,100 miles away from its launch point.  An 1,100-mile 
cross range capability would allow the shuttle to return to Vandenberg after only 
one orbit, which is critical since the orbiter/shuttle was designed to glide 
unpowered back to Earth after reentry.  Because the shuttle would be launching 
and retrieving Air Force reconnaissance satellites to observe the Soviet Union, 
the ability to fly polar orbits from Vandenberg was a requirement.  Another 
reason for the cross-range capability would be to ensure that in an emergency 
situation, the orbiter would be able to avoid coming down in the Soviet Union or 
China. 
The Air Force wanted a once-around capability for two reasons.  The first was to 
be able to abort back to the launch site, which would involve the 1,100 mile cross 
range, as described above.  It also wanted to use the shuttle’s capabilities to 
snatch Soviet satellites from orbit, place them in the payload bay, and return to 
Vandenberg after one orbit—the one orbit requirement is essential here to avoid 
158 
 
any Soviet anti-satellite defenses, and the Air Force thought it best to stay in orbit 
as briefly as possible when engaged in such missions. 
The 60-foot payload bay would require a more massive and heavier orbiter and 
launch system than NASA had been planning, which would drive up costs, 
increase complexity, and decrease safety.  The 40,000 pound polar orbit carrying 
capacity converted into a 65,000 pound equatorial orbit carrying capacity.  These 
new requirements would ultimately become a benefit when the shuttle carried the 
ISS modules into orbit for assembly beginning in the late 1990s, but would 
require a different type of design than had been envisioned.  The 1,100 mile 
cross-range capability would require large delta wings, eliminating the 
conventional wings that designer Max Faget had favored, and created a much 
larger surface area that would need to be protected from the heat of reentry, 
which would be done with thermal tiles, which proved to be extremely 
problematic.  In addition, delta wings required the shuttle to glide much more 
steeply than planned, and perform a flare maneuver just prior to its high-speed 
landing.  The high landing speeds ruled out most of the world’s landing strips, 
since they would be too short to accommodate the shuttle, and put greater stress 
on the landing gear and brakes, which would need to be reinforced. 
The Air Force would eventually testify to Congress on behalf of the shuttle, and 
their support mattered a great deal.  NASA would now have the backing and 
clout of the Air Force in their corner, but the remaining hurdle was the 
requirement to win over the politicians in the OMB and in the White House, which 
was an entirely different matter.   
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The Shuttle Decision 
 
While Richard Nixon fully embraced the Apollo landings, even becoming part of 
the story with strategically placed phone calls and photo ops with the astronauts, 
he still would not commit to a future for NASA.  He felt that other domestic and 
international priorities were more pressing, and decided not to make a decision at 
all for an extended period.  In an unpublished manuscript on the space shuttle, 
John Logsdon wrote of the myriad factors that constrained planning for NASA:  
In the final accounting, though, decisions on the future of the space 
program were constrained by the overall fiscal situation and by the 
President’s priorities as they were expressed through the budget process.  
With respect to NASA, there was not any bias on the part of the President 
or anybody around the White House. . . . It was just that [Nixon could not] 
do all of what NASA was proposing because of the President’s other 
priorities and the limited budget resources available.203 
Another major factor in play was the personality of Nixon and how the structure 
of the White House reflected it.   
Nixon did not possess the gregarious personality that Kennedy enjoyed; instead 
he was solitary, distrustful, and secretive.  He did not like the chaotic 
environment of the White House from which Kennedy seemed to draw energy; 
Nixon sought order in his White House, and the structure he put in place 
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guaranteed this.  According to Nixon’s White House advisors, his personality was 
“dominated by two prominent characteristics: a passion for order and a passion 
for solitude.  Order insures that he receives a regular flow through familiar 
channels of the best advice the bureaucracy and his staff can give him.  Solitude 
insures that when he receives the options he can safely disappear and, in an 
atmosphere of studied detachment, arrive at a decision.”204  With little patience 
for the distractions of human interaction, Nixon set in place a structure that 
restricted White House access to a select few advisors.  Where Kennedy 
surrounded himself with aides, advisors, and cabinet heads, always seeking 
opinions and advice, Nixon worked best when “surrounding himself with 
committees and councils, delegating heavy responsibilities to trusted aides, [and] 
depending on a staff system of his own design,” and that Nixon “deliberately 
sought to isolate himself from the minor irritations of government and husband 
his energies for major concerns.”205  Nixon not only spoke with a select few, but 
he also delegated many of his decisions to a trusted nucleus of advisors, his 
inner circle.  This inner circle included White House Chief of Staff H. R. 
Haldeman and White House Counsel then Chief Domestic Advisor John 
Ehrlichman (both later of Watergate fame), Director of OMB George Shultz, and 
Deputy Director of OMB Casper Weinberger (both later members of the Reagan 
cabinet), among others.  This method of working made it less likely that Nixon 
                                                            
204
 Semple, “Nixon Executive Style Combines Desire for Order and Solitude,” p.1, 
32. 
205
 Semple, “Nixon Executive Style Combines Desire for Order and Solitude,” p.1, 
32. 
161 
 
would act decisively in support of NASA after the STG rendered its report in 
1969, but would instead spend time delegating and stalling. 
According to Nixon’s aides, who perhaps knew him best, he was a fan of the 
space program, especially of human spaceflight.  Ehrlichman claimed in 1983 
that the President thought  
there should be some form of continuing manned space flight program; an 
unmanned program didn’t have any magic. . . . I can remember Nixon 
coming off a phone conversation with the astronauts.  And you know, they 
are up on the moon, and [Nixon was] as high as a kite.  He got a big 
charge out of them.  Then when the astronauts would come to the White 
House for dinner afterwards, he would always be enormously stimulated 
by contact with these folks.  He liked heroes.  He thought it was good for 
this country to have heroes. . . .  He had this metaphysical thing about 
national morality and national fiber and national ideals.206   
Much evidence suggests that Nixon considered astronauts to be symbols of the 
best that America had to offer.   Ehrlichman also reported on Nixon’s persistent 
belief that space flight was instrumental to national prestige.  To maintain 
America’s favored status in the world, it had “to be at the leading edge of applied 
technological development . . .  If we were not, a great deal of national virtue was 
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lost, and [sic] our standing in the world.”207   As he did while Vice President, 
Nixon still believed that a robust space program was a source of prestige. 
Heppenheimer also tells of Nixon’s interactions with astronauts and the 
connection to foreign policy: 
Like other presidents before and since, he basked in the reflected glory of 
spacefarers.  When the crew of Apollo 11 returned from the first landing 
on the moon, he was aboard the aircraft carrier USS Hornet to greet them.  
He then used this triumph to gain diplomatic advantage, for after hailing 
the achievement, he set out on a nine-day world tour that took him to 
capitals in Southeast Asia, India, Pakistan, and Europe.  Significantly, he 
had planned this tour well in advance of the Apollo 11 flight, anticipating its 
safe return.208 
Nixon’s forte as President was his skills in foreign policy and geopolitics; had not 
his baser personality traits led to his demise with Watergate, he likely would have 
been remembered as one of the better foreign policy presidents, having 
successfully mitigated the Cold War by bringing on détente with the Soviet Union 
and opening up Communist China to the West.  As a result of Nixon’s penchant 
for foreign policy and to negotiate rather than confront, Tom Paine’s entreaty to 
Nixon to approve a Mars mission before the Soviets announced a space station 
policy did not have the impact it would have had on Kennedy or perhaps even 
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Johnson.  The US under Nixon was no longer racing the Soviets, but looking to 
coexist with them.  Nixon did not feel compelled to “use the space program to 
prove himself able to deal with the Soviets, as Kennedy and Johnson apparently 
thought they did.”209  Although Nixon enjoyed beating the Soviets to the moon, 
and reaped innumerable political benefits from it, he was more inclined to 
cooperate with them in space.  “Although Nixon spoke of the Apollo 11 mission 
as the ‘most exciting event of the first year of my presidency,’ his presidential 
papers document clearly that his personal interest was more in the diplomacy of 
space.”210  That being said, Nixon considered the Apollo program the legacy of 
Kennedy and Johnson, two political enemies and men he detested, and partially 
for that reason, ended the program prematurely during its most historic moments. 
During a later meeting between George Low and Nixon in 1972 (their only 
meeting) to announce the space shuttle decision, Nixon expressed that he was 
“most interested in making the space program a truly international program” and 
that Nixon “wanted us to stress international cooperation and participation for all 
nations.  He said that that he was disappointed that we had been unable to fly 
foreign astronauts on Apollo.”211  Nixon’s desire to cooperate with the Soviet 
Union was the essence of détente, a method to co-opt them by enticing them into 
the interconnected matrix of the larger international community, where the more 
destructive elements of Soviet foreign policy would damage any benefits they 
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enjoyed from being a cooperative member of that community; according to the 
weltanschauung of Nixon and Kissinger, this strategy would “preserve 
international stability by according the Soviet Union a greater stake in the status 
quo.”212   
Low recounts an illustrative anecdote that sheds light on Nixon’s interest in the 
space program.  When Nixon welcomed the newly-returned Apollo 12 crew at the 
White House, astronaut Pete Conrad was alarmed that Nixon showed no interest 
in the mission details and, when asked about the future of the space program by 
Conrad, Nixon quickly changed the subject to small talk.  In a panic, Conrad 
called George Low and told Low that “the only note of interest concerned the 
proposed world tour for the Apollo 12 crew.  Here the President was more 
interested and said he would personally play a major role in planning which 
countries would be visited and how the visit should be conducted.”213  As much 
interest as Nixon took in the space program as a tool of foreign policy, which was 
in line with the views he revealed to the Greenewalt Committee in 1959, it was 
obvious that he considered it much more than that: “Although there were 
certainly international and national security aspects to the space program, in the 
Nixon White House issues related to NASA were handled through the channels 
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set up for the President’s domestic policy agenda.”214  NASA was a domestic 
program, and Nixon largely saw it in those terms. 
As Nixon’s Chief Domestic Advisor, Ehrlichman was a major influence on Nixon 
regarding domestic policy.  And any decision that Nixon, Ehrlichman, or any of 
the trusted inner circle, consummate politicians all, would make on the shuttle 
would ultimately be a political one.  The thinking of Nixon and his advisors, 
according to Ehrlichman, was that “the country had had enough excitement” after 
Apollo and that “bold new adventures were not needed.”  “[E]verybody 
recognized that the Apollo program had a lot of payoffs for any president”; 
however, “we didn’t get much credit” for starting a new program that would pay 
off politically after the maximum eight years of Nixon’s presidency.  Nixon, ever 
frugal and ever political, had the belief regarding a new space project that “I’m 
not going to be around then and you are not going to spend my money on those 
kinds of things.”  Ehrlichman commented that “there was a good deal of that 
[attitude] in the approach to NASA from a political standpoint, [though we] 
recogniz[ed] at the same time that it had a life of its own and we could not 
terminate it.”215  This was also the view of the inner circle.  But because Nixon’s 
trusted advisors were the ones who did the legwork on projects and policies, the 
space shuttle decision was in limbo without a sponsor to shepherd it, fully 
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developed, to Nixon with a recommendation.  The call for a space shuttle went 
largely unheard by Nixon’s advisors. 
Nixon had no close advisors promoting the space program as he did on 
the major domestic initiatives he undertook.  Put most simply, NASA 
administrators Thomas O. Paine and James C. Fletcher, and even Nixon’s 
first two science and technology advisors, Lee A. DuBridge and Edward E. 
David, Jr., did not have the ear of Nixon or any of Nixon’s inner staff.216 
The buffer provided by the firewall that his advisors maintained between Nixon 
and outside agencies insulated the President from the debate and shielded him 
from having to make a decision either way.  OMB had been hashing out details 
with NASA on economic terms, but had yet to pass a recommendation up the 
hierarchy to the President.  This lack of interest and sponsorship among the inner 
circle was not lost on Low, who wrote a decade later, 
The single most significant factor affecting the space shuttle decision was 
that there was no top-level leadership in the White House.  President 
Nixon was unwilling to deal with his agency heads and dealt solely with his 
staff.  This placed a great deal of decision-making responsibility with the 
OMB, and by definition the OMB is far more interested in short-range 
budgetary problems than in the long-range future of the nation.217 
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Low felt the frustration that Paine had felt earlier and was even less likely to get 
the President’s ear since Paine had made such a negative impression on Nixon.  
This circumstance was in stark contrast to the Apollo decision, in which Kennedy 
made the decision himself after soliciting input from a host of advisors and 
stakeholders.  By contrast, Nixon provided no leadership on the matter of the 
NASA budget or the space shuttle decision, aside from the general mandate that 
the federal budget needed to be reduced and that the US could not leave the 
arena of human spaceflight. 
The space shuttle did have one political factor working in its favor.  Congress had 
cancelled the SST project, which further hurt the recession-impacted aerospace 
industry.  Much as Robert McNamara had felt during the deliberations over the 
Apollo decision, a space project would shore up an aerospace industry in 
recession and would win political support from potential donors in the upcoming 
election.  And Ehrlichman helped Nixon to embrace this view: he “pointed out to 
Nixon that some ‘close’ states controlling large numbers of electoral votes were 
also those with space industries that would benefit from the new space shuttle 
program.”218  Cancelling the human space program was now certainly out of the 
question, and approving the shuttle could provide a political win for Nixon.   
Nixon also realized that the US national defense depended on the maintaining 
the skill set of the US aerospace industry, so keeping the industry in business 
was in the best interest of the nation.   
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Neither President Nixon nor Vice President Agnew had any particular 
interest in the space program except perhaps as it fed a large industry, 
somehow contributed to national security, and could be milked for political 
advantage at home and abroad.  In other words, space was making the 
transition from luxury to necessity, and therefore it could not be allowed to 
languish.  So new goals had to be found.219 
To this end, Nixon commissioned a committee to study steps that the 
government could take to harness the power of the flagging aerospace industry 
to solve the nation’s problems.  Formed in the latter part of 1971, the committee, 
called the New Technology Opportunities Program (NTOP), was headed by 
William Macgruder, former head of the ill-fated SST program.  Ehrlichman 
assisted in the effort, sending out letters to various government agencies, in a 
scene reminiscent of Kennedy’s request for Johnson to find a space project that 
would give the US space primacy.  NTOP proposals included building high-speed 
rail in the Northeast corridor; developing two-way television; integrated utilities 
that would combine power, sewage, heat, light, and waste disposal through 
single units in office and apartment buildings; peaceful uses of nuclear weapons; 
offshore oil terminals for tankers; and other ideas.  In the end, none of them was 
approved, NTOP died, and only the shuttle seemed ideal for buoying the 
aerospace industry.   
NTOP nevertheless was important, for it represented a serious White 
House attempt to redirect the resources of aerospace toward new 
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domestic priorities. When the attempt faltered, it soon became clear that 
Nixon would not try to help the beleaguered aerospace industry by having 
its people work on mass transit or pollution control.  Instead, he would give 
them an election-year gift by keeping that industry's resources within the 
realm of aerospace.220 
Still, the shuttle had no champion within Nixon’s circle of advisors. 
Nixon had appointed James Fletcher, the President of the University of Utah and 
a PhD physicist who had previously been a Vice President at Aerojet, as Paine’s 
successor as NASA Administrator (Low had been Acting Administrator).  Fletcher 
was seen by Nixon’s staff as someone who would be easy to work with and as 
someone who would not be committed to empire-building; this satisfied the 
description of the ideal administrator as outlined in Whitehead’s memo to 
Flanigan (discussed above).  Fletcher took office on May 1, 1971, and, 
recognizing the budgetary realities being imposed by OMB, he adopted a phased 
approach to shuttle development.  Six weeks after he assumed the post, he 
approved the TAOS configuration suggested by Klaus Heiss, with an external 
tank and two solid boosters, which would eventually become the final 
configuration.  NASA had agreed to build the shuttle that they could afford, not 
the one they wanted, which would have a piloted first stage—that design would 
have to wait.  Marshall Space Flight Center, still under von Braun’s direction in 
Huntsville, had been pushing for liquid-fueled boosters to justify their existence, 
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but solids were cheaper to develop.  NASA would eventually abandon the 
phased approach and settle on what had been intended as an intermediate 
approach, with an external tank and strap-ons, as the preferred configuration.   
Many questions remained to be answered, however: what NASA’s budget would 
be, what the final configuration of the orbiter would look like, and whether the 
President would approve a shuttle at all.  And the shuttle still had no champion 
within Nixon’s circle of advisors. 
That support was soon to come from an unlikely source—from within OMB.  
During the course of the OMB budget negotiations with NASA, the OMB argued 
against the shuttle program and wanted to further cut the NASA budget to $2.8 
billion, a funding level that would certainly mean the end of human space flight.  
Caspar Weinberger, Deputy Director of OMB and trusted Nixon advisor, acted as 
Nixon’s main conduit to the shuttle negotiations and, along with OMB assistant in 
charge of NASA budget initiatives Donald Rice, Ehrlichman, and Flanigan, 
provided advice to Nixon on the shuttle issue.  When he learned of the $2.8 
billion budget figure, Weinberger decided to act.  Weinberger, who Low 
described as “a real space buff” and as “the only one in OMB really positive 
toward the NASA program,”221 was the only one of Nixon’s four trusted shuttle 
advisors who was in favor of funding a shuttle.  Weinberger actively opposed 
recommendations from OMB staffers who suggested cutting shuttle funding from 
NASA’s budget.222  He believed that the $2.8 billion budget figure would not only 
                                                            
221
 George Low, Memo for Record, November 15, 1971.  NASA History Office. 
222
 Hoff, in Myth, 108. 
171 
 
kill the shuttle, but also two Apollo missions (in addition to the three Nixon had 
already cut) and Skylab—that in essence, the US would be out of the human 
spaceflight business.  On August 12, 1971, Weinberger wrote a memo to Nixon 
that saved the shuttle and human spaceflight: 
From:              Caspar W. Weinberger 
Via:                 George P. Shultz  
Subject:           Future of NASA 
Present tentative plans call for major reductions or change in NASA, by 
eliminating the last two Apollo flights (16 and 17), and eliminating or 
sharply reducing the balance of the Manned Space Program (Skylab and 
Space Shuttle) and many remaining NASA programs. 
I believe this would be a mistake. 
1) The real reason for sharp reductions in the NASA budget is that NASA 
is entirely in the 28% of the budget that is controllable.  In short we cut it 
because it is cuttable, not because it is doing a bad job or an unnecessary 
one. 
2) We are being driven, by the uncontrollable items, to spend more and 
more on programs that offer no real hope for the future: Model Cities, 
OEO, Welfare, interest on the National Debt, unemployment 
compensation, Medicare, etc.  Of course, some of these have to be 
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continued, in one form or another, but essentially they are programs, not 
of our choice, designed to repair mistakes of the past, not of our making. 
3) We do need to reduce the budget, in my opinion, but we should not 
make all our reduction decisions on the basis of what is reducible, rather 
than on the merits of individual programs. 
4) There is real merit to the future of NASA, and its proposed programs. 
The Space Shuttle and NERVA particularly offer the opportunity, among 
other things, to secure substantial scientific fall-out for the civilian 
economy at the same time that large numbers of valuable (and hard-to-
employ-elsewhere) scientists and technicians are kept at work on projects 
that increase our knowledge of space, our ability to develop for lower cost 
space exploration, travel, and to secure, through NERVA, twice the 
existing propulsion efficiency for our rockets. 
It is very difficult to re-assemble the NASA teams should it be decided 
later, after major stoppages, to re-start some of the long-range programs. 
5) Recent Apollo flights have been very successful from all points of view.  
Most important is the fact that they give the American people a much 
needed lift in spirit, (and the people of the world an equally needed look at 
American superiority).  Announcement now, or very shortly, that we were 
cancelling Apollo 16 and 17 (an announcement we would have to make 
very soon if any real savings are to be realized) would have a very bad 
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effect, coming so soon after Apollo 15's triumph. It would be confirming, in 
some respects, a belief that I fear is gaining credence at home and 
abroad: That our best years are behind us, that we are turning inward, 
reducing our defense commitments, and voluntarily starting to give up our 
super-power status, and our desire to maintain our world superiority. 
America should be able to afford something besides increased welfare, 
programs to repair our cities, or Appalachian relief and the like. 
6) I do not propose that we necessarily fund all NASA seeks — only that if 
we decide to eliminate Apollo 16 and 17, that we couple any 
announcement to that effect with announcements that we are going to 
fund space shuttles, NERVA, or other major, future NASA activities.  We 
could perhaps base any announcement of curtailment of Apollo 16 and 17 
on the ground that Apollo 15 was so successful in gathering needed data 
that we can now shift, sooner than previously expected, to the Space 
Shuttle, Grand Tour, NERVA, etc.  Also, I am certainly not suggesting that 
we give up our attempts to have NASA increase its efficiency, and 
eliminate waste or unnecessary expense in its base or elsewhere. 
7) I believe I can find enough reductions in other programs to pay for 
continuing NASA at generally the $3.3 - $3.4 billion level I propose here. 
This figure is about $400 - $500 million more than the present planning 
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targets. This would mean finding reductions elsewhere, so as to stay 
within the $250 billion figure that is now our goal.223 [emphasis mine] 
Weinberger knew exactly how to appeal to Nixon—by claiming that drastically 
cutting the NASA budget and getting out of human spaceflight would be an 
admission to the world that the US was abdicating its superpower status and that 
“our best years were behind us.”  Weinberger would certainly have known that 
Nixon would find this idea revolting; like Weinberger, Nixon believed in American 
exceptionalism and felt that America had a role to play as the leader of the free 
world.  While cutting the US budget was a priority, the reasons why it was high 
were related to priorities and budgets that had been inherited from the previous 
administration and from the opposition party.  To cut the NASA budget simply 
because it was easier than cutting social programs was not the right answer, 
especially since the world would then see America as a weaker nation.  The 
argument was clever, and it was pitch-perfect in appealing to all of Nixon’s core 
beliefs and foibles: the need for geopolitical strength, the need to avoid political 
pitfalls, the need to cut the budget, the need to address social issues, the need to 
support the aerospace industry, even an appeal to Nixon’s loathing of Lyndon 
Johnson.  It is all there in one memo, and it worked both perfectly and 
immediately.  The proof of its effectiveness is scrawled across the top of the 
memo in Nixon’s hand: “I agree with Cap [Weinberger].”  The shuttle now had its 
champion inside Nixon’s inner circle, and it once again had a fighting chance.  
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Nixon’s sudden conversion was not known by the rest of the OMB staff until OMB 
Director Shultz received a staff memo in mid-September that read: 
The President read with interest and agreed with Mr. Weinberger's 
memorandum of August 12, 1971 on the subject of the future of NASA.  
 
Further, the President approved Mr. Weinberger's plan to find enough 
reductions in other programs to pay for continuing NASA at generally the 
3.3 - 3.4 billion dollar level, or about 400 to 500 million more than the 
present planning targets.224  
NASA was still in the dark about Nixon’s change of heart.  However, when things 
looked bleak, when Fletcher and Low considered abandoning the shuttle 
altogether, Fletcher sent a letter to Shultz on September 30, 1971, containing a 
FY1973 budget request totaling $3.385 billion, including $228 million for shuttle 
development.  At an OMB meeting with NASA on October 22, 1971, the OMB 
staff recommended cancellation of the shuttle program.  Weinberger opposed 
their recommendation, but did not overrule them.  The staff said that if a shuttle 
would be built, it could be done more cheaply than NASA had suggested.  
Weinberger compromised and decided that a shuttle would be built, but that 
another review would be required to determine where costs could be further cut.  
One month later, on November 22, Low submitted NASA’s recommendations for 
a list of cheaper shuttle options that ranged from an orbiter with a variety of 
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booster types to a low-cost, unpowered glider that would be launched on a Titan-
III booster.  OMB’s proposals featured a similar glider on a Titan-III as their most 
expensive option, and a variety of smaller glider/booster options that were less 
expensive.  Low argued convincingly against the unpowered glider concept at a 
later OMB meeting. 
On December 2, 1971, OMB sent Nixon a memo soliciting his opinion on space 
policy, and included a place for him to approve or disapprove various options, 
including a “reduced-cost smaller Space Shuttle program,” the Apollo Soyuz 
mission, Apollo 16 and 17, and other Earth-orbiting missions.  A week later, 
Nixon approved a shuttle, but a smaller version with a 30-foot bay and a capacity 
of 30,000 pounds.  Fletcher would not accept this decision.  The fight over the 
shuttle was not over. 
The OMB effectively killed the Air Force’s involvement with their suggestion of a 
smaller payload and decreased capacity, making the OMB-recommended shuttle 
too small to carry the DoD’s reconnaissance satellites.  This design would 
consign the Air Force to continue using Titan-III launch vehicles as their primary 
launch vehicle.  Charles Donlan, acting Director of the NASA’s Shuttle Program 
Office, decided to revisit the 1,100 mile cross-range capability requirement to 
determine whether they could cut additional costs by abandoning the delta wing 
and reverting to Faget’s conventional wing design.  Donlan determined that the 
high cross range would enable a more abort possibilities and make the shuttle 
safer.  A delta wing would be inherently more stable at both super- and sub-sonic 
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speeds and from various angles of attack.  NASA and the OMB met multiple 
times and made offers and counteroffers until a meeting with George Shultz and 
key White House advisors was scheduled for December 29, 1971.  Fletcher and 
Low had prepared to accept a much smaller shuttle, one with a 45-foot cargo bay 
and a 40,000 pound capacity rather than the configuration desired by the Air 
Force, which was a 60-foot bay with a 60,000 pound capacity.  Low describes the 
meeting as follows: 
On the 29th of December, Fletcher and I met with Shultz, Weinberger, 
Flanigan, David, Rice, and Rose to review our Shuttle recommendations.  
Before going to the meeting, Fletcher and I decided that we could accept 
something as small as 14x40’ with a 40,000 lb. capability, but anything 
less than that would require a presidential decision.  During the meeting 
Shultz looked at the facts and figures and decided that really the only thing 
that makes any sense, as NASA has said all along, is the 15x60’—60,000 
lb. Shuttle capability.225 
Donlan recalled in 1983 that according to Fletcher, Shultz said, “Well, what are 
you fooling around with that 45-foot configuration for?  It doesn't cost that much 
more.  Why don't you get the one you want — take the 60-foot one.”226  Willis 
Shapley, NASA Associate Deputy Administrator, in 1984 told the story slightly 
differently.  His account has Shultz deciding, “If we're going to do it, let's do it 
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right; let's do the big shuttle and forget about the Bureau of the Budget 
shuttle.”227  In his personal notes, Low brought out some other, more ominous 
factors in the final shuttle design.  Several days after the fateful meeting with 
Schultz, he commented, 
In trying to analyze what’s wrong with the decision process, it comes back 
to the fact that there is nobody in the White House willing to make any 
decisions.  Everybody feels that the issue of Shuttle size is too small an 
issue to take to the President, and of course they’re right, but they’re 
unwilling to let the Administrator of NASA make that decision.  Therefore, 
they let their various staffs continue to do the work and continue to ask 
nickel and dime size questions without ever calling a halt to that procedure 
and say it’s about time that we made up our mind and let’s proceed.  Short 
of going to the President, I see no way of avoiding this kind of mess, and 
yet the question is not one of going ahead with the shuttle at all but merely 
one of Shuttle size and weight, I would also agree that we should not take 
this kind of a decision to the President too early.228 
With the President unwilling to make a decision himself or to participate in the 
decision-making process, the entire negotiation process took on the 
characteristics of a bureaucratic nightmare.  By trying to simplify the presidential 
decision-making process, Nixon made the process infinitely more complicated for 
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NASA.  NASA finally got its shuttle, the one that the Air Force had specified, and 
although for NASA it was a compromise, it was still a spacecraft that would keep 
them in space for the foreseeable future.  Many design decisions were yet to be 
made, but the shuttle would happen after years of indecision. 
With the size issue finally settled by Nixon’s advisors, Shultz made his 
recommendation to Nixon, who agreed.  All that was left to do was to meet the 
President for the public announcement.  NASA was asked to prepare a 
statement that the President could issue.  The meeting occurred on January 5, 
1972, when Low and Fletcher flew to the Western White House in San Clemente, 
California, where Nixon had stayed for the holidays.  Nixon and Ehrlichman were 
to meet with Fletcher and Low for a 15-minute photo opportunity.  The actual 
meeting went over by almost 45 minutes, and Nixon showed a genuine interest in 
the details of the shuttle program.  Low recalls in his personal notes that “[t]he 
discussion was warm, friendly, and productive. . . .  [Nixon] is obviously very 
much interested in space for the sake of exploration and space for the sake of 
what it means for the future of the United States.”229  Nixon asked questions 
about the shuttle and the space program in general, and made some 
observations:  
The President wanted to know if we thought the shuttle was a good 
investment and, upon receiving our affirmative reply, requested that we 
stress the fact that the shuttle is not a ‘$7 billion toy,’ that it is indeed 
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useful, and that it is a good investment in that it will cut operations costs 
by a factor of 10.  But he indicated that even if it were not a good 
investment, we would have to do it anyway, because space flight is here 
to stay.  Men are flying in space and will continue to fly in space, and we’d 
best be part of it.230 
Low reported that Nixon, ever the statesman, commented at the time on the 
foreign-policy aspects of space: 
We also discussed with him the real possibility of conducting a joint 
docking experiment in the 1975 time period.  The prospect of having 
Americans and Russians meet in space in this time period appeared to 
have great appeal to the President. . . .  The President asked John 
Ehrlichman to mention both the international aspects of the shuttle and the 
USSR docking possibilities to Henry Kissinger.”231 
Nixon pointed out that he “liked the fact that ordinary people would be able to fly 
in the shuttle, and that the only requirement for a flight would be that there is a 
mission to perform.”232  The shuttle would democratize space and would be 
utilitarian, unlike Kennedy’s Apollo, which only carried test pilots and was built for 
a sole purpose.  This was to be Nixon’s machine—he held the model of the 
shuttle during the entire meeting as if he would never give it up.   
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Nixon’s statement, largely written by NASA’s William Anders, was edited by 
Nixon in his own hand.    
I HAVE decided today that the United States should proceed at once with 
the development of an entirely new type of space transportation system 
designed to help transform the space frontier of the 1970's into familiar 
territory, easily accessible for human endeavor in the 1980's and 1990's.  
This system will center on a space vehicle that can shuttle repeatedly from 
Earth to orbit and back.  It will revolutionize transportation into near space 
by routinizing it.  It will take the astronomical costs out of astronautics. In 
short, it will go a long way toward delivering the rich benefits of practical 
space utilization and the valuable spin-offs from space efforts into the daily 
lives of Americans and all people.  
The new year 1972 is a year of conclusion for America's current series of 
manned flights to the moon.  Much is expected from the two remaining 
Apollo missions--in fact, their scientific results should exceed the return 
from all the earlier flights together.  Thus they will place a fitting capstone 
on this vastly successful undertaking.  But they also bring us to an 
important decision point--a point of assessing what our space horizons are 
as Apollo ends, and of determining where we go from here.  
In the scientific arena, the past decade of experience has taught us that 
spacecraft are an irreplaceable tool for learning about our near-Earth 
space environment, the moon, and the planets, besides being an 
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important aid to our studies of the sun and stars.  In utilizing space to meet 
needs on Earth, we have seen the tremendous potential of satellites for 
intercontinental communications and worldwide weather forecasting.  We 
are gaining the capability to use satellites as tools in global monitoring and 
management of natural resources, in agricultural applications, and in 
pollution control.  We can foresee their use in guiding airliners across the 
oceans and in bringing televised education to wide areas of the world.  
However, all these possibilities, and countless others with direct and 
dramatic bearing on human betterment, can never be more than 
fractionally realized so long as every single trip from Earth to orbit remains 
a matter of special effort and staggering expense.  This is why 
commitment to the space shuttle program is the right next step for 
America to take, in moving out from our present beachhead in the sky to 
achieve a real working presence in space--because the space shuttle will 
give us routine access to space by sharply reducing costs in dollars and 
preparation time.  
The new system will differ radically from all existing booster systems, in 
that most of this new system will be recovered and used again and again--
up to 100 times.  The resulting economies may bring operating costs down 
as low as one-tenth of those for present launch vehicles.  
The resulting changes in modes of flight and reentry will make the ride 
safer and less demanding for the passengers, so that men and women 
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with work to do in space can "commute" aloft, without having to spend 
years in training for the skills and rigors of old-style space flight.  As 
scientists and technicians are actually able to accompany their 
instruments into space, limiting boundaries between our manned and 
unmanned space programs will disappear.  Development of new space 
applications will be able to proceed much faster.  Repair or servicing of 
satellites in space will become possible, as will delivery of valuable 
payloads from orbit back to Earth.  
The general reliability and versatility which the shuttle system offers 
seems likely to establish it quickly as the workhorse of our whole space 
effort, taking the place of all present launch vehicles except the very 
smallest and very largest.  
NASA and many aerospace companies have carried out extensive design 
studies for the shuttle.  Congress has reviewed and approved this effort.  
Preparation is now sufficient for us to commence the actual work of 
construction with full confidence of success.  In order to minimize technical 
and economic risks, the space agency will continue to take a cautious 
evolutionary approach in the development of this new system.  Even so, 
by moving ahead at this time, we can have the shuttle in manned flight by 
1978, and operational a short time later.  
It is also significant that this major new national enterprise will engage the 
best efforts of thousands of highly skilled workers and hundreds of 
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contractor firms over the next several years.  The amazing "technology 
explosion" that has swept this country in the years since we ventured into 
space should remind us that robust activity in the aerospace industry is 
healthy for everyone--not just in jobs and income, but in the extension of 
our capabilities in every direction.  The continued preeminence of America 
and American industry in the aerospace field will be an important part of 
the shuttle's "payload."  
Views of the earth from space have shown us how small and fragile our 
home planet truly is.  We are learning the imperatives of universal 
brotherhood and global ecology--learning to think and act as guardians of 
one tiny blue and green island in the trackless oceans of the universe.  
This new program will give more people more access to the liberating 
perspectives of space, even as it extends our ability to cope with physical 
challenges of earth and broadens our opportunities for international 
cooperation in low-cost, multi-purpose space missions.  
"We must sail sometimes with the wind and sometimes against it," said 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, "but we must sail, and not drift, nor lie at anchor."  
So with man's epic voyage into space--a voyage the United States of 
America has led and still shall lead.233 
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In the drafting of his statement, Nixon was faced with one more decision—what 
to name the program.  Various names were floated, in the style of Mercury, 
Gemini, and Apollo: Pegasus, Hermes, Astroplane, Skylark, even Space Clipper, 
which was proposed in one draft.  Nixon settled on “Space Shuttle,” which was 
an appropriately utilitarian name for the new system.  The shuttle would 
eventually be called something even more prosaic and utilitarian: the Space 
Transport System or STS.  
The statement touches on all of the elements of the new culture: the Earth as a 
fragile place, the need for universal brotherhood, the need for ecological 
husbandry, the fact that by going into space, we will improve our lives on Earth.  
It also emphasizes the requirements of the STG report: utility, reusability, and 
economy.  The statement announces the space shuttle as a new type of 
spacecraft for a new generation.  It begins by using Turner’s frontier metaphor 
and ends with an appeal that deploys the Kennedy-esque rhetorical trope of 
space as a sea that must be sailed and as a voyage in which the United States 
must lead.  Nixon, moved by his creation, waxed romantically on the subject of 
space. 
The shuttle decision was largely made by Weinberger and Shultz—Weinberger 
fought for the shuttle against an OMB determined to kill it, and once it had 
become clear that Nixon would approve a shuttle, Shultz decided on the size.  
Following Nixon’s modus operandi, the decision was brought to him for an up or 
down vote.  As was the case in the Nixon White House, his aides did all of the 
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heavy lifting, and Nixon gave it a thumbs up or down, much like a Roman 
emperor deciding on the fate of a defeated gladiator at the Coliseum.  In the case 
of the shuttle, it received a thumbs-up.  While Nixon was inclined to slash the 
NASA budget, Weinberger, a space buff, knew exactly how to appeal to Nixon to 
win his approval of an increased budget.  It was, however, ultimately Nixon’s 
decision.   
The space shuttle decision stands in sharp contrast to Kennedy’s Apollo 
decision.  Kennedy asked for and received the input of advisors, experts, and 
stakeholders; Nixon’s aides went through the same information-gathering 
exercises in the case of the shuttle decision.  Kennedy was interested in the 
Apollo program as a way to revive his political fortunes and to boost world 
opinion of the US; Nixon had little to gain from approving the shuttle, other than 
avoiding becoming the president who cancelled the human spaceflight program 
and garnering some donations from the aerospace industry in the 1972 
presidential campaign.  Kennedy had real skin in the game, risking real political 
capital by appealing to Congress and the nation to support the moon program on 
live television; Nixon’s decision was done in offices and meeting rooms, far from 
the attention of the public, without the benefit of one public speech in favor of the 
shuttle.  Nixon issued only a single press release on authorizing the shuttle.  
Kennedy made his decision days after receiving the report outlining the results of 
Johnson’s queries; Nixon’s decision dragged on for years.  Kennedy’s decision 
came at a critical point in the Cold War, with the fate of the world in the balance 
during the darkest period of the Cold War; Nixon’s choice also came at a critical 
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time, but a critical domestic time for America, in the midst of civil unrest, a 
growing counterculture, and economic hardship.  Kennedy acted as a leader, 
personally selling the project and overseeing its implementation; Nixon acted as 
the topmost bureaucrat, only signing off on a decision that others had negotiated 
incrementally.   
Kennedy gave the nation a destination that needed a system; Nixon gave the 
nation a system that needed a destination.  While Kennedy gave NASA more 
than it could have dreamed, Nixon gave NASA much less than it wanted.  
Kennedy enjoyed the company of astronauts, because they represented the 
machismo and heroism he valued personally, and he probably detected elements 
of himself in them; Nixon enjoyed the company of the astronauts because he 
could vicariously enjoy their exploits and thought that the country needed heroic 
symbols.  Kennedy was a risk-taker; Nixon was a risk mitigator.   
The two decisions could not have been more different; the two men who made 
them could not have been more different.  Although the two decisions were 
influenced by their respective times and circumstances, the manner in which the 
decisions were made was imbued in each instance with the respective 
personality of each man. 
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Aftermath 
 
As the 1970s progressed, work continued on the design of the space shuttle, but 
the large, make-or-break decisions had been made.  Nixon kept Apollos 16 and 
17, Skylab and the three crewed visits, and, to his great joy, the Apollo-Soyuz 
Test Project (ASTP) mission.  The ASTP was the embodiment of the spirit of 
Nixon in space—a foreign policy initiative by which détente was staged in orbit.  
Ostensibly undertaken to ensure cooperation between the two space 
superpowers and to improve safety by developing systems by which each space 
program could rescue the other in an on-orbit emergency—a concept that had 
been discussed in Kennedy’s time, but was unlikely to happen due to Cold War 
tensions and posturing—the mission was one that Krushchev would never have 
allowed.  Such a mission would have afforded the US a first-hand view of Soviet 
technology, which would have shattered the illusion of Soviet space superiority 
that the USSR propaganda machine had built up over the years.   
In a sense, it was Krushchev who drove the space race, with Eisenhower and 
then Kennedy reacting to Khrushchev’s propaganda-fueled spectaculars.  
Eisenhower eventually agreed to a space program larger than he would have 
preferred after a series of successful Sputniks and US failures.  Kennedy, whom 
Krushchev thought was green and thus easy to manipulate, reacted to 
Krushchev’s Gagarin move and the subsequent press frenzy, although it was the 
Bay of Pigs debacle that ultimately drove Kennedy to action.  Krushchev 
continued to drive Kennedy into space until Kennedy’s death.  By contrast, Nixon 
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personally clashed with Krushchev as Eisenhower’s Vice President during the 
Kitchen Debate of 1959 in Moscow (which launched Nixon’s reputation as an 
international statesman).  However, Krushchev had been deposed by the time 
Nixon ascended to the presidency.  Even if Krushchev had still been in power, 
the balance between the two space programs had shifted drastically toward the 
US program, which was only months away from landing on the moon when Nixon 
took office.   
As Bob Dylan had sung in 1964, the times were a’ changin’, and that very 
palpable change was apparent to all by the late 1960s.  Nixon would withdraw 
from an aggressive space program just as he would eventually withdraw from 
Vietnam.  Nixon sought to extract America from its costly foreign entanglements, 
to create a more peaceful world abroad through diplomacy, and to win peace at 
home by tending to America’s immediate social needs.  “At the very moment 
when Apollo achieved full success and when NASA had the moon within its 
grasp, changing national priorities would prevent this agency from pursuing a 
follow-up program of extensive lunar exploration leading towards manned flight to 
Mars.  Rather than going forward as a focus for the nation’s hope, the space 
program would have to find its home in a prosaic world where the glow of 
Kennedy’s challenge had faded, with many people viewing Apollo as a waste of 
money.”234 
NASA would survive the most turbulent period in its history, having to drastically 
downsize soon after the glories of Apollo.  The space shuttle decision would 
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serve as NASA’s political baptism by fire, and would also serve as the model for 
NASA’s next 40 years, a future of shrinking budgets and political dogfights.  
Although the Kennedy model is widely viewed by the public as the way NASA 
gets its projects, the reality is much more like the Nixon model.  Many at NASA 
themselves originally shared the same view: NASA officials viewed the shuttle 
decision as something of an anomaly, the result of having to negotiate program 
details without much consensus on long-range goals during a period of severe 
budgetary constraints.  “The further NASA got away from the shuttle decision, 
however, the more the Apollo program started to look like the anomaly.”235   
The shuttle was NASA’s only method of bringing crews into LEO when it debuted 
in 1981, and would remain so until 2011, when it flew its final mission.  After that, 
NASA would rely on the Russian Space Agency and the Soyuz for rides to the 
ISS, something unthinkable in either the Kennedy or Nixon era.  America had 
abdicated the primacy in space that had been won with treasure and tragedy.  
While the nation awaits the next chapter in American space history, the recent 
death of Neil Armstrong has prompted Americans to look back fondly to the 
heady days of Kennedy’s bold challenge to go to the moon just 60 years after 
humanity’s first flight, and also to wonder what happened to the spirit of daring 
that animated his challenge.  The space shuttle program sought to make access 
to space routine, and that it did.  As a result, Americans became bored with 
hundreds of similar shuttle missions, even though human spaceflight remained 
difficult and risky, only paying attention in times of tragedy, either after the loss of 
                                                            
235
 McCurdy, Space Station Decision, 32. 
191 
 
lives in the two catastrophic shuttle accidents or in response to the costly near-
fiasco of the Hubble Space Telescope and its heroic repair.  Ever since the 
Apollo 17 splashed down in the Pacific, NASA has sought to rekindle the nation’s 
love affair with space; but we now live in a different era.  This loss of heroes, 
daring missions, and amazing feats is sobering and disappointing for many; 
however, we should remain hopeful about the future of space exploration and of 
NASA.  
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CHAPTER IV 
THE RECKONING 
 
Project Apollo and the space shuttle program have dominated NASA for the past 
50 years.  Apollo is recalled fondly by space advocates and Americans of a 
certain age as representing the Golden Age of Space Exploration.  The pleasant 
nostalgia was very evident at the recent celebrations of the 40th anniversary of 
the first moon landings and again, more recently, at the passing of Apollo 11 
astronaut Neil Armstrong.  The era of Apollo is considered NASA’s best of times, 
although the actual landings themselves continued for only three years.  The 
shuttle era is largely absent that public feeling of heroism and adventure, instead 
instilled with the image of the shuttle program as being routine, perhaps boring, 
and being an astronaut as more akin to performing a job than acting bravely or 
heroically.   
As Roger Launius wrote in his essay “Perceptions of Apollo: Myth, nostalgia, 
memory, or all of the above?” the Apollo missions have assumed a mythical 
quality in American culture.  The Apollo program has come to represent different 
things to different people, who have in turn projected their own views onto the 
program.  For some, Apollo represents the glorious and uniquely American 
pursuit of the “final frontier.”  Others see Apollo as the failed promise of NASA’s 
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utopian vision of the future, one in which the people of the world would could 
achieve perfection by journeying to the stars, leaving their prejudices and 
imperfections behind; for these people, Apollo was a failure, as Apollo did not in 
any sense perfect society or bring the nations of the world closer together.  For 
policy wonks, Apollo is seen as a triumph of the technocratic model, where 
wartime mobilization could be applied to solve peacetime problems.  These 
people consider Apollo to be the one “good” government project.  Space 
advocates view Apollo as a failed opportunity; a false start that should have been 
the beginning of a human diaspora throughout the universe.  For Americans and 
space buffs who lived through the Apollo missions, the majority view is that of 
sehnsucht, or wistful nostalgia, either a pleasant memory of the Apollo era as the 
age of Kennedy and a time of innocence and dreams, or a memory resonant of 
the human tendency to reflect on one’s childhood as better times than the 
present, and of Apollo as emblematic of those better times.  Spiritual people of 
the Apollo era saw the program as a secular religious experience, one that 
evoked emotions of awe, devotion, omnipotence and redemption; these people 
saw the space program in quasi-religious terms, with a new clerical caste 
(astronauts), new rituals (mission control activities), a sense of higher purpose, a 
new language (NASA jargon), and a theology of salvation (the promise of a new 
start in space).  Wernher von Braun himself saw Apollo as a new beginning for 
mankind.   
Another group of people, including those who personally participated in the 
program, view Apollo as a squandered opportunity for the next step in human 
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evolution.  They feel that after the miracles wrought by Apollo, human spaceflight 
became a mundane LEO exercise performed without mystery by the space 
shuttle.  This sense that space travel was quotidian stems from the fact that 
NASA did its job all too well.  It was only after the two shuttle accidents that 
Americans were reminded of just how dangerous the flights still were, and of how 
brave astronauts are; the two shuttle accident reports stress these facts, along 
with the fact that NASA itself, while still striving for the ultimate safety of the 
astronauts, believed its own claims that flights were routine, safe, and that the 
risks could be managed.  
These views, that Apollo was a mythical voyage and that the shuttle was a 
utilitarian workhorse, reflect how each project was originally sold.  NASA 
discovered early on that, even before the first Mercury flight, the seven men 
selected as astronauts were considered heroes by the American people.  Life 
magazine, which had negotiated exclusive access to the Mercury astronauts, 
sold them to the public as such, a product they could market to increase 
subscription rates and advertising revenue, and the public eagerly consumed the 
myths.  What is surprising is that this marketing campaign began under 
Eisenhower’s administration, which sought a modest space program, and not 
under Kennedy’s.  Project Apollo was championed by the Kennedy 
administration as a way for America to both beat back the advancing Soviet bear 
and fulfill America’s unique human destiny—an exceptional people performing 
exceptional acts.  Kennedy sold it as a holy quest, with an ever-looming time 
limit, a ferocious enemy, heroes pure of heart, great dangers to be faced, and 
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with a sacred prize to be won after great travail.  After Kennedy (and arguably the 
Apollo 1 astronauts) died, the project had a patron saint who had been martyred 
in the cause of good.   
The shuttle had been sold to decision-makers and the public in an entirely 
different manner.  Rather than resorting to a mythical and emotional appeal, it 
was sold rationally, using a more practical argument.  Keeping in line with the 
recommendations that the STG report outlined, the shuttle was marketed as a 
safe, reusable, economical, and utilitarian system.  In a time of changing 
priorities, it appealed to the new ethos—less wasteful, less costly, and less elitist.  
The shuttle was a versatile system that presented a more democratic way to get 
into space—even Nixon remarked that he liked how the shuttle would open 
space to regular people, including people from countries that could not afford 
their own space programs.  NASA chose to sell the shuttle as a routine way to 
get into space to perform work rather than to explore.  And the shuttle adequately 
performed this workhorse role for thirty years.   
The popular dictum that time is money is true of the Apollo and shuttle decisions.  
In the case of the Apollo decision, Kennedy’s mandate had emphasized a 
timeline of landing on the moon before the decade had elapsed.  This time limit 
was the driving factor behind the entire program, and the appropriate funds were 
provided and design choices were made expressly to meet this deadline.  As a 
result, Apollo successfully met this deadline, even with a decreasing budget after 
1966 and a two-year hiatus after the Apollo 1 fire.  In the case of the shuttle, the 
OMB had indicated that the budget for development of a shuttle would be less 
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than half of what NASA had requested.  As a result of this basic constraint, 
money rather than time became the dominant factor.  The timetable for 
developing the shuttle was lengthened to accommodate the allocated funds, and 
the design choices, primarily compromises from designs that NASA had originally 
advocated, reflected the necessity of meeting economic requirements rather than 
any timeline.  The development of the shuttle took about as long as the entire 
Apollo project did, a decade, but it came in over budget.  Time and money were 
tradeoffs in each case, and can be considered the main influences on the 
ultimate configurations and operational processes in each space system.  Apollo 
featured a policy determining the budget, while the shuttle featured a budget 
driving the policy.  Apollo’s policy was a destination: the moon.  The shuttle’s 
policy was a concept: cost-efficient spaceflight.  In essence, Apollo was a 
destination looking for a system, while the shuttle was a system looking for a 
destination. 
 
Evaluating Apollo 
 
Thus, the question remains—was Apollo successful?  Taken in terms of 
Kennedy’s original mandate, the answer is a resounding yes.  It safely landed not 
just one, but four humans on the moon by the end of the decade, and returned 
them safely to Earth.  The US space program had surpassed the Soviet program 
at some point during Project Gemini, when it successfully docked two spacecraft, 
but Gemini had been undertaken as an intermediate project to develop the 
197 
 
techniques that Apollo would need to employ in order to land on the moon.  The 
Gemini project’s success, however, was not readily apparent to most non-space 
buffs.  When Apollo 8 orbited the moon, it was clear to the world that the US 
program was ahead of the Soviets’, and Apollo 11 fulfilled Kennedy’s challenge 
by putting Americans on the moon before Soviets; to this day, no one but 
Americans have walked on another celestial body.  Soon after the US moon 
landings, the Soviets quietly abandoned both of their clandestine crewed moon 
programs and turned their focus toward space stations.  
Apollo brought unprecedented goodwill and prestige to the US after the Apollo 11 
success.  Embarking on a world tour as soon as they had left their mandatory 
three-week  quarantine, the Apollo 11 astronauts visited New York, Chicago, and 
Los Angeles, where they were feted by the President, Vice President, 
congressional legislators, most state governors, and ambassadors from 83 
nations.  They then embarked on a 45-day, 25-nation goodwill tour, visited heads 
of state, and were attended by overflowing crowds at all points along the way.  
The lunar landing had been watched by almost the entire planet, except for some 
of the closed societies like the USSR and China, and the people of the world 
have probably never been in closer relationship before or since.  It was hailed as 
an achievement by humankind, not just by Americans.  Dozens of nations issued 
stamps celebrating the landings.   
Apollo accomplished its goals remarkably well.  Technologically, it was 
wondrous.  In addressing the requirements of the program, many technologies 
and sciences were advanced rapidly.  This is especially true with computing.  
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While Gemini featured an on-board computer to calculate orbital parameters, the 
Apollo systems were run entirely by computers.  Due to limitations of computing 
power and memory size, the astronauts were required to load the operational 
programs for each phase of the mission one step at a time.  However, the entire 
flight, from liftoff to lunar landing, from lunar liftoff to splashdown, was computer-
controlled.  The computer on which this was written owes a debt of gratitude to 
the Apollo engineers. 
Considering whether Apollo was successful in a larger sense is more 
problematic.  Apollo was born of the Cold War and of a sense of urgency, if not 
panic, and the decisions made in the course of prosecuting the project may 
therefore be questioned.  By specifying the Apollo challenge as a race against 
time and the Soviets, NASA’s objective became not just getting to the moon, but 
getting there as quickly as possible.  As such, the decisions regarding the 
equipment designed and the procedures developed had both speed of 
attainment and a narrowness of purpose as strategic factors.  All of the decisions 
regarding equipment were made to simply land on the moon, and not to derive a 
more utilitarian system that could be used effectively in a post-Apollo 
environment.  The feat of going to the moon and back required equipment that 
was purpose-built for the specific challenges of that environment:  the Saturn V 
launch vehicle, the Apollo CSM/LM system, and the Lunar Orbit Rendezvous 
(LOR) approach were all designed with landing on the moon as their only goal.  
The systems developed were prohibitively expensive, and were not practical for 
other non-lunar missions, although some of them were adapted as Skylab after 
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the final three Apollo missions had been cancelled—this was more of a 
retrofitting exercise than of designing mission-specific equipment.  Because of 
the monomaniacal nature of the objective, not much thought was given to post-
Apollo usage; engineering decisions were made to facilitate the short-term needs 
of landing on the moon and left NASA without a sustainable infrastructure.  In the 
words of NASA Deputy Administrator Hans Mark, “Apollo was essentially a dead-
end from the technical viewpoint.”236 
The Apollo Applications Project (AAP), out of which Skylab emerged, was an 
attempt to leverage Apollo-era equipment to keep the program alive after the 
moon landings ceased; this involved Skylab missions, and the ASTP, which 
featured a modified Apollo vehicle.  AAP extended the Apollo program for several 
missions, but did not prompt new development.  In fact, after the ASTP mission 
in 1975, America was left without a way to put humans into orbit, including no 
way to travel to Skylab, which deorbited in 1979 before the shuttle could come 
online. 
The method Kennedy used to achieve the lunar landings, the large-scale, war-
level, national mobilization method, was, in the final analysis extremely short 
sighted on the part of America’s leadership.  In solving an immediate political 
problem, an inordinate amount of national treasure and effort was spent.  
Because it was issued as a challenge rather than the coherent long-term policy 
that James Webb had advocated, when Apollo ended, NASA was left with very 
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little political capital.  When the BoB reviewed the Apollo decision years later, it 
seemed to understand this fact, but it framed the evaluation in terms of Apollo 
rather than the space program as a whole; in order to be successful, Apollo 
needed constant, steady support, and “a commitment to a long-term effort and to 
provide the resources it requires.  Starts and stops, changes in goals, or failure to 
provide the required level of budgetary report would impair the success of the 
program.”237  Apollo benefitted from all of these requirements for success, but the 
larger space program, which had been largely ignored during Apollo, did not.  
And when Apollo ended, the US space program became moribund.   
By tying Apollo to national security, Kennedy was able to fend off critics of the 
program, especially those opposed to the high costs.  W.D. Kay writes, 
“[D]efining space policy in a way that makes it essential to ‘national survival’ 
allowed Apollo’s supporters to answer—or, in some cases, ignore—criticisms of 
the program’s high costs, which began in earnest in 1961 and continued for the 
rest of the decade.”238  These criticisms would come from within and outside of 
NASA.  When first discussing the possibilities of beating the Soviets to the moon 
with Kennedy, NASA Administrator Webb balked at pursuing one large program, 
and instead favored a more balanced approach that included other initiatives: 
“President Kennedy considered that landing Americans on the moon was the 
major purpose of NASA’s priorities, while Administrator Webb disagreed, saying 
that the national objective was to become preeminent in space, and he would not 
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take responsibility for a program that was not a balanced one.”239   Vice Admiral 
Hayward also saw the dangers in this approach, stressing, as did Eisenhower 
earlier, a more orderly, structured space program over one large crash program 
that would preclude starting other space projects.  Without this balanced 
approach, NASA “became what James Webb had feared, a one-program 
agency; given the budget constraints of the period, there was no money available 
for major new starts on alternative programs.”240   
Others outside of NASA were critical of the project as well.  Senator William 
Fullbright of Arkansas was a vocal opponent of the focus on the Apollo project as 
early as 1962, saying he was not against “the lunar goal itself, but rather the end-
of-decade timetable, which added considerably to the cost of the program.”241  
Historian Arnold Toynbee pejoratively compared Apollo to the Great Pyramids, 
claiming that it was “rather scandalous, when human beings are going short on 
necessities, to do this,” implying that Apollo was unfairly built on the backs of the 
people.242  By the time of the first moon landing in July of 1969, while worldwide 
interest in the achievement of Apollo 11 was at its peak, public interest in the 
Apollo program itself had waned.  One need only look at the New York Times on 
July 22, 1969 to gauge the mood of the country: of the 34 intellectuals and 
luminaries who gave their opinions on the achievement, half believed that it was 
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not worthwhile, and Saul Alinsky thought it only worthwhile had the entire Nixon 
administration been sent to the moon.   
Historian Michael Beschloss takes a hard look at the Apollo project with hindsight 
and deems it a bad decision:  
As Kennedy concluded, his decision for an accelerated Moon landing was 
ultimately a political decision made in terms of cold war strategy.  How 
does it stand up now that the cold war is over?  Not well.  We now know 
that the reason the Soviet Union gave up in that struggle was that it 
recognized that it could not compete with the Western economies and 
Western societies in those areas of life and death that mattered.  Although 
the Moon program contributed a great deal to the United States, the tens 
of billions of dollars spent in the 1960s on what Kennedy essentially 
thought of as world propaganda could probably have been better devoted 
to US defense or the American domestic economy, and that might have 
convinced the Soviets more quickly of the fruitlessness of the tragic 
conflict with the United States.”243 
Heppenheimer comments on the costs of the program: “Apollo, with a program 
cost estimated at $12.0 billion in mid-1963, ballooned to $21.35 billion by the 
time of the first moon landing in July 1969. That program indeed had fulfilled 
President Kennedy's promise by reaching the moon during the decade of the 
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1960s, but only because it had drowned its problems in money.”244  John 
Logsdon, while conceding that Apollo “turned out to be a dead end undertaking in 
terms of human travel beyond the immediate vicinity of this planet,”245 comes to a 
different conclusion than Beschloss: “Perhaps the technological capabilities 
developed for Apollo were in fact too large and too expensive for subsequent 
regular use, but the principle that the United States should be the leading 
spacefaring nation has served the country well.”246   
While Apollo was a glorious moment in American and human history, and a 
worthwhile endeavor, the decision to prosecute Apollo as an accelerated, quasi-
military effort to the exclusion of other space projects was a mistake that would 
haunt NASA at the end of the Apollo program, and would influence their choice of 
the shuttle design and funding priorities.  Further, the rather arbitrary timeline 
introduced exceptional costs that eroded public support for NASA, a critical error. 
 
Long-Term Effects of Apollo on NASA 
 
Apollo affected NASA in the long term in two important ways: it set a precedent 
for large budgets and larger thinking that was hard to overcome; and it gave 
NASA its greatest moment of glory just a decade after its founding, one that it 
would likely never be able to recreate.  Wernher von Braun commented that “the 
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legacy of Apollo has spoiled the people at NASA.  They believe that we are 
entitled to this kind of a thing forever, which I gravely doubt.  I believe that there 
may be too many people in NASA who at the moment are waiting for a miracle, 
just waiting for another man on a white horse to come and offer us another 
planet, like President Kennedy.”247  That Apollo achieved so much and had been 
such a national priority caused NASA to develop an enlarged sense of 
entitlement.  They reasoned that since it was they who had beaten the Soviets, 
they could set their sights on bigger and better projects.  While in many ways 
Apollo was an end, NASA had the view that Apollo was only the beginning, and 
badly misread the mood of the national leadership and the populace concerning 
the program.  Administrator Paine demonstrated this attitude of entitlement in the 
early discussions of NASA’s post-Apollo future and in his interactions with the 
STG group, and this attitude proved to be counterproductive, if not nearly 
program-ending.   
In lobbying the Nixon administration for a substantially larger budget than Nixon 
had in mind, NASA had not been able to recognize the new reality that, post-
Apollo, they would not be handed a blank check.  “In 1969, proud of having met 
the goal of taking humans to the moon, NASA officials trotted out their long-range 
plan for the exploration of space. . . . The results, for NASA, were disastrous.  
One of the surest ways to kill a long-range plan is to smoke it out before its 
advocates have lined up the necessary support.  President Richard Nixon, to 
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whom the plan was presented, rejected it.”248  As we discussed in the previous 
chapter, the game had changed radically, and Paine was the last person to 
realize it.   
The mechanics of Kennedy’s decision had become the script by which NASA 
wished to operate: the President made a speech, and everyone lined up with 
their support.  The reality in Washington is nearly always the opposite, all the 
more when the President does not have a partisan majority in at least one house 
of Congress.  George H.W. Bush unsuccessfully tried this technique with his 
Space Exploration initiative (SEI), as did his son, George W. Bush, with his ill-
fated Vision for Space Exploration (VSE); SEI’s high price tag doomed it with 
Congress, and VSE died after Bush did not follow up with adequate funding and 
it began to run behind schedule, finally to be cancelled by President Barack 
Obama.  The difference with Apollo is that Kennedy had Congressional support 
lined up through the efforts of Lyndon Johnson and James Webb, and Kennedy 
brought the nation along with him after a series of effective speeches.  In the 
case of the two Bushes, they did not do the legwork that would help to win 
congressional support and failed to get the approval of the public.  The Kennedy 
model was unique and grew out of a certain time in history, and, as we have 
said, it was not to be repeated.  A space program needs presidential support, 
political will, and congressional support in the form of adequate funding.  If one or 
more is missing, the effort is doomed. 
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After Apollo, NASA would have to develop a compelling rationale for any new 
program.  Because the decision would be made by a politician, the rationale had 
to be political in nature.  Kennedy’s decision was political, as was Nixon’s.  With 
the rationale solidly in place, NASA would need to find a champion; if not the 
President, then it had to be someone who had the President’s ear.  The state of 
the economy and of public opinion of the time must also be aligned with NASA’s 
intentions.  To mount an ambitious program like Apollo, the public needs a 
compelling reason to spend the high levels of taxpayer money to justify the 
decision.  And, as Apollo proved, public opinion and congressional support can 
change very quickly.  Space projects are expensive and lengthy, while the 
public’s attention and congressional priorities are short and fickle.  As a result of 
all of these realities, there has not been another decision like the authorization for 
Apollo since then. 
Another long-term effect that Apollo had on NASA was that its greatest 
achievement to date came relatively near the beginning of the agency.  After the 
successes of Mercury and Gemini, followed by the sublime achievements of 
Apollo, all coming in quick succession and creating an upward trajectory, there 
was no way for NASA to top the public spectacle without spending even more 
money—which could not happen during the recession-plagued 1970s.  
Economics and changing public priorities, combined with a lack of political 
support, would combine to shrink NASA’s budget markedly.  Any program 
following Apollo, short of going to Mars, would be seen as a decline.  Bigger and 
bigger spectaculars are needed when relying on the fickle public’s support.  As 
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Kay points out, space histories and stories are written by space enthusiasts, who 
see Apollo as NASA’s apex and everything that followed as a decline—without 
considering that it was Apollo that was the exception, and not the rule.249  
Eisenhower was correct in recommending a space program that grew modestly, 
organically, and sustainably.  After Apollo, the Eisenhower model is what the US 
space program returned to, but not without a difficult, but necessary, change of 
attitude at NASA. 
While Apollo was a short term boon for NASA and the US, it ultimately hurt 
NASA in the long term by setting unrealistic expectations within NASA and with 
the public, expectations that could never be met. 
 
 
Evaluation of Shuttle 
 
There is no question that the space shuttle is an astounding technological 
achievement and a beautiful and elegant spacecraft, a true triumph of 
engineering.  This is especially true when one considers the amount of design 
compromise that was necessary to get the shuttle built at all.  The shuttle that 
flew for thirty years was not the one that NASA had either envisioned or desired.  
It is a minimalist version of what NASA wanted, but it was still wondrous.  One 
need only stand next to an Apollo capsule at the Udvar-Hazy Air & Space 
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Museum, keeping in mind that Apollo was built with a colossal budget, and then 
stand next to the Discovery orbiter, which was developed on a more limited 
budget.  It is nearly inconceivable that something as large and complex as 
Discovery ever made it into space, and did so over 130 times.   
Was the shuttle a success?  As we did with Apollo, we must first evaluate the 
shuttle by comparing it to the terms of the shuttle’s original mandate.  The space 
shuttle was designed to be reusable, economical, utilitarian, and to make access 
to space routine.  To fairly evaluate the shuttle’s success, we must consider each 
of these design goals.  The shuttle was certainly reusable to a degree.  Each 
orbiter was designed to be used over 100 times, or for ten years of planned 
flights, but one orbiter was used for 39 flights, and the others fewer, and they 
were used for 30 years.  Each orbiter required much more maintenance between 
flights than forecast, and the maintenance was more expensive than had been 
planned.  The stresses affecting the shuttle during liftoff and reentry were far 
more severe than had been anticipated.  The external tanks had to be replaced 
with each flight, but the solid boosters were recovered from the ocean and 
reused.  NASA had originally planned a fully reusable shuttle with a fly-back 
piloted first stage, which was estimated to cost $15 billion to develop, but 
dropped this idea when only $5.5 billion was allocated for development. The final 
configuration was mandatory if a shuttle was to be built at all.  So the shuttle 
system was partially reusable. 
The shuttle, largely sold on the basis of being a more economical system than 
the expendable system NASA had used in the 1960s, never achieved the 
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promise of $100 a pound, or even $1,000 a pound, to LEO that was predicted.  In 
fact, it is estimated that the shuttle made access to orbit exponentially more 
expensive than any other launch system.  In addition to the development costs, 
the recurring costs of flights were grossly underestimated—the original $10 
million estimated cost per flight quickly rose to $57 million, and then ballooned to 
$225 million per flight.  By 1992, NASA was estimating the recurring cost per 
flight at a staggering $412 million each, and the program finished at about $450 
million per flight.  Designed to decrease costs drastically, it instead raised them 
even more dramatically, which would soak up much of NASA’s budget for the 
next thirty years. 
The shuttle was designed for utility, and it was fairly utilitarian.  It could carry 
space station modules and laboratories, launch and retrieve satellites, ferry crew 
to and from the ISS, and stay in orbit for up to two weeks.  It was able to launch 
very large payloads, like Key Hole reconnaissance satellites and the Hubble 
Space Telescope, and it was able to service the Hubble several times. It carried 
NASA, DoD, and commercial satellites until the Challenger accident and 
investigation, which determined that the shuttle was more risky than had been 
believed, and that only NASA and DoD satellites should be carried.  As all of the 
US launch service eggs had been placed into the shuttle basket and the ELVs 
had been discontinued, for the several years that the shuttle program was 
grounded, European consortium Arianespace became the prime launch vendor 
for commercial satellites in the world.  The US launch industry was effectively 
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killed off, although it may finally be recovering with the emergence of private 
commercial space vendors like SpaceX and Orbital Sciences.   
The Challenger accident review board found that management pressure to 
maintain an ambitious launch schedule in order to drive costs down by 
economies of scale, as had been promised by NASA in the early 1970s, was a 
contributing factor in the accident.  As a result, the launch schedules were 
relaxed and became much more realistic. 
The shuttle was supposed to make spaceflight routine. This it did not do.  The 
planned 50+ launches per year to achieve cost savings never even reached 
higher than 9, and that was before the Challenger accident in 1986, while 
scheduling pressures were still in play.  The spaceflight “industry” never became 
an industry like the airline industry, which had been NASA’s vision—shuttle 
flights never really made it past the experimental stage.  Pre-Challenger 
accident, NASA had begun to engage in political and publicity stunts, sending 
Senator Jake Garn and Congressman Bill Nelson, both from NASA-heavy 
constituencies, on shuttle flights, but this tactic backfired badly when Teacher-in-
Space Christa McAuliffe was killed in the Challenger accident.  Despite the fact 
that the shuttle flew over 130 times, its flights never became routine. 
When measured against its original objectives, the shuttle fails badly.  On the 
positive side, it kept US crews in space for 30 years.  On the negative side, the 
extremely high costs of operation precluded spending on other NASA priorities, 
such as planetary exploration and the development of a follow-on crewed space 
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system.  The planned Constellation system never received the funding it needed 
to be developed on the required schedule and it was cancelled, leaving the US 
with no immediate follow-on to the shuttle and the US reliant on the Russian 
Space Agency for rides to the ISS.  This situation is likely to change in several 
years, when SpaceX, Boeing, and Sierra Nevada begin private, crewed service 
to the ISS, barring delays or cancellations. 
The Columbia Accident Investigation Board, convened after the loss of the 
Columbia in 2003, summarizes the shortcomings of the larger shuttle program.  It 
was not a failure necessarily of design, although that was part of the issue.  The 
Board found that the issue with the shuttle was a failure of the original concept 
and objectives: 
It is the Boardʼs view that, in retrospect, the increased complexity of a 
Shuttle designed to be all things to all people created inherently greater 
risks than if more realistic technical goals had been set at the start. 
Designing a reusable spacecraft that is also cost-effective is a daunting 
engineering challenge; doing so on a tightly constrained budget is even 
more difficult. Nevertheless, the remarkable system we have today is a 
reflection of the tremendous engineering expertise and dedication of the 
workforce that designed and built the Space Shuttle within the constraints 
it was given. 
In the end, the greatest compromise NASA made was not so much with 
any particular element of the technical design, but rather with the premise 
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of the vehicle itself.  NASA promised it could develop a Shuttle that would 
be launched almost on demand and would fly many missions each year.  
Throughout the history of the program, a gap has persisted between the 
rhetoric NASA has used to market the Space Shuttle and operational 
reality, leading to an enduring image of the Shuttle as capable of safely 
and routinely carrying out missions with little risk.250 
W.D. Kay explains how the shuttle program is representative of NASA in the 
early 1970s, and that the shuttle was “very much a product of its time.  Viewed in 
its larger political and historical context, it is a near-perfect example of a 
technology designed by an agency with no clear mission: the means for 
implementing an undefined policy.”251  This all falls at the feet of Richard Nixon, 
who was responsible for both the policy and the program.  
 
 
Long-Term Effects of the Shuttle 
 
The shuttle program, while keeping NASA in human spaceflight for 30 years, was 
ultimately a net negative for the agency and for spaceflight in general.  One of 
the failures was the budgetary drain on NASA due to the exceedingly high costs 
of operation for the shuttle program, while the overall NASA budget was either 
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flat or being gradually reduced.  As stated above, the cost of the ongoing shuttle 
operations left little for developing its replacement. 
Another failure is one of popular imagination.  The shuttle sought to make 
spaceflight routine, but instead made it mundane.  Launches were not 
considered newsworthy unless there was trouble or drama associated with them, 
such as when John Glenn returned to space as a septuagenarian.  In a 
consumer society, new products and newness keep the interest of the buying 
public--this is true of the US space program as well.  The early space program 
was the model of cutting-edge innovation, and new boosters and spacecraft were 
introduced every few years.  This all came to a halt with the shuttle program, 
where the same 1970s technology became the face of NASA for 30 years.  
Shuttle technology eventually became stale and hard to sell to a bored public, 
which had gravitated to reality television, celebrity news, and professional sports.   
It wasn’t just the public’s interest in NASA that suffered.  Scientific achievement 
also suffered as a result the shuttle program. “[After the Challenger accident,] Big 
Science lost its luster.  Congress cancelled the Superconducting Super Collider 
and nearly abolished the International Space Station (ISS).  NASA’s continuing 
travails with the remaining space shuttles clearly revealed that the transport 
vehicle had failed to meet its original cost, schedule, and reliability goals.”252  
Children no longer dreamed of being astronauts, engineers, or scientists.  They 
were no longer inspired by NASA, which had become uninspiring. 
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After the second space shuttle accident and national tragedy in less than twenty 
years, even NASA began to understand.  In 2005, NASA administrator Mike 
Griffin told the USA Today editorial board that the decision to build the space 
shuttle “was not the right path," and that "[w]e are now trying to change the path 
while doing as little damage as we can."  He also testified to Congress that the 
shuttle was “inherently flawed.”253  Griffin admitted NASA’s failures, and then 
placed NASA on the pathway to the future.  His advocacy of leveraging the 
forces of private commercialization in some space activities just may be the way 
to a better NASA, as we will see below. 
 
 
Lessons Learned 
 
The main lesson we can take away from this study is the vital need for all of the 
following to achieve a successful government space program: consistent political 
will across administrations; a high level of funding over the lifespan of the project; 
and a compellingly articulated rationale for the space program.  All of these 
requirements were understood by perhaps the best NASA administrator, James 
Webb, who articulated them to Lyndon Johnson during the Apollo debate: 
“There’s got to be political support over a long period of time, like ten years, and 
you [Johnson] and the President have to recognize that we can’t do this type of 
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thing without that continuing support.”254   As we have seen, other factors can 
come into play, such as changes in the economy, the nature of science and 
engineering development, and international affairs.  These factors all had lasting 
effects on Apollo, the shuttle, and on NASA itself.  Unforeseen events like 
accidents can influence a space program—with the Apollo 1, Challenger, and 
Columbia accidents, NASA was grounded and had to retrench for approximately 
two years each time.  Unfortunately, these accidents are part of the learning 
process and eventually contribute to future safety.  But they can also influence 
public support for the space program.  In the cases of the Apollo 1 and 
Challenger accidents, public support for the space program grew.  But after the 
Columbia accident, NASA began to plan for a post-shuttle future. 
A program cannot be formulated as a reaction to circumstances, because when 
the circumstances change, the rationale for the expenditures is lost; this 
happened to Apollo.  The exception to this rule would be a program to address a 
threat to humanity, such as a potential NEO strike, which would almost certainly 
guarantee public support of an Apollo-type program.  Another type of 
circumstance that might prompt such a reaction from the public would be a 
paradigm-shifting event, such as the discovery of extraterrestrial life or, more 
dramatically, contact with intelligent extraterrestrial life.  Short of this type of 
event, it is hard to imagine the public advocating a large-scale space endeavor 
like a trip to Mars, unless the spending is spread out incrementally over a period 
of time and involves international cooperation and shared funding.  An incident 
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that might spark another space race would be a Chinese moon landing—the US 
sees the Chinese as the new competition rather than the former Soviet Union, so 
an event like a moon landing has a chance to spark a new space race.  But a 
new race in response to Chinese technological achievement is rendered less 
likely by the fact that the Chinese are not currently a military threat as much as 
an economic threat to the US. 
What the shuttle decision teaches us is that it is folly to build a space system 
either as a compromise or on the cheap.  If we are to place men and women in 
space vehicles, it should not be in a vehicle that is “good enough,” but rather, the 
vehicle should be the best that can be designed and produced.  Space travel is 
difficult and dangerous, and will remain so into the future; and even if space 
travel becomes much less costly, it will still be dangerous because of the 
unforgivingly hostile environment of space.  If a system fails, the crew will die.  
The forces of nature will not change as our space systems become more 
economical.   
We should heed the advice of Dwight Eisenhower and maintain a steady, organic 
space program.  The pace should be natural and should be such that it could 
remain funded through the vagaries of economic cycles and changing political 
climates.  We cannot race, nor can we stagnate.  Eisenhower and Webb were 
right—we need a space program that is balanced and affordable. 
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The Way Forward 
 
When the 30-year old US Space Shuttle program ended in 2011, America was 
again left without the means to ferry crews to LEO.  A similar situation has 
happened three times since NASA started sending humans into space: from 
1963 to 1965, during the period between Projects Mercury and Gemini; from 
1966 to 1968 during the period between Projects Gemini and Apollo (extended 
by the Apollo 1 tragedy and its aftermath); and from 1975 to 1981, during the 
period after the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project and before the inaugural flight of 
Columbia.  In each case, NASA was developing the next-generation spacecraft 
during the interim, and it was assured that the American human spaceflight 
program would again proceed after the temporary disruptions.  However, after 
the last flight of Atlantis took place, the future of America's crewed space 
program became less than certain.   
History tells us that the failure of strong presidential leadership on the issue of 
human spaceflight will likely result in confusion and false starts.  Several 
presidents have attempted to jump-start post-Apollo NASA by introducing space 
policies and making nationally-televised policy speeches, but without sufficient 
funding and follow up support, the attempts were destined for failure.  Realistic 
deadlines must be set and met, and sufficient funding must be provided by a 
supportive Congress.   
President Bush's Vision for Space Exploration (VSE), first proposed in early 
2004, promised trips back to the Moon and on to Mars and featured as its 
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centerpiece the Constellation Program.  But this program has fallen victim to poor 
planning and inaccurate cost estimating, a lack of political will and support, and 
flat budgets; the funding that had been allocated was largely consumed by the 
prohibitively expensive STS program.  The Constellation Program, composed of 
the Ares launchers, the Orion crew capsule, and the Altair lunar lander, and 
originally expected to begin service to the ISS early in this decade, has been 
cancelled by the Obama administration following the recommendations of the 
Augustine Commission.  Although its decisions were non-binding, the Augustine 
Report stated that Constellation Program was negatively impacted by inadequate 
funding, massive cost overruns, schedule delays (the report estimated that 
Constellation could not be ready before 2017), and seemingly intractable design 
and technical issues.   
Without a new vehicle in the works but with an immediate need for crew and 
cargo service to the ISS, America has turned to the international community for 
assistance.  NASA contracted with the Russian Federal Space Agency 
(Roscosmos) to provide crew transport services to the ISS on the venerable 
Soyuz, and is working with Roscosmos, the European Space Agency (ESA), and 
Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) on automated cargo flights for 
resupply services to the ISS.  NASA has studied the possibility of human-rating 
the Enhanced Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELV) such as the Delta IV Heavy 
and Atlas 5.  These changes underline the obvious point that NASA needed to 
move in a new direction if it was to maintain its leadership in human space flight.  
219 
 
During the past decade NASA has done just that by positioning itself to support, 
leverage, and eventually rely on, private companies for access to LEO. 
The VSE program called for the end of the shuttle flights by 2010, exacerbating 
the need for supply missions to the ISS.   When NASA administrator Mike Griffin 
admitted that the shuttle was a mistake, he sought to provide a more economical 
solution.  Rather than looking to cut corners or to compromise, he decided that 
an entirely new approach was necessary: to change the way NASA deals with 
contractors and to rely more on market forces to contain development and 
operational costs. Griffin determined that the cargo resupply capabilities of 
Roscosmos, ESA, and JAXA would be insufficient to keep the station adequately 
provisioned, and that there would be a gap of at least four years between the end 
of shuttle service and the start of Constellation service; Griffin and NASA 
therefore turned to private industry to develop commercial solutions to bridge this 
gap.  In 2005, Griffin created the Commercial Crew and Cargo Program (C3PO) 
to fulfill three objectives: implement US Space Exploration policy with 
investments to stimulate the commercial space industry; facilitate US private 
industry cargo and crew space transportation capabilities with the goal of 
achieving reliable, cost-effective access to LEO; and create a market 
environment in which commercial space transportation services are available to 
government and private sector customers. 
The C3PO has developed several novel programs that work with commercial 
companies in a partner capacity (rather than in the traditional NASA-style 
government/contractor relationship).  These programs include the Commercial 
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Orbital Transportation Services (COTS), the Commercial Crew Development 
(CCDev) and the Commercial Resupply Service (CRS) programs, which are 
transforming the way NASA does business.  These programs, which partner with 
private space ventures to provide cargo service to the ISS and will someday 
soon carry US crews to the ISS, are not based on the traditional “cost plus” 
financial model as old as the Space Age itself.  Instead, these programs bring 
market forces to bear on the space industry by using Space Act Agreements 
under the "other transactions" authority in the National Aeronautics and Space 
Act when contracting with vendors.  These agreements are milestone-driven, 
performance-based contracts that only release funds to the contracts when pre-
defined milestones are successfully met.  In a revolutionary new twist, at certain 
points in the timetable the companies under contract, such as SpaceX and 
Orbital Science in the case of the COTS program, are required to provide some 
of their own investment funds to match NASA’s. This structure requires the 
companies under contract to remain viable and, therefore, attractive to private 
and institutional investors, from whom they raise the equity they need to bring to 
the table with NASA.  In this way, NASA, now itself an investor in space 
technology, is able to ensure that the companies under contract are sound, 
viable, and are being run in such a way as to appear to be a good business risk, 
regardless of the potential value of their technology. 
Recent history has seen NASA wrestle with an identity crisis.  Should NASA be a 
development or a mission agency?  Should it continue to operate in the 
traditional cost plus/prime contactor aerospace mode, or should it become 
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leaner, leveraging the forces of privatization to bring the costs of travelling into 
space down and increase reliability?  The accident review conducted after the 
2003 Columbia accident recommended that the shuttle program be terminated by 
2010, but the supporting Constellation program that was championed by the VSE 
program became a multi-billion dollar boondoggle that was over-budget, late, and 
underperforming.  The only certainty at NASA was that funding would remain flat 
at best, and most likely be reduced in the face of a prolonged and deep 
economic recession, with the US seeming to teeter on the verge of bankruptcy.   
In May of 2009, the Obama administration’s Office of Science and Technology 
Policy announced that a review of NASA’s Human Space Flight (HSF) plans 
would be undertaken by the newly formed Review of United States Human 
Space Flight Plans Committee.  The Augustine Committee, as it has come to be 
known, was composed of 10 space experts, astronauts, professors, and 
aerospace executives, and headed by Norman Augustine, former CEO of 
Lockheed Martin.  The Committee’s findings were intended to inform and shape 
the Obama administration’s space policy in the post-Shuttle era.  In a widely 
covered media event, the Committee’s 157-page final report was released on 
October 22, 2009.  Public reception of the report was mixed.  The House Science 
and Technology Committee excoriated it.255  Many NASA-philes lamented the 
recommended death of the Constellation program.  Some thought the panel was 
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misguided, focusing on means rather than ends.256  The Committee fulfilled its 
charge to take a hard look at the current NASA human spaceflight trajectory, 
reconcile it with budgetary and timeline realities, and provide options for moving 
forward with human spaceflight.  On the whole, this Presidential Review 
deserves a lot of credence because its findings are based on sound science and 
a clear-eyed look at the realities.   
The Augustine Commission Report discussed two options for transporting crews 
into LEO: government-operated systems and private, commercial systems.  Due 
to budget and scheduling conflicts, Ares I would not have been ready to support 
the ISS when the shuttle was retired, as had been planned.  The Report 
recommended that the capability to launch humans into LEO be provided by 
private industry, as Mike Griffin had suggested and NASA had been pursuing; 
the return from the complex and reusable shuttle back to simpler and smaller 
capsules is seen as an opportunity to turn this capability over to the US private 
sector.  Although this approach does have risks, it could reduce the operating 
costs due to the introduction of market forces.  It would also accelerate the 
timeline for providing a US-based system of putting humans into LEO and 
servicing the ISS.  Such a system could be achieved through government-
awarded, guaranteed contracts to private firms, thereby stimulating the 
commercial space industry, driving up the number of commercial launches, and 
driving down operating costs for NASA and others in need of launch services.   
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By outsourcing the launch services to a third party, NASA could focus on its core 
competencies, such as research and development, designing and operating 
exploration systems (especially beyond LEO), and program management.  The 
Committee went on to say, in the strongest possible language, that it was time for 
NASA to resume its “crucial role in developing new technologies for space.”  The 
available alternatives for space exploration are limited due to NASA’s lack of 
strategic investment in space technology development over the past thirty years.  
They further stated that it is crucial for NASA to develop a technology path that 
would serve their future goals of exploration.  With appropriate funding, the 
Committee felt this new focus could serve to reenergize the thinking at 
universities, in industry, and within NASA itself, and should be done with the dual 
goals of developing new capabilities and reducing development and operating 
costs.   
Current NASA structure is ideal for Cold War-era Apollo-style projects,257 but is 
insufficient for current needs, and the Augustine Commission Report made 
recommendations for improving the structure and operational aspects of NASA to 
better suit it for its future mission of exploration.  For example, they recommend 
that the NASA administrator have the proper authority to effectively manage the 
organization’s resources, including funds, personnel, and facilities.  Additional 
funding should be provided to cover unanticipated overages or delays.  Funds 
should be transferable from one project to another when needed.  Requests for 
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additional funding should be addressed more quickly than the current two years.  
The Augustine report makes it clear that the NASA organization must become 
flexible, responsive, and resilient if it is to move forward successfully, and that to 
facilitate this success, government support for NASA should be steady, constant, 
and reliable. 
Whether the cancellation of Constellation for a privatized LEO capability is the 
appropriate strategy remains to be seen.  What is clear, however, is that 
Constellation was underfunded and behind schedule, and the clock on the shuttle 
and ISS programs was ticking.  The actions and funding allocations necessary to 
deliver Orion and Ares I by 2012 needed to have been made years ago, but were 
neglected; that failure constitutes the political reality that the Augustine 
Committee confronted when it examined NASA’s plans for human spaceflight.  
The Committee fulfilled its charter and made the difficult, unpopular, but 
necessary choices in determining the best way for NASA move safely and surely 
into the future.  
The Augustine recommendations were not binding, but the Obama administration 
adopted many of the suggestions in its new Space Policy in 2010.  The Space 
Policy is also non-binding, as Congress determines the direction of the US space 
program.  However, the recommendations for leveraging private space 
companies to deliver crew and cargo to LEO rather than relying on the 
Constellation program or on international vendors continues the trajectory started 
by Mike Griffin towards the privatization of launch services that NASA can 
purchase rather than develop.   
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It is certain that Congress cannot easily decide what to do with NASA.  For every 
advocate who believes in privatizing cargo and crew missions into LEO, another 
Representative or Senator continues to fight for "big space," the traditional 
method of space procurement, if only to protect their constituencies, many of 
whom relied on the shuttle and Constellation programs for employment.  To 
replace the lost Constellation program, Congress has authorized the Space 
Launch System (a heavy lift system that may or may not ever be built), or SLS, 
and a modified Orion capsule, which will be used for future NASA missions 
beyond LEO. 
How the current situation will play out is still unknown.  NASA is changing how 
they do business in an attempt to do more with smaller budgets.  But the nature 
of the privatized commercial launch business is such that one accident or 
dramatic failure, especially one involving loss of life, can kill a company or even 
arrest the broader move toward privatized spaceflight.  Putting crew and cargo 
into orbit is an extraordinarily difficult and dangerous task fraught with roadblocks 
and fickle politicians, and is always dogged by the ever-present and immutable 
laws of physics.   
If companies like SpaceX are successful in their efforts, maintain their 
relationships with NASA, remain profitable, and, most importantly, deliver on their 
contractual obligations, they are positioned to become the means by which 
American astronauts travel into LEO for years to come.  If SpaceX's Falcon 
Heavy is successful and lives up to its early marketing claims of delivering 53 
tons into LEO for about $100 million dollars a flight, it will almost certainly change 
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the dynamics of a world launch market that is presently dominated by the ESA 
and Russia, and may just recapture the US share of world launches that was lost 
after the Challenger accident.  Another factor that hinders the US share of the 
launch market besides cost is the restrictive International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations (ITAR) regime, which deserves revisiting and perhaps an overhaul. 
The success of private launch services, of course, is merely speculative at this 
point.  The spaceflight community has long been fueled by unrealistic 
expectations and fantasies.  Oftentimes, it is difficult to separate fact from fond 
wish.  However, if at all possible, SpaceX has shown positive signs that it can 
work with NASA in a partnership to develop an American launch system that may 
eventually drive down costs and safely deliver crews to the ISS, and could even 
usher in the next phase of spaceflight: private space access.  SpaceX recently 
successfully delivered cargo to the ISS and is now contracted to do so moving 
forward, as is Orbital Sciences.  SpaceX's success to date has been based in 
reality, not on PowerPoint presentations and puffery.   
The way forward should involve private spaceflight services for crew and cargo to 
LEO.  Prices for these services can be negotiated, and the necessary funds set 
aside by Congress and NASA for each scheduled flight.  NASA should be 
involved in space research and beyond-LEO space missions.  The projects that 
they undertake should be well-defined, and money should be put away 
incrementally in advance of the missions, so that the funds can draw interest and 
be available when needed, in an effort to mitigate the effects of cyclical budgets.  
The mission planning and fund sequestering activities must transcend 
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presidential terms and need to become national projects not subject to the whims 
of changing administrations.  This would require a change made to the NASA 
Authorization Act that would take the budget and planning process out of the 
hands of politicians once the decisions have been made.  NASA should continue 
its public outreach efforts—NASA should emphasize, however, how small the 
NASA budget really is to counter the public perception that it is huge.  NASA TV 
should be reconceived and financially supported to make it accessible and 
appealing to the general public.  The public will continue to determine whether 
NASA is treated as a priority or deemed a waste of taxpayer money, so public 
outreach should be seen as a vital effort of the agency. 
There are no easy answers here, but it appears that NASA is finally on the right 
track with its recognition that the premise, and not so much the design, of the 
shuttle was to blame for its failures.  The fact that human spaceflight is very 
expensive is due to the fact that getting into space is very difficult.  The forces of 
nature and the physical principles will not change, so costs should be brought 
down through the application of market forces and not through design-impacting 
cost-saving measures.  The deployment of market forces should not be done, 
however, by the government itself, as was discovered through the shuttle 
experience, but rather, through contracting with private companies in a manner 
that emphasizes efficiency and economies of scale.  The impulse for economical 
space travel was correct, but the economy should come in the manufacturing and 
operations efficiencies, not in cutting corners on the design or in creating a one-
size-fits-all system.   
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The US should have a separate system, built by private industry, to ferry crews 
into LEO, which is a largely known quantity at this point.  A second system 
should be used for the more exploratory purposes, like the SLS/Orion system.  
Large scale projects should be avoided, or if they are necessary, should be 
planned well in advance so the costs could be amortized over time to minimize 
the effects of political fickleness and changing budgets.  Funding a future Mars 
mission would be a great start—the funds could begin to be allocated for the 
journey twenty or thirty years in advance, perhaps even through selling bonds or 
crowdsourcing, and a portion should be allocated for the mission, in addition to 
the R & D funds.  Compound interest could be a powerful way to increase future 
NASA budgets.   
NASA itself also needs a good reorganization and culture change.  The 
employees are likely the right ones, but bureaucratic inertia and territoriality 
constitute a real drag on the management side.  The organization should become 
leaner and more aggressive, and it must move out of the bureaucratic mode.  If a 
few changes could be made, it could do more with less, as American business 
has had to do over the last two decades.  The money saved from overhead and 
bureaucracy could be spent on research or banked for the future. 
NASA’s future is bright, and I believe that it is finally on the correct path.  Mike 
Griffin’s changes are starting to bear fruit, and the Augustine Commission has 
made some excellent recommendations that should be followed.  NASA was able 
to capture the imagination of a large portion of the public with the excellent 
outreach efforts it made surrounding the Mars Science Laboratory landing 
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several months ago—the agency is beginning to understand the nature of the 
new online culture and to deploy social media to garner support.  I am very 
optimistic that NASA’s best days are still ahead.  I hope someday to read of a 
person who, as a 10-year old, was inspired by what NASA was doing in 2012 
and stands on the surface of Mars.   
Both Kennedy and Nixon were right—space is a frontier to be conquered, and 
America does need heroes.  NASA is an organization that, with the help of 
American industry and ingenuity, can enable those heroes to conquer that 
frontier far into the future.   While the mythology of Apollo makes for good 
marketing, NASA cannot count on that type of support and must remain clear-
eyed and tenacious moving into the future.  NASA’s charge moving forward 
should be, borrowing a quote from Alfred, Lord Tennyson: to strive, to seek, to 
find, and not to yield. 
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